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The results of continuing global research, including this study, have found that employee fraud 
is ubiquitous. An analysis of the crime statistics relating to fraud in South Africa reflects a 
similar picture. This study delved into employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal by 
evaluating the nature and causes of this phenomenon as well as the preventative measures that 
are, or should be, implemented to obviate the risk of fraud at universities. The study of fraud 
and corruption at universities in KwaZulu-Natal represents a microcosm of such crimes at 
national and international universities.  
 
The objectives of this study were to gain knowledge and understanding of the causes and 
nature of employee fraud and to establish other measures that could prevent fraud as well as to 
propose a conceptual model and recommendations which universities could use to prevent 
fraud. In order to achieve these objectives, the study included an extensive review of recent 
and relevant literature, an empirical survey, review of case files and interviews with 
knowledgeable individuals in the field of fraud risk management. In addition, the study 
provides an overview of historical and philosophical origins of the theoretical concepts and 
frameworks and models relating to employee fraud, fraud risk management, internal controls 
and governance of fraud risks.  Results indicate that employee fraud is considered a risk to the 
sustainability of higher education, vis-à-vis the provision of tertiary education to the 
community.  
 
A conceptual model is proposed to address employee fraud at universities. The conceptual 
input/output transformational systems model adapted from Easton (A systems analysis of 
political life (1979)) was utilised as a sophisticated addition to the set of recommendations 
provided in the last chapter. Despite its particular shortcomings, this model would be useful as 
a concept clarifier to those entrusted with designing and implementing policy at universities 
destined to elevate the fraud prevention process. The conceptual model advocates a holistic 
approach to prevent fraud. In responding to stakeholder demands to combat fraud, universities 
should implement specific policies that would transform any such dysfunctionalities within its 




Supplementary to the adapted input/output transformational systems model for prevention of 
fraud and corruption at universities in KwaZulu-Natal, a set of recommendations is proposed 
that is intended to provide policy-makers with information about the inputs from the 
environments that impact the achievement of goals and that proposes a conversion mechanism 
which could support achieving, maintaining and enhancing of predetermined goals. The 
prevention of employee fraud would be beneficial to all stakeholders, such as the community, 
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
It is evident from the crime statistics which were released by the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) on their website (SAPS, 2013), that commercial crimes have increased 
significantly and progressively over the past decade. The SAPS refer to commercial crime as 
a catch-all term for fraud and corruption. These statistics do not differentiate who the 
perpetrators of commercial crime are, for example, whether they are employees of the victim 
organisation or external third parties. Within the Republic of South Africa, commercial 
crimes have escalated from 55 869 incidents during 2003 to 91 569 incidents during 2013 
(SAPS, 2013), which equates to an increase of 63.9% in commercial crimes in South Africa. 
 
According to a global survey by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 
(2012:4) in the report to nations about occupational fraud, most organisations lose 
approximately 5% of revenue to fraud every year, equating to an annual global loss to fraud 
in excess of $3.5 trillion (R42 trillion). Employee fraud thus has significant impact on 
organisations throughout the world.  
 
A global forensic auditing firm, KPMG (2011:21), conducted an analysis of global fraud 
patterns where it was found that internal control weaknesses were an increasing contributor to 
the commission of fraud. KPMG (2011:10) concluded that economic factors play a role 
which leads companies to reduce their costs, resulting in a smaller number of people left to 
monitor the internal controls. This situation affords fraudsters the opportunity to commit 
fraud, a view supported by Sivnarain (2010:49). KPMG (2011:10) asserts that companies 
need to carefully consider cost reduction measures in conjunction with adequate fraud risk 
management. 
 
Peltier-Rivest (2014:37) suggests that universities are often defrauded as the internal control 
environment is based on openness, collegiality and academic freedom, with resistance from 
staff to being controlled, leading to incompatible duties not being segregated and a lack of 
monitoring. Fraud at universities have been reported on in newspaper articles; copies of some 
are attached as Appendices 8, 9 and 10 to this thesis.  
 
 2 
The intention of this research was, inter alia, to conceptualise the concept “fraud”, how and 
why it is committed, what internal controls are currently in place, and what other factors have 
led to the commission of fraud within the context of South Africa in general and KwaZulu-
Natal universities in particular. It intends further to propose and recommend methods and 
procedures to monitor and/or prevent its occurrence in the workplace. Certain international 
trends can be universally applied to the South African situation.  
 
Understanding the causes that lead to fraud being committed and subsequently concealed by 
employees, is valuable in attempting to prevent fraud from being committed in the future. 
Cressey (1973:30), a criminologist, created a hypotheses that three factors contribute to the 
commission of fraud. Firstly, there is personal pressure on a person. Secondly, there is a 
violation of a position of trust by that person. Thirdly, the person justifies their conduct.  
 
The research intended to establish the causes of employee fraud and how universities that are 
victims of employee fraud could provide valuable information that would be useful in 
developing and implementing effective strategies to prevent fraud. According to Ratcliffe 
(2005:439), the interpretation and influence of crime information both occupy a key role in 
the prevention of fraud. Information gathered from the victims about the commission, 
concealment and detection of the fraud is pivotal in assisting employers to design or enhance 
fraud resistant internal controls to prevent fraud in the workplace. The prevention of the crime 
of fraud is supported by Zinn (2007:111), who asserts that crime information can be used as a 
proactive measure in the prevention thereof. 
 
Investigating fraud is a reactive process whereby the employer has incurred a loss of funds, 
and faces further costs of the forensic investigation, legal and other fees for disciplinary 
enquiries and civil litigation. According to Laufer (2011:402), an organisation may be further 
prejudiced due to legal and investigation costs. It would be cost-effective to prevent 
employees from committing fraud, than to investigate fraud after it has taken place. The cost 
of forensic investigations is exorbitant, and has resulted in the emergence of flourishing 
companies providing forensic investigation services throughout South Africa to cater for the 
need in this niche market. 
 
The King Code of Governance for South Africa (2009:44-46), which is commonly referred to 
as King III, asserts that the Internal Audit department within an organisation has to assess 
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how adequate and effective the systems of internal control and risk management are and 
present a report in this regard to the governing body/Board. The objective is for the Internal 
Audit department to provide independent assurance to the Board that the system of internal 
controls is adequate and working as intended, to prevent fraud. 
 
According to Rae and Subramaniam (2008:106), internal control, as a management tool, has 
gained prominence in the recent past as a critical element to ensure sound corporate 
governance in preventing and detecting fraud. They argue that further studies should be 
undertaken in order to understand the internal control environment better and to design robust 
internal control strategies to detect and prevent fraud. 
 
Albrecht (1996:26) asserts that the absence or over-riding of internal controls creates an 
opportunity for all employees to commit fraud. Albrecht (1996:26) found that the usual 
symptoms of fraud are deficient internal controls, poor segregation of duties, non-existent 
independent verification, non-existent physical safeguard, deficient authorisations by those in 
charge, deficient documentation, controls that are over-ridden and a poor system of 
accounting. 
 
According to Sivnarain (2010:67), deficiencies in the internal control environment should be 
identified and addressed in order to prevent fraud. Buckhoff (2002:64) concurs that the most 
appropriate way to reduce or eradicate opportunities for the perpetration of fraud is to design 
and implement robust systems of internal controls, because fraud is perpetrated when there 
are opportunities to do so. Robust internal controls, as espoused in King III (2009:14), are 
essential for sound governance and ultimate success of any organisation.  
 
Although Hillison et al. (1999:354) concur that opportunities to commit fraud arise when 
internal controls are poor or non-existent, they found that opportunities are also created when 
an employee is highly trusted. This study focuses on the causes of employee fraud and the 
prevention strategies employed by universities in KwaZulu-Natal, in advancement of good 
governance. It is envisaged that the evidence from the study will assist university management 
in identifying key internal controls that need to be implemented or enhanced in order to make 




A preliminary search was carried out on the NRF Lexus database of completed research 
projects in South Africa, which indicated that no research was conducted on the exact topic 
"Employee Fraud and Prevention Strategies at Universities in KwaZulu-Natal". 
 
The ACFE (2012) highlighted in its Report to the Nations the global trends in respect of 
fraud. However, the report did not provide any specific solutions to prevent fraud from 
occurring. Further literature, such as a thesis on convicted house robbers as a source of crime 
information by Zinn (2007:4), focused on convicted criminals involved in house robberies 
only. It did not deal with fraud and governance. In an unpublished dissertation on the 
profiling of fraudsters, Sivnarain (2010:3) focused on how fraud offenders should be profiled 
for purposes of investigations into fraud. The study did not focus on the causes of fraud nor 
the prevention thereof. 
 
King III (2009:44), which was released by the Institute of Directors, highlights the need to 
ensure that internal controls are adequate and effective in preventing fraud, but does not 
specify what the internal controls should be. KPMG (2011:21) conducted an analysis of 
global patterns of fraud. This report focused on reporting global fraud trends, but did not 
provide specific solutions on making the internal control environment robust enough to be 
fraud resistant.  
 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) (2011:18) conducted a global economic crime survey 
which focused on fraud trends and the detection of fraud. However, the report did not deal 
with the prevention of fraud or the designing or enhancement of the internal control 
environment to make it fraud resistant. 
 
Although various literature has been written and research undertaken on fraud and fraud 
prevention, this does not appear to have stemmed the tide of escalating employee fraud. The 
above preliminary literature review reflected that further research in this particular proposed 
area was required and would be valuable. This research focused, inter alia, on evaluating the 
knowledge of staff and experts about what the nature of fraud is, what causes it, how 
extensive it is and what impact it has on universities in KwaZulu-Natal. It also evaluated 





1.2 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
1.2.1 Fraud 
According to Snyman (1987:456), fraud is “the unlawful and intentional making of a 
misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to 
another”. 
  
1.2.2 Employee  
According to Wells (2013:2), an employee is an individual who receives regular compensation 
for providing his or her labour, and includes executive, senior and middle managers as well as 
contracted and other employees. 
 
1.2.3 Employee Fraud 
The ACFE (2012:6) define employee fraud as a person who uses his or her occupation to 
enrich themselves by misusing their employer’s resources. 
 
1.2.4 Fraud Prevention  
Fraud prevention is a defined programme comprising of proactive measures aimed at 
preventing fraud or mitigating it (Adams et al., 2006:56).       
 
1.2.5 Internal Control   
The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission COSO (2013:2) 
defines internal controls as a method that is implemented by directors of a board, management, 
and other staff, with the purpose of providing reasonable assurance that the defined objectives 
will be achieved relating to operations, reporting, and compliance.  
 
1.2.6 Corporate Governance  
A generally accepted definition of corporate governance by the Cadbury Committee (1992:15) 





1.3 FORMULATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM  
The perpetration of employee fraud appears to be pervasive despite the existence of internal 
controls which are intended to prevent fraud from taking place. Employees who commit fraud 
contribute to 56% of the loss incurred by organisations, according to PwC (2011:18).  
 
According to the ACFE (2012:5), approximately 50 percent of the organisations who were 
victims of fraud during 2010 to 2011, were not able to recover any of the losses from the 
fraudster. The statistics on the South African Police Service (SAPS) website (SAPS 2013) 
reflect that fraud, which is categorised as a commercial crime, had increased by 63.9% in 
South Africa between 2003 and 2013. With the escalation of the number of incidents of 
commercial crime, the cost of the loss to the victim organisations can also be expected to 
escalate. In support of this statement, the ACFE (2012:14) in its Report to the Nations, noted 
that organisations lose approximately 5% of their income every year to fraud.  
 
Losses due to employee fraud need to be prevented, as the cost of the loss is not limited to the 
amount that has been defrauded. The loss does not include the cost to have the matter 
investigated, disciplinary action, dismissal arbitration, civil litigation and criminal 
prosecution. This study proposes recommendations that focus on the proactive prevention of 
fraud. It provides an understanding about what causes fraud and what counter measures 
should be implemented to prevent fraud from occurring. The recommendations emanating 
from this study are intended to arrest escalation of fraud at universities that may intensify if 
the trends recorded in various surveys are continuing. These resultant losses may place an 
undue burden on the government and taxpayers, who have to provide further funding to 
universities by means of increased taxes. 
 
The South African National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) (2012:57) suggests that 
procurement policies in the public sector are ineffective and susceptible to fraud due to the 
manner in which compliance with the policy is tested. The crime of corruption, which is 
intrinsically linked to fraud, appears to be pervasive to the extent that this offence is 
specifically addressed in the NDP. The NDP (2012:445) proposes enhanced public awareness 
of these crimes as one of the means of prevention. It (2012:450) advocates whistle blowing as 




1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions driving this research were posed as set out below: 
 What are the causes of employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal? 
 What is the current nature and extent of fraud committed by employees at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal? 
 What fraud-prevention measures are currently in place to manage fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal? 
 What fraud prevention measures and procedures could be recommended to 
universities for implementation on various levels? 
 
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of the study were: 
 To establish the main causes of employee fraud as found in the literature. 
 To conduct an empirical survey to determine the extent of fraud and factors 
relevant thereto in the practical arena, with the resultant statistical analysis and 
recommendations to deal with the dysfunctional situation as set out in the problem 
statement.  
 To establish what additional measures are put in place to prevent fraud as found in 
the literature. 
 To propose a theoretical model and set of recommendations for fraud prevention at 
universities in general and in KwaZulu-Natal in particular. 
 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
Fraud affects every facet of the economy and the community. The number of incidents of fraud 
is increasing, coupled with the value of losses to the economy. The damage to the reputation 
and image of an organisation which becomes victim to fraud, is immeasurable. This research 
provides an improvement aimed at minimising, if not preventing, and detecting fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal. Management at these universities would benefit from the 
outcomes of this research which provides practical recommendations that would assist them to 





1.7 RESEARCH DEMARCATION 
Research should be manageable. To ensure this, it should be done in a demarcated area based 
on considerations of sample size, available time as well as economic reasons. Geographical 
demarcation ensures that research can be carried out economically. Mouton (2001:40) suggests 
that a demarcated study ensures that the research is done soundly as opposed to a wide study 
which may not be completed on time. 
 
According to the Higher Education South Africa (2014) website, South Africa has twenty-five 
public universities, which are located in various provinces within the country. Due to economic 
and logistical considerations, this study was limited to the four universities which are located 
in different parts of the province of KwaZulu-Natal. A search on the websites of each of the 
four universities indicated that they all had different organisational structures. Regardless or 
perhaps more so because of their differences, much could be gained from this study to prevent 
fraud. Similarly, although this study was conducted in KwaZulu-Natal, it is envisaged that the 
findings and recommendations would be applicable to public universities in South Africa and 
elsewhere. This demarcation of the study area is regarded as a microcosm of the South African 
population of universities that can be universally applicable within the broader higher 
education environment in this country and elsewhere.  
 
There are four universities in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. They are the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, University of Zululand, Mangosuthu University of Technology and Durban 
University of Technology. The province of KwaZulu-Natal has three different types of public 
universities. These three types of universities are also found in the rest of South Africa. Firstly, 
there are the traditional universities that offer Bachelor degrees and have sound research 
capacity. Secondly, there are universities of technology that offer vocationally oriented higher 
certificates, diplomas and degrees in technology and have some postgraduate and research 
capacity. Lastly, there are comprehensive universities that offer both Bachelor and technology 
qualifications focusing on teaching and conducting research and postgraduate study. The 
University of KwaZulu-Natal is a traditional university, whereas the University of Zululand is 
a comprehensive university. Durban and Mangosuthu are universities of technology. The 
demarcation of this area for the study ensured that data were collected from all three types of 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal, which represent other public universities in South Africa as 
well. The study focused on frauds committed by employees against their universities in 
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KwaZulu-Natal, but the recommendations about internal controls, fraud risk management, and 
sound governance are universally applicable to all sectors of the economy in South Africa and 
globally.  
 
1.8  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Welman and Kruger (1999:2) state that research methodology incorporates research methods 
and techniques, where the reasoning for the methods is contemplated and clarified. According 
to Mouton (2001:56), research methodology is concerned with the process and tools needed for 
the research. 
 
The research methodology employed for this study includes a literature search and empirical 
survey. The phases of the research incorporated a literature search and an empirical survey that 
includes sampling, quantitative and qualitative data collection, statistical analysis of data, and 
the interpretation, presentation and articulation of the results of the statistical analysis. The 
detailed descriptions of the various phases are provided in Chapter Seven.  
 
1.8.1 Literature Search 
Literature was sourced from the latest relevant books, academic journals, legislation, published 
and unpublished research as well as other literature sources, in order to acquire enhanced 
understanding and knowledge about employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. The 
search of available and relevant literature was required to ascertain what studies had previously 
been conducted on topics that were integral to this research. Mouton (2001:91) suggests that 
the literature search should be based on the research problem and should be logical. The 
objective of a literature search is to ascertain the latest, pertinent and reliable studies in a 
particular research area (Mouton, 2001:87).     
 
The review of literature included primary and secondary sources. According to Welman and 
Kruger (1999:36), a primary source, such as a witness or participant, provides information 
about what they experienced first-hand; this may include an incident or an audio recording, 
photographic or video footage thereof. Welman and Kruger (1999:36) state that indirect 




A survey of primary sources encompassed relevant South African legislation, the Internal 
Control Integrated Framework of the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Commission, the King Code of Governance for South Africa of the Institute of Directors, as 
well as the KPMG Whitepaper on Fraud Risk Management. A survey of secondary sources 
encompassed journal articles, textbooks, legislation, internet websites as well as unpublished 
research theses and dissertations. Emanating from the literature search, relevant theoretical 
criteria were identified. These criteria, together with the results of the empirical survey, were 
utilised to develop a theoretical model and a set of recommendations towards greater 
understanding and managing the research problem.  
 
1.8.1.1 Extracting Selected Theoretical Criteria from the Literature 
Based on the literature review, a selection of theoretical criteria were extracted from the 
following models and frameworks regarded as relevant to the study of employee fraud and 
prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal: 
 Fraud triangle model of Cressey (1973:30); 
 Fraud diamond model of Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:38); 
 Fraud risk management model of KPMG (2006:20);  
 Internal control integrated framework of COSO (2013:5), and 
 King III corporate governance framework of IODSA (2009:16). 
 
1.8.1.2 Public Administration 
Universities in KwaZulu-Natal are public-funded institutions and as such fall under the realm 
of public administration. Employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-
Natal affect the manner in which public universities are administered or managed. The 
literature search provided an understanding of the nexus between employee fraud at public 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal and public administration. According to Thornhill (2012:93), 
public officials are expected to abide by stipulated ethical guidelines when they carry out their 
duties, which are the cornerstone of public administration. Relevant theoretical criteria for 
ethical conduct in the public sector were identified and utilised in the development of a 





1.8.1.3 Fraud Case Files 
The review of literature also included a review of 12 fraud case files pertaining to fraud cases 
that were investigated at the four universities in KwaZulu-Natal. The overall number of fraud 
cases that were investigated were not very large; therefore, the selection of a sample of those 
cases was not necessary (Bailey, 1987:78). A determination about the quantum of fraud case 
files for review was made as the research progressed. The review of available fraud case files 
pertained to matters that were investigated during 2013 only.  
 
1.8.1.4 Knowledgeable Individuals 
During the collection of data from literature sources the study also included selecting, on a 
purposive non-probability sampling basis, knowledgeable individuals in the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal who could contribute to this research, such as directors of forensic auditing 
companies as well as forensic investigators employed by universities. These individuals 
possess vast experience and knowledge about investigating fraud at universities.  
 
The theoretical criteria sourced from the literature and the above models are elaborated on in 
more detail in ensuing chapters.  
 
1.8.2 Empirical Survey 
After the literature search and concomitant identification of selected theoretical criteria, an 
empirical survey was embarked on. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014), 
empirical means “based on testing or experience”. A survey questionnaire, which is attached 
as Appendix 2, was used to collect specific and relevant data from participants to record their 
knowledge and experience about fraud committed by employees. Empirical data were gathered 
using a survey questionnaire. The collected data were provided to the statistician for analysis. 
The results of the statistical analysis of the responses to the empirical survey questionnaire was 
interpreted and incorporated into this study. 
 
Quantitative and qualitative data were gathered by means of a survey questionnaire. The 
survey was carried out using a structured self-administered survey questionnaire (Babbie, 
1998: 257-263), which was distributed electronically to all participants. The structured 
questions were both closed and open-ended. Closed-ended questions were based on a five-
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point Likert scale. The scale measured attitudes in terms of two sets of five dependent 
variables, namely, 1: “strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly 
agree” and 2: “never, rarely, sometimes, often and always”. This configuration was validated 
by the qualified, registered, institutional statistician.The purpose of open-ended questions was 
to afford the participants the opportunity to expand on their answers for the purposes of 
clarification, or to express an opinion on the issue. The options of “yes” or “no” answers were 
also provided in the questionnaire. Both quantitative data, such as biographical information of 
participants, and qualitative data such as the participants’ opinions were sought by means of 
the survey questionnaire. The use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches is known as 
triangulation (Leedy, 1993:143). The triangulation approach enabled accurate conclusions to 
be made from the research based on both the qualitative and quantitative methods. Such an 
approach positively impacted the validity and reliability of this research. The survey 
questionnaire ensured that relevant and applicable data were collected. 
 
The questions in the structured interview schedule aimed at the collection of quantitative data 
were mainly of a closed and multiple-choice type question, from which collected responses 
revealed relevant and pertinent information which could be numerically presented and 
statistically analysed 
 
1.8.3 The Research Population and Sample 
The total research population was the staff employed at the four chosen universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal. The total possible research population, sample population and response 
population were determined in collaboration with the institutional statistician. A random 
sample of executive managers and senior managers at the four universities in KwaZulu-Natal 
were chosen for this study. There was a total of 31 executive managers and 83 senior managers 
at the four universities in KwaZulu-Natal. The number of participants from both categories of 
management totalled 114. Additionally, there was a total of 7 vacant posts in both categories. 
All members of the target population were requested to participate in this survey by 
completing the online survey questionnaire. The above modus operandi was validated by the 






1.8.4 Data Collection 
The data collection instruments, including the methods used for quantitative and qualitative 
data, were agreed upon in consultation with the statistician. Quantitative data were collected 
using a survey questionnaire based on a five-point Likert Scale. The survey questionnaire 
contained both open-ended and closed-ended questions. 
 
1.8.5 Statistical Analysis of the Responses to the Questionnaire  
According to Mouton (2001:108), the purpose of analysing data is to understand how they 
relate to and between concepts, constructs and variables, and to identify any themes, patterns 
or trends in the data. The collected data, which could be numerically presented, were analysed 
by the statistician by means of recognised statistical methods and analytical instruments. The 
manner in which the quantitative and qualitative data was analysed is elaborated on in Chapter 
Seven. The statistician has provided a letter that is attached as Appendix 5.  
 
1.8.6 Interpretation, Presentation and Articulation of the Results of the Statistical 
Analysis 
The data collated from the empirical survey, incorporating the survey questionnaires and face-
to-face interviews, were analysed by the statistician by using recognised statistical instruments. 
This process is further elaborated on in the relevant chapter on statistical analysis of the 
empirical data. The results were subsequently interpreted by the researcher and presented in the 
form of tables, figures and charts. The presentation and explanation of the results and findings 
of this study is expounded in Chapter Eight. 
 
1.9 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY TO THE EXISTING BODY OF 
KNOWLEDGE IN THE FIELD 
This study has been designed to make a contribution to the current body of knowledge in the 
field of fraud risk management within universities in KwaZulu-Natal and forms a nexus 
between expansive preventive internal controls, ethical conduct and the prevention of fraud 
within universities. The proactive prevention of fraud will not only positively assist in the 
sustainability of organisations but also contribute towards the entrenchment of ethical conduct 




The study proposes a list of expansive fraud-resistant measures which can be implemented 
within universities in South Africa. The findings of the research are beneficial to management 
at the universities as it will equip them to adequately and effectively manage fraud risks with 
the ultimate objective of minimising losses. 
 
A conceptual model was designed and recommended, supplementary to the set of 
recommendations in the last chapter as a contribution towards the existing body of knowledge 
for effective and efficient management of fraud at universities and other organisations in 
general. This proposed conceptual model is unique in that it reflects a holistic approach to 
preventing employee fraud by incorporating fraud risk management, internal controls and 
corporate governance interventions. The guitar analogy to a systems model depicts the input, 
transformation, output and feedback phases of a systems model. The model is original in that it 
also depicts an essential factor of “ethical tone” which is a vital foundation for setting a sound 
ethical culture at universities in KwaZulu-Natal, like a well-tuned guitar. This study will assist 
higher education institutions in focusing on the scourge of fraud and placing this topic on the 
regular agenda of management and executives. A reduction in financial loss, due to fraud, may 
ease the burden on universities as well as the community in the form of reduced student fees. 
The combating of fraud may also benefit tax payers and the government, as funds that are 
defrauded should have been be used for purposes for which they are ultimately intended, the 
education of citizens.  
  
1.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS   
Researchers should take into account ethical considerations when conducting research. Leedy 
and Ormrod (2001:107) show that participants should be provided with sufficient information 
in order to consent; no harm should come to them; their privacy rights should be guaranteed 
and the researcher has to be truthful with professional colleagues. Welman and Kruger 
(1999:181) show that participants have to be given assurance about their anonymity when the 
research findings are released. Participants have a right to privacy, which was maintained and 
respected in this study. They were assured they would not be subjected to any reputational 
harm.  
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2001:108), findings should be reported truthfully and 
sources have to be acknowledged. All sources were cited in the text and the list of references. 
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Welman and Kruger (1999:181) believe that participants have to be assured that their identities 
will not be revealed when the findings of the research are released.  
 
The research thesis was subjected to the Turnitin system to establish the similarity index. Prior 
to distributing the survey questionnaire, the Ethics Committee of the University of KwaZulu-
Natal (UKZN) was approached to provide ethical clearance; which was subsequently granted 
and is attached as Appendix 1. In order to proceed with this research, approval was also 
requested from each of the four universities located in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. 
Approval was received from all four universities permitting the research at the respective 
universities.    
 
The participants were provided with a covering letter that set out the purpose of the research. 
The document reflected that their participation was voluntary and that they would not be 
reimbursed for it. Participants were also informed that it was their right to choose not to answer 
certain questions and to withdraw from participating at any time. They were assured of their 
anonymity and the confidentiality of the information they provided. Their written consent, 
which is attached as Appendix 3, to participate in the study was obtained.     
 
1.11 ORGANISATION OF THE RESEARCH/STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis contains nine chapters. These chapters elaborate on the various concepts raised in 
the study.   
 Chapter One:  Serves as an introduction to the study and introduces the problem 
statement, the key questions, the objectives, the demarcation of the study 
area and the research methodology. 
Chapter Two: Philosophical and Theoretical Foundations of the Causes of 
Employee Fraud and Prevention Strategies   
This chapter sets out the foundations in relation to the causes of 
employee fraud as well as strategies intended to prevent fraud from 
occurring in the workplace. The focus was on previous research 
conducted in this area as well as on selected models and frameworks. 
Chapter Three:  Theoretical and Practical Perspectives of Employee Fraud  
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The chapter elaborates on the nature and extent of fraud; the modi 
operandi, motive and profile of fraudsters. This chapter also explains the 
applicability of the fraud triangle and fraud diamond models. 
Chapter Four: Perspectives of Fraud Prevention  
   In this chapter, prevention of fraud is expounded, based on the KPMG 
   fraud risk management model. 
Chapter Five: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives of Internal Control  
Chapter Five deals with internal controls as a means of preventing fraud. 
The COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework is expanded from a 
prevention of fraud perspective. 
Chapter Six:  Perspectives of Corporate Governance 
This chapter consists of explanations of corporate governance as a 
contributor to the prevention of fraud. The King III Corporate 
Governance Framework is elaborated on in relation to its link to 
preventing fraud risks.  
Chapter Seven: Research Methodology  
The research methodology employed in this study is explained in detail. 
The areas covered include the research design, approach, strategy, data 
collection methods, data analysis methods, sampling technique, validity 
and reliability and ethical considerations.  
Chapter Eight: Interpretation, Presentation and Articulation of the Results of the 
Statistical Analysis 
In this chapter, the results and findings of the study are explained in 
detail, covering the areas of employee fraud, fraud prevention, internal 
control and corporate governance. 
Chapter Nine: Model Theories and Proposal of Conceptual Model 
Chapter Nine elaborates on the model theories pertaining to employee 
fraud, fraud prevention, internal control mechanisms and corporate 
governance. In particular, a conceptual framework is proposed to deal 
with preventing employee fraud. The model supplements the set of 
recommendations provided in the last chapter. The model supplements 
the set of recommendations provided in the last chapter. 
Chapter Ten:  Recommendations and Concluding Remarks 
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The recommendations and concluding remarks emanating from this 
study are contained in this chapter. References that were cited in this 
thesis are acknowledged in the reference list. 
 
1.12 SUMMARY 
Incidents of fraud are escalating both in South Africa and globally. Consequently, so too is the 
cost of losses to organisations. Based on ongoing global surveys, employee fraud seems to be 
continuing unabated, despite measures being implemented to prevent it. Internal controls are 
not the only solution to preventing fraud. The ethical culture of an organisation also occupies 
an essential role in the fight against fraud. Although trust and collegiality are essential in 
maintaining a sound working environment, these two aspects of trust and collegiality require a 
degree of circumspection on the part of management. 
  
In the chapters that follow, the search for knowledge and understanding of the nature and 
extent of employee fraud is explained and rationalised and what current measures can be 
proffered to prevent fraud from occurring. In this regard, various models and frameworks are 
examined on how employee fraud is being prevented currently. Emanating from this study is a 




















PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CAUSES OF 
EMPLOYEE FRAUD AND PREVENTION STRATEGIES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to establish what employee fraud is, one has to consider firstly, what fraud is. The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary (1990:467) defines fraud as “criminal deception by the use of false 
representations to gain an unjust advantage”. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
(2014), fraud is defined as “deceit or trickery; specifically: the intentional perversion of truth 
in order to induce another to part with something of value or to surrender a legal right”.  
 
According to Snyman (1987:9), fraud falls under the ambit of common law. Common law in 
South Africa refers to the rules of law that are not legislated in parliament or other legislative 
body and are referred to in Roman-Dutch law. Roman law, according to Snyman (1987:5), has 
its origin around 450 B.C. According to Snyman (1987:7), Roman law was merged with local 
customary law in the Netherlands and gradually became known as Roman-Dutch law between 
the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries.     
 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014) defines prevention as “the act or practice of stopping 
something bad from happening”. For the purpose of this study, a fraud prevention measure is 
regarded as an action that is taken to obstruct the occurrence of a fraudulent activity. Early 
strategies to prevent fraud emerged during the eighteenth century when reference was made by 
Blackstone (1753:381) to the need to prevent fraud.  
 
Modern day fraud prevention strategies are associated with the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), which was established during 1985. 
According to the COSO website (COSO, 2014), the organisation originated in 1985 to sponsor 
the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting in the United States of America. 
This was an initiative that was implemented by the private sector to establish what the root 
causes were that led to fraudulent financial reporting by organisations. The objective was to 
assist organisations to prevent fraud from occurring. In attempting to address the problem 




2.2 EMPLOYEE FRAUD  
Snyman (1987:456) avers that fraud is a crime in terms of South African criminal law. Should 
this statement be accepted, then the pervasiveness of employee fraud has to be investigated. 
Firstly, this study researched the reasons why employees commit fraud:  their motives for 
committing fraud could provide an indication of the root causes of employee fraud. Secondly, 
the methods used by employees to commit fraud, namely, their modi operandi had to be 
identified and evaluated. This section briefly elaborates on the theoretical and historical origins 
of employee fraud which is regarded as relevant to the study of employee fraud and prevention 
strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.  
  
2.2.1 Fraud during the Roman Empire 
According to Garnsey (1968:7), fraud was dealt with in terms of civil law and not criminal law 
during the Roman Empire. All requests for a civil suit were sent to the praetor (magistrate) 
who would receive and scrutinise the complaint and make a decision on whether to appoint a 
private judge or not. The praetor was expected to deny a request of a commoner for civil action 
against a person from the upper class for fraud.  
 
Garnsey (1968:9) shows that during the period of the Roman Empire, 27 B.C. to A.D. 235, 
judges and juries were chosen from the upper classes of society. These judges and juries were 
impressed by the social status, wealth and reputable character of people from the upper classes, 
even if they had committed a crime. Garnsey (1968:10) held that civil suits by common people 
against those from the upper classes were infrequent because of the common feelings and 
prejudices they shared with the praetors and judges of the time. This section should be 
considered when addressing employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal in particular and in South Africa in general.  
  
2.2.2 Fraud during the Greek Empire 
According to Bakewell (2007:123), the Greek Empire saw the emergence of trade in gold and 
silver coins and other precious metals during the fifth century. This highlighted the nexus 
between finances and war during that period. Bakewell (2007:126) held that the increased 
number of currencies in existence at the time, quality and weight of the precious metals, 
existence of counterfeit coins, varying rates of commission charged as well as the lack of 
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reliable information provided fertile grounds for fraud. Fraud takes on various manifestations 
which should be considered when addressing employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal 
in particular and in South Africa in general.   
 
2.2.3 Origins of Criminal Law 
According to Burchell (2005:4), the word crime is derived from the Latin word “crimen”, 
which means accusation. Crime is not only an accusation. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
(2015) defines crime as “an illegal act for which someone can be punished by the 
government”. Schmaus (1994:130) quotes Emile Durkheim’s definition of crime as “an act 
that merely seems harmful to society”. Burchell (2005:18) holds that a criminal is a person who 
commits a crime. Crime is regarded as an action that contravenes a given criminal law. South 
African law, according to Burchell (2005:20), emerged from a range of different legal systems 
that existed in other parts of the world, such as the oldest contributor which was the law of 
Rome during the period 753 B.C. to the year 565.  
 
Burchell (2005:20) observes that this system of criminal law evolved after the fall of the 
Roman Empire in Western Europe around the year 600. The law was based on the customs and 
laws of the “Germanic” people at the time. This law, according to Burchell (2005:20), evolved 
during the period 600 to 1500, influenced by the ethical values and morals which were based 
on Judaeo-Christian beliefs. The emergence of separate political states in Western Europe 
during the period 1500 to 1750 resulted in the establishment of different systems of criminal 
law as well (Burchell, 2005:20). According to Lee (2013:1), Roman Law was legislatively 
recognised in (Holland) the Netherlands during 1462. Roman-Dutch Law came into existence 
in 1528 in Holland. Roman-Dutch Law, according to Burchell (2005:20), emanated from 
Holland and was introduced to South Africa by the Dutch during the seventeenth century.    
 
The above view is supported by Snyman (1987:9), who holds that Roman-Dutch Law was 
introduced to South Africa when Jan van Riebeeck, an official of the Dutch East India 
Company, landed in the Cape in 1652. According to Burchell (2005:32), Dutch Settlers arrived 
at the Cape of Good Hope during that time. The intention was to establish a refreshment station 
for passing ships. During the nineteenth century, new crimes were introduced in South Africa 
such as assault with the intention to commit other crimes; housebreaking with the intention to 
commit a crime; receiving stolen property knowing it to be stolen; culpable homicide and fraud 
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(Snyman, 1987:9). These are some of the crimes that are listed in Schedule 1 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which is attached as Appendix 4 to this thesis. Common law in 
South Africa was derived from Roman-Dutch Law. Understanding the context of the origins of 
current legislation is regarded as relevant to the study of employee fraud and prevention 
strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.  
  
2.2.4 Natural Law 
According to Blackstone (1753:46), natural law dealt fundamentally with the “substantial 
happiness” of a person; in essence, this was ethics. Any action that violated this natural law 
was prohibited and was binding all over the world. Blackstone explained that no other laws 
would have been required if man abided by natural law. Dorminey et al. (2012:572) postulate 
that the creation of an ethical work environment deters fraudsters because they will be aware of 
the likelihood of being apprehended and punished. According to Blackstone (1753:47), man is 
fallible, necessitating the enactment of “human laws” to address crime. He asserts that natural 
law is superior to all other subordinate laws. Blackstone (1753:48) argues that people do not 
only interact with their fellow citizens, they also interact with people from other nations.  
 
Over time, it became essential to regulate this interaction between people of different nations 
with the creation of, what Blackstone termed, “the law of nations”. According to Blackstone 
(1753:48), the enforcement of the law of nations is the responsibility of each sovereign nation 
which is dependent on the rules of natural law and other agreements or treaties existing 
between the different nations. No nation can be regarded as superior to another in terms of the 
law of nations. Chitty (1844:v) cites Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss jurist during the eighteenth 
century, who espoused the view that natural reasoning, which is practised by all mankind, is 
the law of nations that is followed by all people. The modern term for the law of nations is 
international law. The primary goal of the United Nations (UN) (2015) is to develop and 
administer international law. The legal responsibility of countries in terms of international law 
are, inter alia, human rights, international crime, disarmament and refugees. There are more 
than 500 multilateral treaties that have been signed between various countries with the 
involvement of the UN. In 1948, the UN established the International Law Commission to 
develop international law. According to the UN (2015), countries are bound by international 
law because they are signatories to the various treaties. The Rome Statute was created in 1998 
by 120 countries and gave approval for the formation of the International Criminal Court 
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(ICC). The ICC is an international independent body that is based in The Hague in the 
Netherlands. According to the UN (2015), the ICC has heard 17 cases involving violation of 
international law. The role of natural law should be considered when addressing employee 
fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal in particular and South Africa 
in general.     
  
2.2.5 Criminality 
According to Burchell (2005:18), despite the existence of criminal law, which prohibits 
different forms of criminal conduct, people continue to commit crimes while aware that 
punishment may result as a consequence of such criminal acts. Understanding why criminals 
commit crimes, while knowing that they will be punished, is an area of study in Criminology. 
Criminology is a science, according to Burchell (2005:18) that studies the committing of crime 
in relation to the person who perpetrates it, with the objective of explaining the phenomenon of 
crime vis-à-vis the criminal. According to Duff and Green (2011:1), one can only understand 
the foundations of criminal law through historians and sociologists, because of their skills in 
observing and interpreting its context from a historical and socio-political perspective. They 
aver that different disciplines provide varying perspectives on the philosophical foundations of 
criminal law. Duff and Green (2011:3) hold the view that criminal law was the “messy 
outcome of the variegated, shifting forces that determined its historical development”. This 
section has particular relevance to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal.      
 
Lacey (2001:361) postulates that, during the eighteenth century, the law was based on the 
premise that the jury was able to identify criminality when they saw it. This premise was based 
on the known character and reputation of the accused person within the community. The 
criminal responsibility of the accused was not relevant. All he needed was to be perceived to 
be a law-abiding citizen. According to Lacey (2001:367), during the nineteenth century and 
partly the twentieth century, English criminal law functioned on the presumption that an 
accused had the intention to commit the crime with the resultant consequences. There was no 
clarity, at that time, between the application of subjective and objective tests to determine 
whether a rebuttal of this presumption could succeed or not. Lacey (2001:360) suggests that 
the criminal responsibility (blameworthy state of mind) of the accused became the subject of 
debate in legal circles during the 1950s. The emergence of legal counsel, attorneys, expert 
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witnesses and the evolution of the law of evidence contributed to the transformation of the 
judicial process. In associating the element of criminal intention with this study, it is accepted 
that fraud cannot be committed due to negligence on the part of the accused person. The 
accused has to have had the intention to commit fraud in present day. This section is 
particularly relevant to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-
Natal.   
  
2.2.6 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
According to Hiemstra (1985:1), the first Criminal Procedure Act was promulgated in South 
Africa in 1917. It was Act 31 of 1917. A consolidation of the Act took place during 1956, 
resulting in the promulgation of Act 55 of 1956. Later, during 1977, the Act was revised once 
again and consolidated into Act 51 of 1977. The current Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is 
still in force in South Africa to this day, albeit with certain amendments since 1977. The 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 sets out the procedures and other related aspects pertaining 
to proceedings in a court of law. Simply put, the Criminal Procedure Act regulates how cases 
relating to criminality are dealt with in a court of law in South Africa.  
 
According to Hiemstra (1985:109), fraud, which is a focus of this study, is listed as an offence 
under Schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Fraud constitutes a criminal act 
which is punishable in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. In terms of this study, 
fraud committed by employees falls within the ambit of this Act. Employee fraud can be dealt 
with by an organisation at a disciplinary enquiry and by means of criminal prosecution, 
including civil litigation against the implicated employee/s. The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977 is regarded as relevant to the study of employee fraud and prevention strategies at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
     
2.2.7 Origins of Fraud 
Snyman (1987:456) holds that fraud is derived from two specific crimes in Roman law: 
stellionatus and crimina falsi. Stellionatus could be equated to the delict of dolus, which is 
referred to in criminal law and involved the perpetrator in making a misrepresentation with the 
intention to cause prejudice to another. The term crimina falsi was used to refer to various 
crimes involving falsification, such as the falsification of a will. The term dolus malus refers to 
a vehicle employed for the purpose of cheating or circumventing existing authority. According 
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to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015), “dolus malus refers to fraud and misrepresentation 
that is actionable and punishable or is ground for rescinding the transaction resulting from it”. 
 
2.2.7.1 Crimes and Delicts 
According to Snyman (1987:2), the difference between a crime and a delict is that a crime is 
punishable by the state in terms of criminal law. A delict involves the claim of compensation 
for damages suffered by an individual person in terms of civil law. It is possible for certain 
crimes to also be delicts and vice versa. An example is where a person who is assaulted by 
another, can claim for damages as well as lay a complaint of assault with the police. In relation 
to this study, the employer, who has been defrauded by an employee, can report the matter to 
the police and may also proceed to recover the financial loss (damages) in civil proceedings 
against the employee. According to Snyman (1987:457), the significant difference between 
these two former crimes was that stellionatus entailed the victim suffering patrimonial 
(property inherited from a person’s father) prejudice, whereas crimina falsi entailed no 
prejudice to a specific person. 
 
2.2.7.2 Elements Constituting Fraud 
According to Snyman (1987:457), common law requires four inherent elements to be present 
in order to render an act to be fraud. The four elements are: 
 Misrepresentation 




According to Burchell (2005:170), the criminal law pertaining to fraud was extended during 
the early twentieth century in South Africa to include potential prejudice. Burchell (2005:170) 
holds that the purpose for including potential prejudice in the definition of fraud was in order 
to distort the distinction made between fraud and attempted fraud.    
 
Wells (2013:3) simplifies the four elements of fraud and reflects them as: 
 A statement that is materially false. 
 The accused’s awareness that he/she made a false statement. 
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 The victim’s dependence on that statement. 
 Resultant damages.  
 
According to Snyman (1987:16), the purpose of punishment, in terms of preventive theory in 
criminal law, is to prevent the recurrence of crime. This means that the committing of a crime, 
such as fraud, is punishable by law in order to prevent future crimes. The punishment that is 
imposed on an accused by a court of law serves to act as a deterrent for similar future acts by 
the same accused and society in general. Understanding the origins and elements of a crime is 
regarded as relevant to the study of employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal in particular and in South Africa in general.     
  
2.2.8  Evolution of Fraud Theory 
According to Dorminey et al. (2012:556), fraud has been in existence for the past thousands of 
years when commerce first came into existence. These authors aver that dishonest traders may 
have existed when people began to trade with other people a few thousand years ago, resulting 
in the implementation of a system to enable the identification of trustworthy traders during that 
era. Dorminey et al. (2012:556) hold that the past six decades have seen an evolution in the 
fraud theories that were developed. The newer theories have made a distinction between fraud 
and other financially motivated crimes, such as burglary and theft. According to Dorminey et 
al. (2012:560), fraud has become more complex in recent times, with fraudsters using creative 
ways in which to commit, conceal and convert fraud. This suggests that strategies to prevent 
employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal in particular and South Africa in general 
should evolve in order to adequately combat fraudulent schemes that continually mutate.  
       





Cesare Lombroso was an Italian medical doctor and criminologist during the nineteenth 
century. His book entitled “Criminal Man”, which he wrote during 1898, was translated by 
Gibson and Rafter (2006:1) from Italian into English. Gibson and Rafter (2006:1) describe 
Lombroso’s theory of delinquent nato, meaning a person who is a born criminal, or the theory 
of atavism. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014), atavism is defined as 
“recurrence in an organism of a trait or character typical of an ancestral form and usually due 
to genetic recombination”. Lombroso described these “born criminals” as people who were 
dangerous and had identifiable “anomalies” such as physical or psychological abnormalities. 
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According to Gibson and Rafter (2006:1), Lombroso believed these abnormalities were similar 
to ancient man and animals. Lombroso associated white men with being civilised and 
conversely associated black, brown and yellow men with having their origins in “primitive” or 
“savage” communities (Gibson and Rafter, 2006:17). The theory suggested that criminals 
genetically inherited their traits from their ancestors. This section has particular relevance to 
employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
  
2.2.9.1 Circumstances Leading to Fraud 
In relation to fraud, Gibson and Rafter (2006:18) explain Lombroso’s view that Jews were 
more prone to commit fraud and receive stolen property than others. According to Lombroso, 
the Jews were placed in this situation because most nations in Europe prohibited them from 
occupying any professions except in “peddling and commerce”. He further added that atavism 
was not innate to the character of Jewish people because they moved into other noble 
professions very quickly, once they were granted equal opportunities by their fellow Christian 
citizens. This suggested that the circumstances and environment in which people found 
themselves determined whether they would commit fraud or not, not just their genetic makeup.   
  
2.2.9.2 Origins of Fraudulent Behaviour 
According to Taylor (2013:1), fraud has been a crime in Britain since at least 1757. Frauds 
related to companies were criminalised in Britain in the nineteenth century between 1820 and 
1830. Taylor (2013:15) showed that during this period, the attitude of governments towards 
fraud was one of “toleration”. On the one hand, governments were of the view that prevention 
and punishment for fraud were not their responsibility. On the other hand, judges and 
magistrates, during that period, chastised greedy investors rather than company directors who 
committed fraud. Taylor (2013:15) holds that during the period 1840 to 1860, the focus was on 
“criminalisation” of acts, by defining and prohibiting fraudulent conduct linked to the 
management of a company. This section has particular relevance to employee fraud and 
prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
Victims of fraud were tasked with the responsibility to prosecute the perpetrators of fraud. In 
such instances, the judges read the legislation in a narrow manner, resulting in poor success in 
prosecutions for the victims. According to Taylor (2013:15), the period 1870 to 1900 saw the 
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emergence of a prominent role being played by governments in respect of the “enforcement” of 
laws. 
  
Judges adopted a firmer stance against perpetrators in the “boardroom”. The stance of 
governments and the judiciary towards fraud improved during the entire twentieth century, 
with continuous amendment and refinement to legislation and enforcement. This indicates that 
certain international trends can be universally applied to universities in particular and in South 
Africa generally.    
 
2.2.10 Fraud during the 20
th
 Century 
A different approach to that described above was subsequently required to explain criminal 
behaviour in a more acceptable manner. Sutherland (1940:2) explained that white collar crimes 
are found in every different type of occupation. The financial losses arising out of white collar 
crime are substantial, including the damage to social relations as it violates the trust between 
employer and employee. Sutherland (1940:10) asserts that white collar criminality is learned 
either directly or indirectly from the behaviour of other criminals. Such individuals, who learn 
how to commit crime, are isolated from constant exposure to the law-abiding conduct of 
others. In order to explain this theory, it could be associated with the saying “birds of a feather 
flock together”. Slezak (2013:21) equates this theory to the warning parents give to their 
growing children not to associate with friends who are trouble-makers. The intention of the 
parent is to dissuade the child from also getting into trouble, due to their association with 
trouble-makers. Sutherland’s theory was called “differential association”, advocating that 
criminal behaviour is learned from one’s exposure to people with whom they associate. The 
suggestion is that associating with criminals would result in honest people turning into 
criminals themselves.  
 
Cressey (1973:742), who was Sutherland’s student at the time, undertook research to 
understand why employees surrendered to temptation to commit fraud against their employers. 
He called them “trust violators” because they violated the trust of their employers. This section 
has particular relevance to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal. A total of 250 incarcerated “trust violators” were interviewed as part of the 
study. Arising from the study, Cressey (1973:741) found that there were three factors that were 
present which gave rise to the violation of trust and which resulted in fraud. They were: a non-
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shareable financial problem (pressure), an opportunity to commit the crime and the 
rationalisation by the “trust violator”. In recent years, these factors became known as the fraud 
triangle (Wells, 2013:8), incorporating pressure, opportunity and rationalisation. According to 
Comer (1977:9), organisations have the capacity to influence the motivation of an employee 
who is intent on committing fraud. Comer (1977:13) asserts that a potential fraudster will only 
exploit an opportunity to commit fraud if he/she has the perception that the likelihood of being 
detected is very low.    
 
2.2.10.1 Surveys Conducted during the 20
th
 Century 
According to Wells (2013:6), it was Edwin Sutherland, a criminologist, who researched fraud 
committed by business executives against shareholders and the public. It was this pioneering 
work, according to Wells (2013:6), which resulted in Sutherland coining the phrase “white 
collar crime” in the year 1939. According to Kranacher (2010:60), white collar crime is being 
used as a nomenclature when referring to economic crimes, including employee fraud.  
 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) conducted a biennial survey during 
1996, where the objective was to establish the status of fraud and white collar crime in the 
United States of America (USA). The ACFE Report to the Nation (1996:3) found that 
employees who committed fraud against their employers ranged from junior employees and 
managers through to executives of various organisations. The survey found that the most 
common category of violations were asset misappropriation, corruption, false statements, false 
overtime, theft, use of company resources for personal benefit, payroll and sick leave abuses 
(ACFE, 1996:3). The survey also found that financial losses arising out of fraud committed by 
managers and executives were sixteen times higher than fraud committed by junior level 
employees. The report concluded by recommending the following: 
 Consult a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE); 
 Management should set the tone at the top; 
 Provide a code of ethics for employees; 
 Check the references of potential employees; 
 Scrutinise the bank statements of the organisation; 
 Institute a fraud hotline for receiving anonymous tip offs, and 




In this research and explained later, it can be inferred that preventing unethical behaviour of 
employees at universities in KwaZulu-Natal, compels the inclusion of an ethical component as 
part of regular training sessions for employees.  
The biennial ACFE Report to the Nation (2004) in the USA, inter alia, found that: 
 Organisations suffered losses in excess of $761 million (R9 132 billion) due to 
employee fraud;  
 Employee frauds were mostly detected through a tip off rather than through 
internal or external audits or internal controls;  
 The provision of anonymous fraud hotlines assist in fraud reduction, and should 
also be made accessible to third parties such as suppliers;   
 There is a need for robust internal controls; 
 Preventing fraud is cost effective, and 
 On average, the victim organisations recovered only 20% of their loss.  
 
The above information can be extrapolated relevant to employee fraud and prevention 
strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. A common recommendation in both these reports 
by the ACFE, in 1996 and 2004, were the implementation of an anonymous fraud hotline as a 
means of detecting fraud. 
 
2.2.10.2 Current Nature of Employee Fraud 
According to Johnson and Rudesill (2001:57), employee fraud involves a three-step process:  
the fraudulent act, the conversion of the act and the concealment thereof. The unlawful act is 
the crime of fraud. The conversion is the misrepresentation that is perpetrated. The fraudulent 
act is concealed so that the truth is not exposed. They assert that the use of computer 
technology has enhanced business opportunities. In so doing, computers have exposed 
organisations to increased risk of fraud. Computers have thus created more opportunities for 
fraud to be perpetrated (Johnson and Rudesill, 2001:58). As enablers for organisations to 
successfully and sustainably operate, computers have brought about their own challenges to 
organisations in the form of fraud risks. According to Johnson and Rudesill (2001:58), 
computers provide more opportunities for employees to use as a tool to commit fraud.  
 
Albrecht et al. (2006:10) classify fraud into two categories. Firstly, there is fraud committed by 
employees against their employers. Secondly, there is fraud that is committed on behalf of 
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one’s employer. In this study, the focus is on fraud committed against the organisation by 
employees. For purposes of clarity, fraud committed by employees on behalf of their 
employers can be explained as falsification of the financial results of an organisation. The 
motive here may be the enhanced payment of bonuses that employees would receive to the 
prejudice of shareholders due to inaccurate listing of share or stock prices.  
 
Occupational (employee) fraud is the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through 
the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organisation’s resources or assets 
(Wells, 2013:2). This definition encompasses all levels of employees, from executives to the 
lowest ranking employees. According to Wells (2013:2), the employee carries out the 
fraudulent act secretly. This act is carried out contrary to her fiduciary duties. The result is that 
the employee unduly derives direct or indirect financial benefit from the act. The victim is the 
organisation that suffers a loss due to the fraud. This view is echoed in the ACFE Report to the 
Nation (1996:3).  
 
The negative impact of employee fraud on organisations, which prompted this study, is of 
grave concern. From a preventative perspective, more effort is required in averting fraud from 
taking place rather than reacting to fraud that has already occurred and handling the losses 
suffered. 
 
2.2.10.3 Fraud Prevention  
The Greek Empire, according to Bakewell (2007:126), implemented measures to prevent fraud 
during the year 425. A body of citizens was constituted to prevent dishonest practices such as 
fraud and the trade of goods that were not in a suitable condition. The measures were 
implemented due to the emergence of fraud related to trading in counterfeit and poor quality 
gold and silver coins, as well as other precious metals in Athens.   
 
2.2.10.4 Origins of Fraud Prevention 
During the eighteenth century, Blackstone (1753:381) also made reference to the prevention of 
fraud. In this instance, reference was made to a situation where the husband bequeaths to his 
wife a part of land belonging to his father, who is still alive. The law required that this 
transaction be made “in facie ecclesiæ, et ad ostium ecclesiæ; non enim valent facta in lecto 
mortali, nec in camera, aut alibi ubi clandestina fuere conjugia”, meaning it had to be made 
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“in the face of the assembly, and at the church door; for it is not worth to take place in the bed 
of death, neither have entered into the camera, or in other places where clandestine marriages 
were”. The purpose of this requirement in law at the time was to prevent fraud involving the 
bequeathing of land to a beneficiary. Transparency was the key element in these situations in 
order to prevent fraud. 
 
According to Lee (1971:151), the segregation of duties, as a control measure, was in existence 
during 3600 to 3200 B.C. The managers at the time sought to separate accounting duties, for 
example. Lee (1971:153) holds that another form of control implemented by the Greeks and 
Romans during the period 500 B.C. was the widespread use of auditors (arbiters) to scrutinise 
the accounts of public officials when their terms of office culminated. According to Lee 
(1971:154), the period 1100 to 1200 A.D. saw the introduction of a “tally stick” as a control 
measure, which served the purpose of a receipt. Notches were cut out on the wooden tally stick 
to indicate how much money was received or owed. The tally stick was split into two halves; 
one half was retained by each of the two parties. One of the purposes of this control was to 
prevent fraud and error. The control measure used in England during the period 1100 to 1135 
A.D., was the “Pipe Roll” (Lee, 1971:154). The Pipe Roll was used to record the revenues that 
were due to the monarchy, the revenues actually collected and the expenditure incurred in 
collecting the revenues.  
 
2.2.10.5 Fraud Prevention Strategies 
According to Irvine (2001:344), the principles of modern day common law in England were 
tweaked to incorporate fraud prevention as a consideration in the overall business strategy. For 
example, if it was found that shareholders had created a company with the intention to commit 
fraud, they would be held liable in their personal capacities for the debts incurred by the 
company. The risk of being held personally liable for company debts due to fraud served as a 
measure to prevent fraud from occurring in the first place.  
 
Wells (2013:7), in considering Sutherland’s (1940:10) theory of differential association, asserts 
that although dishonest employees will negatively influence honest employees, the converse is 
also true. Honest employees will influence their dishonest colleagues against committing fraud. 
This theory should be considered when providing regular fraud awareness training to 
employees as a means of fraud prevention. It suggests that honest employees could justifiably 
 
 32 
be regarded as the eyes and ears of an organisation. They should be appropriately trained to 
identify fraud or their suspicion of fraud in the workplace and encouraged to report it to the 
relevant authorities. Such training should be provided to all employees and not only to 
employees who are perceived to be honest.  
 
The prevention of fraud is essential to the viability of an organisation. Fraud results in financial 
loss to organisations. This has a direct impact on the bottom line of an organisation. Comer 
(1977:305) holds that an organisation cannot remove all opportunities that enable fraud to be 
committed because internal controls require funds for implementation. Coenen (2008:148) 
concurs that designing, implementing and maintaining adequate and effective internal controls 
can be costly to an organisation. A weakness in the internal control environment does not 
necessarily provide an automatic opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated. In order to prevent 
fraud, organisations should implement adequate measures that prevent or detect fraud. If these 
counter-measures are communicated to all employees, it will convey a message that employees 
who commit fraud will be caught out. According to Comer (1977:306), the risk that the fraud 
will be detected has a deterrent effect on would-be fraudsters. The risk of being detected poses 
a risk to criminals but it does not inhibit law-abiding employees from doing their job (Comer, 
1977:306).  
 
Krummeck (2000:269) explains that law-abiding employees are expected to report fraud to the 
relevant authorities within the organisation because it is the correct thing to do. Fraud 
prevention, according to Krummeck (2000:269), is not the responsibility of any single 
department but rather that of all employees in the organisation. This section is of particular 
relevance to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
 2.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of the causal factors of fraud and fraud prevention. Fraud 
has been in existence since 27 B.C. Roman-Dutch law was introduced to South Africa in 1652 
when the Dutch settlers arrived in the Cape of Good Hope. The authorities at the time 
identified that people were fallible and could succumb to the temptation of fraud. The 
existence of fraud during the period 3600 to 3200 B.C. necessitated the implementation of 
control mechanisms to prevent fraud at that point in time. Such control mechanisms have 
evolved over time to keep pace with changes in the business environment. Just as business 
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processes have evolved, it is essential for fraud prevention techniques and methodologies to 
keep pace with the continuing change in the work environment, which is a focus of this study.  
Fraud has been in existence for millennia. The only difference is that the perpetration of fraud 
has become more sophisticated over time. The hallmarks of fraud are misrepresentation and 
prejudice. Fraud cannot take place through negligence on the part of the fraudster. The law 
requires that the fraudster should have intended to commit the fraud. There are three simple 
steps that a fraudster follows to commit fraud; the act, conversion and concealment. The 
designing and implementation of adequate and effective internal controls alone are insufficient 
to prevent fraud. 
   
In the following chapter, the research further explores understanding of employee fraud and 
how it can be prevented. In addition, the role of internal controls and corporate governance in 


























THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES OF EMPLOYEE FRAUD 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on three essential aspects of employee fraud. Firstly, as explained briefly 
in the previous chapter, Cressey’s (1973:741) theory about trust violators is further analysed 
and explained. The model, attributed to Cressey, is a founding model that is referred to as the 
fraud triangle. It is used to facilitate understanding of why employees commit fraud. The three 
elements of the fraud triangle, pressure, opportunity and rationalisation, are analysed and 
explained. Secondly, this chapter analyses another relevant model referred to as the fraud 
diamond model, by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:38). The fraud diamond model builds on 
Cressey’s fraud triangle model by adding a fourth element of capability. Lastly, various 
surveys have been carried out by reputable global forensic auditing companies and the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) pertaining to employee fraud. In this 
chapter, a review of the results of those surveys is presented, inter alia, in order to analyse and 
conceptualise the nature and extent of employee fraud, who the fraudsters are, their respective 
modi operandi and their motives.    
 
3.2 EMPLOYEE FRAUD THEORY 
According to the ACFE (2014:6) there is a common misconception among many organisations 
that fraud does not occur within their organisations. Organisations do not believe that their 
employees would commit fraud against them. KPMG (2011:4) found that senior managers 
within an organisation are more likely to commit fraud against their employer than other levels 
of employees. According to Simuyemba (2012:1), the element of entitlement involves people 
holding the view that those in charge owe them something. Simuyemba (2012:1) cites the 
example of an employee who expects to be promoted based on the fact of long service in the 
organisation. The entitlement mentality may not justify the notion that the world owes anybody 
anything. The reality is that employee fraud is on the increase, causing financial losses to 
employers. The ACFE (2014:8) reported in its global fraud study that an estimated $3.7 trillion 
(R44.4 trillion) loss is attributable to employee fraud. The study was premised on 1483 cases 
of occupational (employee) fraud globally. This is the formal estimation. The informal reality 
may be substantially more. The ACFE (2014:4) postulate in its report that employee fraud 
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comprises three types of fraud: asset misappropriation, corruption and financial statement 
fraud. These types of employee fraud are explained in more detail later in this chapter when the 
nature of employee fraud is explored. In order to understand what fraud is, one has to establish 
what elements constitute fraud.   
 
3.2.1 Elements Constituting Fraud 
According to Snyman (1987:457), the legal definition of the crime of fraud requires four 
essential elements to be present in order for it to constitute a crime. The four elements that 
define fraud are briefly described below in order to provide an understanding of what fraud is.   
 
3.2.1.1 Misrepresentation 
Snyman (1987:457) holds that the act by the employee has to involve a distortion or perversion 
of the truth, commonly referred to as a misrepresentation. The employee has to represent to the 
employer the existence of certain facts while knowing in his/her mind that these facts do not 
exist. The employer accepts this representation at the time in good faith on the understanding 
that the employee will honour his/her commitment. The misrepresentation may be made in 
writing, verbally or by means of a physical gesture, such as nodding of one’s head. The 
misrepresentation could be made explicitly or implicitly. It could be made by an omission of 
relevant facts. For example, had the victim been made aware of this particular essential fact, he 
would not have acted to his detriment. By implication, this means that an employee who 
withholds vital information can be regarded as making a misrepresentation to the employer, 
which results in prejudice.  
 
3.2.1.2 Prejudice  
The element of prejudice could be in the form of actual or potential prejudice to the victim. 
According to Snyman (1987:459), the potential that the victim is being prejudiced is sufficient 
in law. In other words, it is not a prerequisite in law for the victim to suffer actual prejudice. It 
is of no consequence that the fraudulent act was unsuccessful because of it being detected 
during its commission. It is the “intent” that is the key here (“mala fide”, “dolusmalus”, 
“falsum” and “stellionatus”). Whether the victim suffered a loss, or not, is irrelevant, as 
Snyman expounds (1987:460). The prejudice may be in the form of a financial or proprietary 




The act has to be unlawful. The perpetrator cannot rely on a defence that he/she did not know 
that the act of misrepresentation was unlawful. Snyman (1987:172) is of the view that the 
fraudster has to, in principle, know that his/her conduct is forbidden in law. The fraudster may 
raise the grounds of justification that he/she was acting upon an order or compulsion. Snyman 
(1987:462) found that the court refused to accept the ground of justification that the accused 
had acted unlawfully on instruction from his employer when fraud was committed, in the case 
of Shepard 1967 (4) SA 170 (W) 177-178.   
 
3.2.1.4 Intention 
Intention is an essential element that makes up the crime of fraud. The accused should have 
intended to commit the crime. One cannot negligently commit fraud. According to Snyman 
(1987:462), the accused should have been aware that he/she was making a false representation 
at the time. In terms of Section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, an accused on 
trial for fraud will be deemed to have made the representation while knowing it to have been 
false, if such is proved in court. The onus rests on the accused to prove otherwise.  
 
There has to be the presence of all four elements in order for the act to be deemed fraud. The 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 currently lists fraud as a crime which is punishable by the 
State.  
 
The question often asked by employers is “why did my employee do it?”. In attempting to 
understand this phenomenon, criminologist Donald Cressey (1973:30) suggests that trusted 
persons violate trust when they have a financial difficulty and are able to conceal their 
fraudulent conduct and rationalise to themselves that they are entitled to use the funds. 
According to Simuyemba (2012:1), this involves employees who have an entitlement 
mentality. Cressey identifies three factors which facilitate the perpetration of fraud. The factors 
are pressure (incentive), opportunity and rationalisation. He argues that the fraudster has to be 
under some pressure to commit the fraud, such as having a gambling habit, drug abuse or 
greed. Secondly, there has to be a lack of, or weak internal financial controls, which the 
fraudster exploits in order to create the opportunity to commit and conceal the fraud. Thirdly, 
fraudsters justify the fraudulent act by convincing themselves that they will repay the money, 
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or that the money is due to them, for example, by being overlooked for promotion (Cressey, 
1973:30).  
 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:38) expanded the fraud triangle model and created the “Fraud 
Diamond Model” by adding a fourth factor. This was the factor of capability. They assert that 
the individual has to have certain observable traits, for example, the personality, to commit 
fraud. They postulate that some capability traits are holding an authoritative position, having 
the capacity to exploit deficient internal controls, being confident of not being caught or having 
the ability to explain away the fraud and lastly, the ability to deal with the stress of committing 
fraud. Both the fraud triangle and fraud diamond models are deliberated on below in separate 
sections of this chapter.  
 
Regular global fraud surveys are conducted by various forensic auditing companies including 
KPMG, PwC and Deloitte; as well as the ACFE. The objective of these surveys is to provide 
insight into the nature and extent of employee fraud and how these could be detected and 
prevented.  
 
PwC (2011:18) found that a total of 56% of perpetrators of fraud were employees of a 
company. It is evident from this study that the risk of fraud emanates largely from within a 
company’s own ranks. In view of this finding, this study focused on higher education 
institutions that were victims of employee fraud, in order to explore the modi operandi used 
and motives of employees to commit and conceal the fraud. Organisations can prevent fraud 
from occurring if they are aware what fraud is, who commits it, why and how it is committed 
and how it is concealed. The ACFE (2012:5) found that the longer a fraudster was employed 
within an organisation, the greater the value of the loss. This situation is exacerbated when two 
or more employees collude with each other to defraud their employer. The ACFE (2012:43) 
asserts that collusion between employees to commit fraud results in greater financial losses 
than fraudsters working on their own. Fraud involving collusion amongst employees is also 
difficult to detect as they have the ability to circumvent internal controls and conceal their 
fraudulent conduct. Considering that preventative internal controls, according to KPMG 
(2006:8), are designed to assist in the reduction of the risk of fraud, these internal controls are 





Albrecht and Schmoldt (1988:16) explain that dishonesty and compromised integrity are 
prevalent in society. The reasons why employees commit fraud against their employers have to 
be considered. According to Jones and Jing (2011:859), experts agree that the motive for 
committing fraud is greed for money. Wells (2001:89) concurs that the motive to commit fraud 
is greed. Albrecht and Schmoldt (1988:111) caution that trustworthy employees are not a 
control measure. Albrecht and Schmoldt (1988:113) are also of the view that employees 
commit fraud due to three inclusive factors, namely, pressure, opportunity and rationalisation. 
These three factors form the fraud triangle, as explained earlier in this chapter. Thus, 
understanding the motive and modi operandi of fraudsters will be helpful to organisations in 
their quest to address the occurrence and impact of employee fraud.      
 
Peterson and Zikmund (2004:30) suggest that employees would be less likely to commit fraud 
if they were aware that they could get caught; they recommend implementing robust internal 
controls, the presence of internal auditors, conducting fraud risk assessments, implementation 
of a fraud hotline and awareness training programmes to staff about fraud risks. Management 
needs to set a sound ethical tone at the top and lead by example in order to win the hearts and 
minds of employees in the fight against employee fraud. While incidents of fraud are 
escalating within South Africa, so too is the cost of the loss to the victim organisations. It is of 
concern that fraud remains pervasive. Perhaps the assertion by Larson (2006:16), that there is a 
scarcity of skilled forensic accountants, is indeed a shortcoming in fraud prevention and 
detection.  
 
It is also likely that employees are aware that they will not be caught out as their organisations 
lack the relevant skills and expertise to unearth fraudulent conduct. Larson (2006:16) avers that 
little is being done by tertiary institutions to incorporate forensic accounting concepts into their 
curricula in order to provide undergraduates with fraud prevention skills. The gap in the 
curricula of universities could possibly be addressed by creating a partnership between 
universities and the ACFE. The ACFE (2014) provides an “Anti-Fraud Education 
Partnership” initiative between itself and universities, whereby the ACFE provides the 
required resources for the fraud examination course to universities at no cost. The ACFE 
suggests that this fraud examination course be integrated into the applicable mainstream degree 




Apart from the actual loss, organisations incur financial costs to have fraud cases investigated 
and to recover their losses. Laufer (2011:402) argues that a victim organisation may be further 
prejudiced due to legal costs, negative publicity and poor staff morale resulting from the fraud 
committed by an employee. Organisations undoubtedly have to spend additional funds for 
legal fees and costs to institute formal disciplinary procedures against the implicated employee, 
over and above the direct loss arising from the misappropriated funds. 
 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 was promulgated because 
the illegal obtaining of personal wealth is considered to be harmful to organisations, the 
economy, ethical values and the rule of law. Section 34 of this Act also places the onus on 
persons who are in positions of authority, to report corrupt transactions, inter alia, the offence 
of fraud involving an amount of R100 000 or more, to any police official. In its attempt to 
combat fraud and corruption, the government has made management personnel accountable 
should they not report such cases to the SAPS. The intention of the legislature is to eradicate 
employee fraud with the assistance of management and the public. Section 29 (1) of the Higher 
Education Act 101 of 1997 stipulates that a university council should establish committees 
who will have the delegated authority to carry out certain duties on its behalf. One such 
committee which is tasked with oversight of audit and risk at a university, is the audit and risk 
committee (UKZN, 2014:23). According to COSO (2013:148), the role of the audit and risk 
committee is, inter alia, to ensure oversight over the implementation of adequate and effective 
systems of internal control to mitigate all risks, including fraud risks by management. Both 
these Acts should be considered when addressing employee fraud and prevention strategies at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal.    
 
In this chapter an analysis is presented of various global fraud surveys that have been 
conducted by forensic auditing companies such as KPMG and PwC, as well as the ACFE. 
Hereunder, the factors of pressure, opportunity and rationalisation are explained in order to 
obtain enhanced insight into the fraud triangle explained below. 
 
3.3 FRAUD TRIANGLE MODEL  
According to Wells (2001:89), there are three factors that contribute to the perpetration of 
employee (occupational) fraud.  These three factors make up what is known as the fraud 
triangle. The elements that constitute the fraud triangle are pressure, opportunity and 
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rationalisation. According to Wells (2013:8), this model emanated from a hypothesis that was 
created by Cressey (1973:30).  
 
The three constructs mentioned above (pressure, opportunity and rationalisation) were utilised 
in Cressey’s study (Cressey, 1973:30) to establish the causes of employee fraud. These 
constructs, which are explained in in this chapter, provided an understanding of the root causes 
that lead to employees committing fraud against their employers.  
 
Cressey’s hypothesis (1973:30) is that persons on whom trust is bestowed, could breach that 
trust when faced with a financial difficulty. These so-called “trust violators”, as Cressey refers 
to them, are able to hide their fraudulent conduct and justify to themselves that the stolen funds 
were due to them in some way. According to Simuyemba (2012:1), this type of justification is 
premised on an entitlement mentality. The fraud triangle is cited globally as a recognised 
model in understanding the behaviour of fraudsters.  
 
The fraud triangle model is depicted in Figure 3.1 below: 
Figure 3.1: Fraud Triangle 
 
Source: Wells (1997:45) 
 
The three elements of the fraud triangle are referred to by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA; 2002:1722), through its Auditing Standards Board, which issued 
the Statement on Auditing Standards number 99. SAS 99 (as it is commonly referred to), deals 
with considering fraud when conducting an audit of financial statements. It stipulates that 
auditors should consider the pressure, opportunity and rationalisation of employees to commit 
fraud when auditing financial statements of organisations.  
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Although various researchers have in recent years modified and adapted the fraud triangle 
model, Coenen (2008:10) holds that it continues to be a popular model to provide improved 
understanding of fraud. The three factors of pressure, opportunity and rationalisation, which 
make up the fraud triangle, arise out of various types of circumstances that lend themselves to 
committing fraud. Albrecht et al. (2006:32) liken fraud to fire. Fire also requires three essential 
elements to be simultaneously present for it to ignite: fuel, oxygen and heat. Fire fighters bring 
fires under control by removing any one element. For example, the fire is doused with 
chemicals to prevent the supply of oxygen, heat is terminated with water and fuel is removed 
by building fire breaks. The circumstances that fraudsters rely on to commit fraud are 
elaborated on in detail below under each of the three factors. This section is particularly 
relevant to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
3.3.1 Pressure 
The pressure or motivation to commit fraud forms the first of three parts of the fraud triangle. 
Pressure manifests itself in the form of personal financial pressure facing the employee that 
motivates the employee to commit fraud. According to Cressey (1973:30), the source of 
pressure is usually a financial difficulty facing the person. The ACFE (2014:59) state in their 
Report to the Nations that 44% of fraudsters displayed behaviour that indicated that they were 
living beyond their means before the fraud was discovered. In other words, these persons were 
living a lifestyle that they were unable to afford or sustain. The ACFE (2014:59) also found 
that 33% of fraudsters were experiencing financial difficulties that were known to others. 
Coenen (2008:10) refers to the element of pressure as “motivation”. In essence pressure or 
motivation has to do with the reason why a person commits fraud. The pressure experienced by 
an employee to commit fraud could emanate either from work or personal life. Universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal should be cognisant of the types of pressure that employees encounter in order 
to address exposure of the universities to employee fraud.  
 
Albrecht et al. (2006:33) describe four different types of pressures. They are financial, vice, 
work-related or other types of pressures. According to Albrecht et al. (2006:33), most frauds 
relate to financial or vice pressures, which involve approximately 95 percent of cases. The 
vice-related pressure is generally attributed to drug, alcohol or gambling addiction. Work-
related pressure could be an employee who is disenchanted at being overlooked for promotion 
and commits the fraud to get even with the employer. Other pressures could emanate from 
 
 42 
wanting to please another person such as a spouse, by buying them expensive gifts. According 
to Albrecht et al. (2006:33), financial pressure can emanate from greed, living a lifestyle that is 
unaffordable, incurring a personal financial loss or unplanned financial need. 
       
Albrecht et al. (2006:36) found that most people face different types of pressure in their daily 
lives, but not everyone is susceptible to committing fraud. They hold the view, however, that a 
person of sound integrity, with a limited opportunity to commit fraud, will commit fraud if the 
pressure is excessive. The authors do not provide any examples of instances where this view is 
supported. Although Albrecht et al. (2006:36) postulate that the removal of pressure will 
ensure that fraud seldom occurs, this is perhaps not easily achieved. An employer, for example, 
can have little impact on an employee whose motive is greed or whose pressure is to get even 
with their employer. Albrecht et al. (2006:33) explain the fraud triangle by means of the 
“Fraud Scale”, which is depicted in Figure 3.2 below. The element of personal integrity has an 
impact on the rationalisation to commit fraud. If the situational pressures and opportunities to 
commit fraud are low, fraud would not occur when combined with high personal integrity. 
Employees with high personal integrity would not rationalise their criminal conduct to justify 
its commission.   
Figure 3.2: Fraud Scale 
 
Source: Albrecht et al. (2006:33) 
 
The results of a fraud survey carried out by Deloitte in the United Kingdom (2012:9) revealed 
that 43% of cases involved external pressure that motivated the employee to commit fraud. 
According to the results of the KPMG (2013:13) global fraud survey, the motives of the 
fraudsters were personal financial gain, at 47%, followed by greed at 42%. In instances where 
employees benefit from fraud, based on their motivation (pressure) of greed or personal gain, it 
is essential for organisations to ensure that their internal control environment is adequately 
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robust to prevent the risk of fraud by their employees. Opportunities that could be exploited by 
fraudsters to commit fraud should be minimised.   
 
3.3.2 Opportunity  
Opportunity to commit fraud constitutes the second element of the fraud triangle. An employee 
exploits an opportunity, such as a weak internal control, to commit and conceal the fraud. An 
employee who is intent on committing fraud either exploits an existing opportunity in the 
internal control environment or, if there is no available opportunity, creates one to complete 
the crime. According to Coenen (2008:12), an opportunity to commit fraud relies on the 
fraudster’s ability to access people and resources within the organisation. These resources are 
used to commit and conceal the fraud.  
 
Albrecht et al. (2006:37) refer to one control and five non-control elements that significantly 
contribute towards providing an opportunity for fraud to occur. The control element is: 
 Deficient controls or circumvention of controls.  
 
The five non-control elements are: 
 Unverifiable quality of goods or services is evident; 
 No appropriate disciplinary sanction is taken against employee for committing 
fraud; 
 Access to information by management is deficient; 
 Management is ignorant, apathetic and lacks capacity in terms of fraud, and 
 Non-existent audit trails are evident.  
 
When these six elements are appropriately addressed, it may limit the opportunity to commit 
fraud. In addressing the control and non-control elements, in order to reduce the opportunity to 
commit fraud, Albrecht et al. (2006:37) provide detailed examples and suggestions for the 
adequate and effective implementation of these six elements. The elements of internal control 
are explained in detail in Chapter Five.  
 
Albrecht et al. (2006:37) draw attention to the fact that most fraud prevention initiatives are 
focused on eliminating the opportunity to commit fraud, at the expense of the other two 
elements of the fraud triangle, namely, pressure and rationalisation. They assert that fraud 
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fighters are focusing on implementing internal controls and monitoring compliance to such 
controls. The issues of pressure and rationalisation are being ignored. They postulate that the 
decreasing levels of honesty in developed countries indicate that employees will continue to 
commit fraud as they rationalise their conduct, and require fewer opportunities or pressure.  
 
According to Maher (2013:1), an experiment was conducted by the magazine Reader’s Digest 
in 16 cities around the world. The experiment involved dropping purses that contained local 
currency of the relevant cities to the value of $50, in parks, shopping malls and sidewalks. The 
12 purses that were dropped in each city contained a photograph and a contact telephone 
number. The result of the experiment was that 47% of those who found the purses returned 
them to the “owners”; and the remaining 53% kept the purses for themselves. Helsinki in 
Finland had the most number of honest people, whereas Lisbon in Portugal had the least 
number of honest people. According to Maher (2013:1), the inference drawn from the study 
was that honest people could become dishonest based on the circumstances that enable them to 
be dishonest. A similar experiment could be extrapolated to South Africa to determine, for 
example, which provinces have citizens that may be susceptible to be dishonest.  
 
3.3.3 Rationalisation  
The third element of the fraud triangle, which is rationalisation, poses the highest risk to an 
organisation, according to Coenen (2008:13). This is because the organisation has little control 
over employee rationalisation. The fraudster rationalises the wrongful behaviour in his/her 
mind by, for example, justifying the wrongdoing because he/she was overlooked for promotion 
at work. Employees rationalise their misconduct in their minds in order to convince themselves 
that the fraudulent act that they are going to perpetrate is acceptable conduct. They use 
different scenarios to justify their fraudulent act to themselves. Albrecht et al. (2006:51) and 
Coenen (2008:13) share the view that fraudsters justify their misconduct in their minds by 
attributing it to a bonus or salary increase that they were entitled to but never received; they are 
also borrowing the money and will repay the money to the organisation, and moreover, no one 
will miss the money.  
 
The entitlement mentality as explained by Simuyemba (2012:1), is apt in this instance. Coenen 
(2008:13) is also of the view that fraudsters rationalise that the organisation brought the fraud 
upon itself by not implementing stronger controls and monitoring over the funds. Furthermore, 
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Albrecht et al. (2006:51) suggest that fraudsters also use other rationalisations such as the 
belief that fraud is perpetrated with a good cause in mind; the fraudster will rectify the book 
entries once the financial pressure is sorted out, and lastly, either the integrity or reputation of 
the fraudster has to be sacrificed in order to prevent embarrassment to them should the fraud be 
detected and exposed. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:38) summarise rationalisation as the 
“attitude” of a fraudster towards his conduct. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014) 
describes attitude as “a feeling or way of thinking that affects a person's behaviour”. The 
manner in which a person thinks or rationalises his/her intended actions will influence his/her 
response towards that conduct. The elements of the fraud triangle are of particular relevance 
when addressing employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
3.4 FRAUD DIAMOND MODEL 
The fraud diamond model was created by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:38) in pursuit of 
progressively refining the seminal fraud triangle model. The authors found that the 
interventions that were implemented to prevent and detect fraud, after the infamous Enron and 
WorldCom accounting frauds in the United States of America, may perhaps not be adequate to 
tackle the problem of fraud within organisations. The interventions that were implemented, 
post the accounting scandals of Enron and WorldCom, included stricter legislation, more 
robust internal controls, onerous standards and procedures for auditing, as well as wider 
oversight and ongoing monitoring of transactions and processes. In keeping with the various 
enhancements in the accounting and auditing fields at the time, the authors proposed an 
improvement to the fraud triangle.  
 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:38) proposed a fourth element in order to improve the detection 
and prevention of fraud. The addition of the fourth element of “capability” resulted in the 










Figure 3.3: Fraud Diamond 
 
Source: Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:38) 
 
3.4.1 Capability 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:38) suggest that frauds, which result in significant losses, are 
usually committed by “the right person with the right capabilities”. The authors hold the view 
that a person has to have the requisite traits to recognise an opportunity to commit fraud and 
the capacity to exploit that opportunity, thereby committing the fraudulent act. The other 
elements of the fraud triangle have to be present as well for fraud to take place.  
 
According to Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:39), there are six types of traits and abilities that are 
symptomatic of a fraudster’s capability. These employee capabilities are based on the 
following: 
 Position or type of job  
 Intelligent and experienced 
 Egoist and confident  
 Persuasive personality 
 Liar 
 Handles stress well  
 
The above authors suggest that fraudsters often rely on their position within an organisation to 
exploit opportunities or to create new opportunities to commit fraud. They are usually highly 
intelligent people who have substantial experience in their fields of expertise, and they 
understand the weaknesses within the organisations for which they work. They are confident 
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and have big egos, which make them believe that they are invincible. These types of people 
can influence other employees or suppliers to perpetrate and/or conceal the fraud. A fraudster 
is a good liar who is capable of maintaining a consistent trail of lies aimed at concealing the 
fraud. Lastly, fraudsters handle stress well because they need to continuously ensure that the 
fraud remains undetected in order to protect them (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004:39).  
 
KPMG (2013:7) suggest a differing view, arguing that the element of capability is a sub-
category of the element of opportunity because the fraudster has to possess certain personal 
traits that predispose him/her to exploit existing opportunities to commit fraud. KPMG 
(2013:5) finds that there are only three elements which drive fraud, based on the fraud triangle. 
The fourth element of capability, proffered by Wolfe and Hermanson, should be considered as 
a sub-element of opportunity.    
 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:42) identify three steps in attempting to understand the capability 
of a person to commit fraud. Firstly, they suggest that an assessment is made of the traits and 
skills of senior executives and other key employees. These could include vetting their 
background, having discussions with them, observing their behaviour to identify any signs of 
dishonesty and taking note of what other people say about the behaviour of the person. 
Secondly, if a person’s capability is identified as a risk, then adequate and appropriate internal 
controls have to be implemented, concurrent with regular auditing of the control environment 
associated with this person. These interventions have to be based on elements of the fraud 
diamond, but with specific focus on the capability of these employees to exploit identified 
opportunities. Lastly, it is suggested that a reassessment is made of the senior executives and 
key employees as an ongoing process. There is a need to reassess their capabilities as these 
tend to change as they are promoted in the organisation and gather more knowledge and 
authority in new positions. This may prompt a review of internal controls and/or the level of 
oversight over the new activities. According to Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:42), changes in 
business processes or systems may also warrant relevant review and enhancement of existing 
internal controls, due to new opportunities being created for employees who have the 
capability to commit fraud.  
 
The above three steps suggested by Wolfe and Hermanson may not be pragmatic in a real life 
sense because the proactive vetting and clandestine enquiry processes suggested may not be 
easily achievable. This is more so when the employee being vetted is a senior manager or 
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executive director. However, global fraud surveys, such as the survey by the ACFE (2014:40), 
continuously reflect that these senior levels of management are more prone to commit fraud 
than other junior levels of employees.  
 
According to Dorminey et al. (2011:23), there are two different types of fraudsters. They are 
“predators” and “accidental fraudsters”. Predator fraudsters could be compared to career-
criminals who commit crimes as a way of life. They have a criminal mind-set which is boosted 
by their arrogance. Predators are well organised, conceal their fraudulent schemes well and are 
not intimidated by auditors and other internal control interventions. Dorminey et al. (2011:23) 
postulate that a predator does not need pressure or rationalisation to commit fraud. The 
predator only seeks opportunities to commit fraud because of his/her criminal mind-set. This is 
unlike the accidental fraudster who requires all three elements of the fraud triangle to commit 
fraud. Dorminey et al. (2011:23) proffer a rival “New Fraud Diamond” model which is 
depicted in Figure 3.4 below. This “New Fraud Diamond” model reflects the aspects which 
motivate both types of fraudsters (accidental and predators). According to Dorminey et al. 
(2011:23), the fraud triangle was created with the accidental fraudster in mind because they are 
law-abiding citizens who would not normally commit fraud.  
 
Dorminey et al. (2011:23) found that predator fraudsters actively search for employment where 
they can commence their fraudulent schemes as soon as they are employed. Accidental 
fraudsters can eventually become predators if they are not caught out. The common element 
contained in the New Fraud Diamond model is opportunity. Both the predator and the 
accidental fraudster have to exploit an opportunity to commit fraud. Figure 3.4 below depicts 
the common element of opportunity: 
Figure 3.4: A New Fraud Diamond emerges with a Common Element 
 
Source: Dorminey et al. (2011:23) 
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The seminal fraud triangle model remains regularly cited by researchers such as Wells 
(2001:89), Albrecht et al. (2006:33) and Coenen (2008:10), who are involved in the study of 
employee fraud globally. The fraud diamond and the new fraud diamond models seek to 
enhance the understanding of researchers and other role players in the fields of fraud 
prevention and detection. Both predators and accidental fraudsters pose a risk to organisations.  
 
The fraud triangle model has evolved into the fraud diamond model, which posits the existence 
of four elements that a fraudster requires to perpetrate fraud. The fourth element of the fraud 
diamond model is “capability”. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:38) hold that fraud is committed 
by a person who has the “the right capabilities” to commit fraud. An honest employee who is 
under financial pressure, who is able to rationalise the unlawful deed, and who has found a 
weakness (opportunity) in the internal control system would not commit fraud if she/he is a 
law-abiding citizen. The fraud triangle model does not take into consideration the capability of 
a potential fraudster. The view of KPMG (2013:7) that the element of capability is a sub-
category of the element of opportunity is not supported because Cressey (1973:30) holds that 
there has to be deficient internal financial controls (opportunity) which the fraudster exploits in 
order to commit the fraud. A dishonest employee with the capability to commit fraud would 
take advantage of such an opportunity to commit fraud. An honest employee would not exploit 
that opportunity to commit fraud. It is essential to understand the element of capability in order 
to prevent fraud.  
 
The major theoretical stance that underpins this study is based on these four elements of the 
fraud diamond model, which are pressure, opportunity, rationalisation and capability. The 
ability to identify fraudsters and how they operate will be of assistance in addressing employee 
fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. In this regard, it is imperative 
that a holistic approach be considered by universities in KwaZulu-Natal.   
 
3.5 NATURE OF EMPLOYEE FRAUD 
The ACFE (2012:6) defines employee fraud as committed by a person who uses his/her 
occupation to enrich himself/herself by misusing the employer’s resources. The ACFE 
(2014:71) refers to employee fraud as “occupational fraud”, which they define as “the use of 
one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of 
the employing organization’s resources or assets”. This is supported by Albrecht (1998:110), 
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who asserts that embezzlement by an employee is an employee who steals company assets. 
Various studies have found that fraud which is committed by employees against their 
employers is ubiquitous and escalating. The findings of an international survey on economic 
crimes, carried out by PwC (2011:18), show that a total of 56% of perpetrators of fraud were 
employees of a company. Employees committed fraud against their employers. KPMG 
(2013:2) found in a survey that employees who commit fraud against their employers are 
mostly members of senior management who are employed in either finance, operations, 
executive, sales or the marketing functions.  
 
Deck (1985:52) draws attention to the concern about the increase in employee fraud within the 
private and public sectors, where an employee betrays the trust of a manager in order to 
commit the fraud. Etheridge (2012:42) is of the view that employee fraud is a worldwide 
problem. Accordingly, Scott (2001:16), asserts that employee fraud poses the greatest threat to 
an organisation than any other type of fraud. 
 
Gill and Wells (2007:64) suggest that training should be provided to all employees about ethics 
and anti-fraud policies of an organisation. Seidman (2002:423) states that internal controls and 
audits will not totally eradicate fraud, unless people are virtuous. Employees need to be 
continually reminded to conduct business in an ethical manner. According to Bryan (2012:21), 
the tone set at the top, by senior management, is a critical component in preventing fraud 
committed by employees against their employers. The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO; 2013:4) asserts that the board of directors and senior 
management have to set the tone at the top about the importance of internal controls as well as 
the ethical conduct of employees.  Bryan (2012:22) also believes that executive management 
should bear in mind that every employee has the capability to commit fraud against their 
employers under certain circumstances.  
 
Managers, leaders and executives have to adopt and constantly create awareness of the code of 
ethics of their organisation, according to Bryan (2012:22). Executives should lead by example 
in order to create an ethical culture that pervades the organisation and enables employees to 
prevent fraud in the workplace (Bryan 2012:22). The Councils of the universities in KwaZulu-
Natal together with the relevant executive and senior management should consider the creation 
and implementation of a code of ethics for university employees. In this regard, an ethical 
 
 51 
culture should be set by the leadership of the universities in order to lead by example when 
addressing employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
The ACFE (2014:11) depicts the three main categories and sub-categories of employee fraud 
as a “Fraud Tree”. Figure 3.5 below reflects the Fraud Tree, which also briefly depicts how 
employee fraud is committed in each category and sub-category. 
Figure 3.5: ACFE Fraud Tree 
 
 
Source: ACFE (2014:11) 
 
In the fraud tree, each identified sub-category contains its own inherent risks which have to be 
mitigated by adequate and appropriate measures aimed at preventing fraud from occurring. As 
organisations differ in the manner in which they operate, so too do the approaches and 
interventions that need to be implemented with the objective of preventing employee fraud. 
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The ACFE (2014:10) found that, despite the global advancements and evolution of technology 
and the business landscape, fraud schemes maintained a consistent pattern in the manner in 
which they were committed. Universities in KwaZulu-Natal should consider these consistent 
fraud patterns when devising strategies to manage fraud risks.    
 
3.6 EXTENT OF EMPLOYEE FRAUD 
As explained in Chapter One, the ACFE (2012:8) reported that losses, arising out of employee 
fraud, are estimated to cost organisations $3.5 trillion (R42 trillion) globally. This figure has 
increased to $3.7 trillion (R44.4 trillion) globally, according to the latest report from the ACFE 
(2014:4), which conducted its biennial survey (2014:2) involving 1483 cases of employee 
fraud that were investigated globally by Certified Fraud Examiners (CFE).  
 
The Report to the Nations by the ACFE (2014:4) reflects the three categories of employee 
fraud to which organisations fall victim. These are asset misappropriation, corruption and 
financial statement fraud. The ACFE (2014:71) defines asset misappropriation as employee 
fraud involving, inter alia, theft of cash, processing fake invoices and submitting fraudulent 
expense claims. Corruption involves the misuse of an employee’s influence in their official 
capacity in order to gain an undue personal benefit from a business transaction; such as 
bribery. Lastly, financial statement fraud involves an employee making a mis-statement in the 
financial reports of an organisation or the omission of vital information from such reports, inter 
alia, inflating income, understating expenses, or overstating assets.  
 
Cases involving asset misappropriation were found by the ACFE to be the highest, totalling 
85% of all cases reported on. The average loss per case was $130 000 (R1.5 million). The 
second highest was corruption, totalling 37% of all cases surveyed, with an average loss per 
case of $200 000 (R2.4 million). The lowest was financial statement fraud totalling 9% of 
cases. According to the ACFE (2014:12), the average loss in this category was $1 million (R12 
million).  
 
An analysis of fraud, categorised as asset misappropriation by the ACFE (2014:13), revealed 
that cheque tampering, billing as well as non-cash misappropriations, posed the highest risk to 




Figure 3.6 reflects the frequency and median loss due to asset misappropriation sub-schemes: 
Figure 3.6: ACFE Frequency and Median Loss of Asset Misappropriation Sub-Schemes 
 
Source: ACFE (2014:13) 
 
As concealment is a cornerstone of employee fraud, numerous fraud schemes are never 
unearthed or reported. Over and above the actual funds that are stolen, organisations incur 
other indirect costs such as loss in production, fees to have the fraud investigated and 
processed through courts of law, and damage to the image and reputation of the organisation. 
The ACFE (2014:8) suggests that this scenario is comparable to the proverbial iceberg, where 
the direct loss is clearly visible above the surface but there are other significant hidden costs 
that are not plainly visible because they lie below the surface. This scenario indicates that fraud 
is more wide-spread than what is actually known. 
 
PwC (2011:20) conducted its biennial global economic crime survey and found that asset 
misappropriation accounted for 72% of the cases surveyed; accounting fraud (financial 
statement fraud) was at 24% and corruption was also at 24% of cases surveyed. PwC reported 
that asset misappropriation has consistently been the highest type of reported fraud, escalating 
by 20% since their 2003 global economic crime survey. 
 
The results of the biennial fraud survey conducted by KPMG (2011:16) indicate that the 
average duration of fraud, before being detected, is 3.4 years. The delay in organisations 
detecting fraud is directly related to the controls that are implemented coupled by management 
oversight over these control activities. Deficient controls and lack of management oversight 
impact the prevention and detection of frauds. These deficiencies provide fertile grounds 
(opportunities) for dishonest employees to commit fraud without fear of being detected or 
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being prevented from doing so. The longer the duration of fraud, the higher the escalation of 
the losses arising out of fraud. This section is clearly relevant to employee fraud and 
prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.    
 
3.7 MODI OPERANDI OF FRAUDSTERS 
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014), modus operandi is defined as “a distinct 
pattern or method of operation that indicates or suggests the work of a single criminal in more 
than one crime”. Horgan (1979:59) holds that the term modus operandi is derived from Latin, 
meaning “operational method of procedure”. It is commonly referred to as method of 
operation or “M.O.”. The analysis of the modus operandi of a criminal is useful to forensic 
investigators because it enables them to identify the manner in which a specific criminal 
commits a specific type of crime on a number of occasions. The view of Campbell and DeNevi 
(2004:15) is that the repeated pattern according to which a crime is committed will assist in 
establishing the modus operandi of the perpetrator, especially if a serial criminal is responsible 
for the crimes.  
 
Jackson and Bekerian (1997:2) assert that the types of motives and modi operandi employed 
by criminals, in committing crimes, are limited. In addition, they postulate that a crime and the 
criminal are not unique when viewed as a whole. On the one hand, the limited types of modi 
operandi employed by criminals may create a perception that detecting, investigating or 
preventing fraud will be an easy task. On the other hand, a fraudster who uses a specific 
method to commit a crime, cannot automatically be considered to be linked to a particular 
crime. In other words, profiling an offender based only on their motive and/or modus operandi, 
in order to identify a fraudster, for example, will not be an easy task. This can be largely 
attributed to the various ways in which criminals commit crimes. Fraud, for example, is 
perpetrated in various ways.  
 
The ACFE (2014:71) defined the various terms used to describe the various types of fraud 








Table 3.1: Definition of Terminology 
TERM DEFINITION 
Billing Employee submits invoices for goods and/or services that were never received, but payment is made. 
The scheme also involves invoices for the purchase of personal items as well as inflated invoices. 




Employee steals cash, for example, petty cash belonging to the organisation. 
Cash register 
disbursements 
Employee makes fraudulent entries in the records of the organisation in order to steal cash on hand, for 
example, by voiding a transaction on the cash register to steal the cash. 
Cheque tampering Employee steals the cheque of his employer and fraudulently makes it out to himself/herself or to an 
accomplice, or intercepts a cheque from a debtor and deposits it into the fraudster’s bank account. 
Expense 
disbursements 




Employee steals or misuses non-cash assets, for example, inventory from the storeroom or confidential 
business information. 
Payroll Employee claims for overtime that was not worked or adds non-existent (ghost) employees onto the 
payroll. 
Skimming Employee steals money received on behalf of the organisation before it is recorded in the financial 
records or banked. 
 
Source: ACFE (2014:71) 
 
Asset misappropriation is a predominant category of fraud that is occurring globally. The nine 
sub-categories of fraud schemes listed above provide a portrait of the modi operandi employed 
by fraudsters in perpetrating these sorts of fraudulent schemes. Once there is an understanding 
as to how fraud is committed, this forms a basis for designing and implementing adequate and 
appropriate prevention and detection measures.  
 
To augment the steps taken to combat fraud within an organisation, the use of red flags in 
conjunction with the analysis of modi operandi and motives should be considered. The term 
“red flag” is commonly referred to by individuals within the forensic auditing, accounting and 
investigation fields. A red flag is defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015) as “a 
warning sign which indicates that there is a problem that should be noticed or dealt with”. 
Results of the ACFE biennial survey (2014:59) revealed that fraudsters displayed certain 
behavioural characteristics before a fraud was detected. Not all behavioural red flags mean that 
an employee is involved in committing fraud. Red flags provide the organisation with an early 
warning system, which indicates that something may be amiss. The ACFE (2014:59) surveyed 
and reported on 17 types of red flags. The types of red flags that the perpetrators of employee 
fraud displayed, were ranked from highest to lowest as follows: 
 Living beyond their means; 
 Experiencing financial difficulties; 
 Having unusually close association with supplier or customer; 
 Control issues and reluctance to share duties; 
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 “Wheeler-Dealer” attitude; 
 Divorce/family problems; 
 Irritability, suspiciousness or defensiveness; 
 Addiction problems; 
 Complained about inadequate pay; 
 Past employment-related problems; 
 Refusal to take vacation leave; 
 Excessive pressure from within the organisation; 
 Social isolation; 
 Complained about lack of authority; 
 Excessive family/peer pressure for success; 
 Instability in life circumstances, and  
 Past legal problems. 
 
The ACFE (2014:59) found that one red flag was present during 92% of the cases surveyed, 
while a combination of at least two or more red flags were present in 64% of the cases. An 
analysis of the results indicates the top six types of red flags which constitute the majority, 
namely: 
 Living beyond their means – 44%;  
 Experiencing financial difficulties – 33% ; 
 Having unusually  close association with supplier or customer – 22%; 
 Control issues and reluctance to share duties – 21%; 
 “Wheeler-Dealer” attitude – 18%, and 
 Divorce/family problems – 17%. 
 
According to the ACFE (2014:59), these six red flags were also found to be the most common 
types of red flags during the previous three biennial studies that were carried out globally. 
Coenen (2008:127) suggests that organisations should set out a list of red flags which could be 
used to trigger an investigation, once a warning sign (red flag) or a combination of red flags 
are identified. Knowledge about these modi operandi will be beneficial in addressing employee 




3.8 MOTIVES OF FRAUDSTERS 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014) defines motive as “a reason for doing something”. 
The motive of employees to commit fraud was briefly explained in Chapter Two. Generally, 
when a crime occurs, employers would like to know why the crime occurred. For example, it is 
not unusual for employers to want to know the reason why an employee committed fraud 
against their employer. Popular culture seeks this knowledge, and movies tend to focus on this 
aspect in the build-up to the main action. 
 
According to Comer (1977:9), it will be useful to understand what motivates and demotivates a 
criminal to commit a crime, in order to enhance the prevention and detection thereof. 
According to Robertson (2000:193), motives that are based on financial needs prompt 
employees to commit fraud against their employers. This view is shared by Silverstone and 
Sheetz (2007:18), who suggest that financial motives are a significant motive to commit fraud.   
 
Coenen (2008:10) likens the element of “pressure” from the fraud triangle to motivation. He 
holds the view that motivation (pressure) is the first step which activates an employee to 
commit fraud against his/her employer. In other words, the employee has a reason to commit 
fraud. Coenen (2008:11) suggests that, apart from financial reasons, there could also be non-
financial reasons to commit fraud. For example, the reason could be to cover up a task that was 
not done well. Financial motives are more prevalent than non-financial motives. Coenen 
(2008:53) suggests that employees who are paid according to market rates will be less inclined 
to commit fraud. According to Schwartz et al. (2008:1), pressure on university employees to 
commit fraud against their employers are high due to mediocre salaries paid to staff by most 
universities. The publication by Schwartz et al. (2008:1) relates to preventing university fraud 
and is attached as Appendix 7 to this thesis. 
 
3.9 PROCESS OF FRAUDSTER PROFILING 
The purpose of profiling fraudsters is to recognise the type of employee who commits fraud. In 
respect of this study, the focus has been on employees who commit fraud against their 
organisations. As explained earlier in this chapter, a number of the “Big 4” auditing and 
accounting firms and the ACFE conduct biennial global fraud surveys. The results of global 
surveys that are explained below, were conducted by KPMG (2013:2), KPMG (2011:4), the 
ACFE (2014:40) and PwC (2014:15). These global fraud surveys revealed the categories of 
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positions occupied by the fraudsters within their organisations. The results about the type of 
employees who commit fraud are listed in Table 3.2 below:  
Table 3.2: Category of employees who commit fraud 
CATEGORY ACFE PwC KPMG 
Junior employees 42% 34% 18% 
Management 36% 42% 29% 
Owners/executives 19% 20% 35% 
Other 3% 3% 18% 
 
Source: (ACFE 2014) (PwC 2014) (KPMG 2013) (KPMG 2011) 
 
The results of these three global surveys indicate that management and senior management 
constitute the majority of fraudsters. The ACFE (2014:58) revealed that the majority of 
fraudsters had not committed fraud previously. It was noted that 5% of the fraudsters had 
previous convictions for fraud-related crimes. The ACFE (2014:40) also found that 82% of the 
fraudsters had not been previously subjected to disciplinary action by their employers. This is 
corroborated by the survey by KPMG (2013:6), which found that the fraudsters were mostly 
first time offenders. Table 3.3 below reflects the findings of these three surveys in respect of 
the predominant age, gender, department employed in, and length of service of fraudsters 
globally: 
Table 3.3: Category of age, gender, qualifications and length of service of fraudsters 
CATEGORY ACFE PwC KPMG 
Age in years 31-45 31-50 36-55 
Gender Male Male Male 
Qualification  University degree University degree University degree 
Length of service in years 1-5 >10 >6 
 
Source: (ACFE 2014) (PwC 2014) (KPMG 2013) 
 
There were collectively 33% females and 67% males in these three surveys. The ACFE 
(2014:55) study also found that the fraudsters were predominantly employed (in 77% of cases) 
in seven departments, namely, accounting, operations, sales, executive/senior management, 
customer service, procurement and finance. Two of the surveys found that most fraudsters had 
university degrees. A difference was noted in the findings in these surveys relating to the 
length of time that fraudsters had been employed by the victim organisation when they 
committed the fraud. The ACFE (2014:52) found that the group with a length of service 
between 1 to 5 years were involved in the highest number of frauds. In contrast, PwC 
(2014:15) found that the length of service was in excess of 10 years. KPMG (2013:2) found 
that the length of service was in excess of 6 years. The results of the three surveys, which 
pertain to the length of service of employees, do not correlate with one another as the ACFE 
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survey indicates that employees begin to commit fraud against their employees after the first 
year of service and PwC found that this happens after 10 years of service.  
 
These surveys also found that mostly well-educated male employees, holding senior positions 
and are first time offenders, fit the typical profile of a fraudster. The finding from the KPMG 
and ACFE surveys suggests that employees commit fraud after 6 years and 10 years of service, 
which indicates that fraud predators are not necessarily a prevalent group. Dorminey et al. 
(2011:23) suggest that fraud predators commence with their fraudulent activities immediately 
when they commence a new job, not after 6 or 10 years. This section is particularly relevant to 
employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.   
 
3.10 SUMMARY  
This chapter explained in detail the theory of employee fraud, the fraud triangle model, the 
fraud diamond model, the nature of employee fraud, the extent of employee fraud, the 
respective modi operandi of fraudsters, the motives of fraudsters and fraudster profiling. 
 
The ongoing global fraud surveys reflect that employee fraud continues to have a negative 
financial impact on organisations. The fraud triangle model and other models that have since 
emerged after it, afford organisations a chance to understand why fraud is perpetrated by their 
employees. Despite the existence of various laws prohibiting fraud, this crime continues 
unabated. There is a need for organisations to focus on addressing lapses in the ethical culture 
amongst their employees, as well eradicating opportunities which fraudsters exploit. 
Employees with a criminal mind-set coupled with an attitude of arrogance, pose a risk to their 
employers. Most fraudsters emanate from the senior and executive management cadres. 
Misappropriation of the assets is the most prevalent category of employee fraud. Red flags 
serve a useful purpose in alerting employers about potential fraudulent activities of their 
employees.         
 
Given this background to the occurrence of fraud, the next chapter explores the prevention of 
fraud and provides an explanation of the fraud risk management models that are available for 








PERSPECTIVES OF FRAUD PREVENTION 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
During the rule of the Greek empire, around 500 B.C., Lee (1971:152) describes how 
“checking clerks” were appointed to verify receipts and payments relating to governmental 
organisations. These receipts and payments were approved and ordered by magistrates who 
were appointed for that purpose. There is further indication that ancient civilisations were not 
only designing and implementing control measures, but were adapting newer ones over time. 
In modern times, fraud prevention has become an integral component of conducting business 
throughout the world. With the advent of evolving business practices, organisations 
conducting business across geographical and political borders, and the sophistication of 
computer technology, fraudsters have also adapted their modi operandi to perpetrate fraud in 
the twenty-first century. In order to prevent fraud, governments have enacted legislation, 
while organisations in general have implemented or amended relevant fraud prevention 
policies and procedures. The pervasiveness of fraud in society has also resulted in the setting 
up of global organisations that are involved in providing advisory consulting services, to 
design models and frameworks aimed at preventing organisations from becoming victims of 
fraud. This chapter elaborates on a number of fraud prevention models and frameworks. In 
this study, the Fraud Risk Management Model, which was compiled by KPMG (2006), is 
explored in more detail with focus on selected constructs relevant to employee fraud and 
prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.    
 
4.2 FRAUD PREVENTION THEORY 
During the period 1100 to 1200 A.D., accounting duties were segregated, according to Lee 
(1971:151), in order to serve as a control measure. Lee (1971:154) holds that a “tally stick” 
was also used at the time and served the purpose of a receipt, with one of the objectives being 
to prevent fraud and error. According to Lee (1971:154), a “pipe roll” was in use in England 
during the same period in order to maintain a record of the revenues due to the monarchy, as 




Wells (2002:28) theorises that educating employees about fraud is relevant in protecting 
organisations from becoming victims of fraud, because awareness about how various fraud 
schemes are perpetrated equips organisations from becoming victims. Wells (2002:28) points 
out that the prevention of occupational fraud is easier than its detection. In relation to the topic 
of this study, Peltier-Rivest (2014:37) specifically holds that numerous universities do not 
report frauds of which they were victims, because they want to protect their reputation with 
stakeholders such as students and donors. Peltier-Rivest (2014:40) shows that universities can 
effectively combat fraud if they implement a mechanism which allows people to anonymously 
report fraud. 
 
Abbasi et al. (2012:1293) emphasise that detecting fraud remains a challenge for technology 
that is used for business intelligence purposes. It is beneficial for organisations to prevent fraud 
from occurring than detecting it. According to Adams et al. (2006:56), prevention is a cost-
effective way in which to deal with financial loss attributed to fraud. Kranacher (2013:80) 
suggests that the focus of antifraud efforts is moving from detection to prevention. 
 
According to Gannaway (2013:12), it is a requisite, in the prevention of fraud, to accept that 
fraud is a common occurrence which is also perpetrated by the most trusted employees. In 
support, Tusek and Klikovac (2011:60) suggest that an appropriate fraud prevention 
intervention is the implementation of a code of ethics for all employees in an organisation. It is 
relevant for management, who are responsible for the prevention of fraud, to assess all fraud 
risks in their work environment and devise proactive fraud prevention strategies to address the 
risks. Placing reliance on internal controls only to prevent fraud is misguided, as management 
needs to lead by example and also educate employees about ethical conduct. The issue of 
ethics within a sound governance framework should be addressed by management who need to 
set the tone for ethical conduct which staff are expected to follow. 
 
According to Coenen (2008:2), most organisations have control systems that are not designed 
to prevent fraud from occurring because fraudsters violate these systems for their own financial 
gain. Coenen (2008:18) holds that employees should be made aware that prompt action will be 
taken against them should they commit fraud. This deters future acts of fraud against the 
organisation. Coenen (2008:148) asserts that fraudsters violate existing internal controls in 
order to commit and conceal fraud. Preventive internal controls are a prerequisite for fraud 
prevention. Coenen (2008:159) consequently offers a fraud prevention framework which is 
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based on three key aspects. They are fraud education, investigation, and prevention techniques. 
Firstly, the education aspect involves educating employees about the risks of fraud. Secondly, 
is the investigation of fraud whenever it is suspected. Lastly, designing and implementing 
internal controls that prevent the perpetration of fraud, are essential. While it may be stated that 
internal controls are not the only measure that will prevent employee fraud, the model 
proposed by Albrecht et al. (2006:111) advocates a range of interventions, including internal 
controls, for the prevention of fraud. This section sets out relevant aspects that should be 




According to Burchell (2005:9), criminal law is used as a social mechanism that is used to 
instil fear into people not to commit crime, by threats of negative consequences against them 
in the form of punishment being imposed on them should they not abide by the law. The 
primary purpose of criminal law is to prevent crimes from taking place. Burchell (2005:10) 
avers that punishment entails depriving one of something, or inflicting suffering on a person 
found guilty of committing a crime. He (2005:18) postulates that penology deals with 
addressing criminal behaviour with the objective of rehabilitating the criminal so that s/he 
does not commit crimes again. The existence of criminal law also serves a preventative 
purpose by prohibiting certain conduct that is deemed to be unlawful. An act is unlawful and 
is also punishable by the state, through incarceration, paying a fine or community service. 
The obvious implication for the perpetrator is that s/he would have a criminal record which 
would impact on future employment that is sought.  
 
4.2.1.1 Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
According to Burchell (2005:116), the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 is the authoritative legislation in the country; the 
provisions of all statutes, common law and customary law should be aligned with the norms of 
the Bill of Rights. Section 29 (1) (b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
108 of 1996 stipulates that “everyone has the right to further education, which the state, 
through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible”. Further 
education includes education provided by public universities, which are funded by the state. 
The state has a duty to progressively make further education available to all its citizens. The 
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Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014) defines “progressively”, which is used in the Bill of 
Rights, as “happening or developing gradually over a period of time”. The perpetration of 
fraud by employees of universities contributes towards undermining this right, as universities 
are unable to gradually increase the number of new students at universities due to constrained 
funding. The need to prevent employee fraud at universities is essential, according to Peltier-
Rivest (2014:37), as it contributes towards ensuring the mitigation of reputational risk and the 
continued financial support from governments and donors, which is essential for the 
sustainability and growth of public universities.  
 
Section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 relates to the 
values and principles that govern public administration. The salient principles that relate to 
preventing employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal in particular and other public 
institutions in general are: 
 Professional ethical standards must be maintained; 
 Resources must be utilised efficiently and effectively, and 
 There must be accountability from those entrusted with public administration. 
 
The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele White Paper) was 
implemented within the public sector in South Africa in 1997. The Batho Pele (People First) 
(2010:2) principles, were designed and implemented by the South African government in order 
to ensure effective and efficient service delivery to the public based on sound ethics. Section 8 
of the Batho Pele principles (2010:77) relates to education, and to higher education in 
particular, which is the focus of this study.    
  
Section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 as well as the 
Batho Pele principles are explained in further detail in Chapter Six.  
  
4.2.1.2 Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 
The Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 stipulates under Section 27 (1) that the Council of a 
public higher education institution is tasked with the governance of that institution within the 
parameters of applicable laws and the statute of that institution. According to the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary (2014), the word “govern” is defined as “to officially control and lead (a 
group of people)”. It is the role of the Council of a public higher education institution to ensure 
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that the institution is managed in an effective and efficient manner in line with good 
governance principles espoused in Section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 108 of 1996, Batho Pele principles (2010:77) and King III (2009:16).  
 
4.2.1.3 Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 is intended to combat organised crime, 
money laundering and criminal gang activities. As fraud is one of the crimes that may be 
committed in an organised manner, it is listed under Schedule 1 of this Act. Of relevance to 
this study are the prohibitions and implications for persons who perpetrate fraud as an 
organised crime activity. There is a common law responsibility that people who are aware of 
organised criminal activities, to report such to the police so that these could be investigated so 
that those who are implicated could be successfully prosecuted. 
 
4.2.1.4 Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 
The Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 aims to encourage the eradication of criminal and 
irregular behaviour within the workplace. This Act encourages employees to make a protected 
disclosure against an employer or the employee of an employer who is suspected to be 
committing an offence. Section 1 of the Act stipulates, inter alia, that an employee may make a 
protected disclosure when s/he has reason to believe that a criminal offence was, or is being, or 
is going to be, committed. The Act prohibits the employee, who has made a protected 
disclosure, from being subjected to any occupational detriment by the employer. Section 1 
defines occupational detriment as, inter alia, the employee being subjected to disciplinary 
action, harassment, intimidation and dismissal due to the protected disclosure s/he has made. 
The provisions of this Act are essential when organisations consider implementing an 
anonymous whistle blowing service. Employees require assurance that their confidential 
disclosure would not be detrimental to their continued employment. 
 
4.2.1.5 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 is intended, inter alia, to 
enhance the measures to prevent corrupt activities, including fraud. This Act succeeded the 
previous Corruption Act 94 of 1992. In the preamble to this latest Act, it states that “the illicit 
acquisition of personal wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic institutions, 
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national economies, ethical values and the rule of law”. The impact of corrupt and fraudulent 
activities is widespread, necessitating the creation of this Act. A further measure aimed at 
preventing and combating fraud and corruption is contained in Section 34 (1) (b) of this Act, 
which makes it incumbent upon any person in authority, who is aware or should be aware, that 
any person has committed theft, fraud extortion, forgery or presenting a forged document, 
valued at R100 000 or more, has to report this to a police official. The Act aims to engender a 
culture of reporting violations to the police for the investigation and prosecution of offenders. 
 
4.2.1.6 Companies Act 71 of 2008 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 was promulgated in order to, inter alia, define the relationships 
between companies, their directors and shareholders, as well as how companies are 
incorporated, managed, operated and governed. Section 159 of this Act also deals with the 
protection of whistle blowers. The Act reaffirms the provisions of the Protected Disclosures 
Act 26 of 2000 insofar as it relates to the Companies Act. Various forms of fraudulent conduct 
are prohibited in the Companies Act and punishable in law. In terms of this study, the 
Companies Act contributes towards the prevention of fraud by setting out the prohibitions and 
penalties for transgressions of the Act. The Act serves a deterrent value to potential fraudsters. 
The Act is not directly applicable to higher education institutions as they are not regarded as 
companies in terms of the Act.  
 
4.2.1.7 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956  
In terms of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, employers who are defrauded by their 
employees are entitled to recover the value of the loss, including legal fees, from the pension 
fund benefits of the employee who is implicated. Section 37D deals with the pension fund 
making certain deductions from the pension fund benefits. Section 37D (1) (b) (ii) authorises a 
pension fund to deduct compensation that is due to the member’s employer for damage 
suffered by it due to fraud, theft or misconduct from the pension fund benefits of the employee. 
This Section of the Act also serves as a deterrent to other employees. It reminds them that the 
employer is able to recover the value of loss from their pension fund benefits. In instances 
where, for example, an employee resigns before any disciplinary action could be instituted 
against him/her, the employer has recourse to recoup its loss from the pension fund benefits of 
the implicated employee. This Act contributes to the prevention of employee fraud. These Acts 
 
 66 
should be taken into consideration when addressing employee fraud and prevention strategies 
at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
4.2.2 Fraud Prevention Initiatives 
Fraud prevention is essential for the sustainability of any organisation, not least universities. 
According to Abbasi et al. (2012:1294), fraud schemes continue for many years before being 
detected, which indicates the fraud prevention systems that were implemented had little effect 
in preventing fraud from taking place. Adams et al. (2006:56) hold the view that fraud has 
negative consequences for a business, which could lead to its demise if there are no fraud 
prevention procedures in place. The authors describe fraud prevention as a set of proactive 
measures aimed at preventing or mitigating fraud. Boyle et al. (2012:62) suggest that fraud 
prevention and detection initiatives should be focused on chief executive officers (CEOs) and 
chief finance officers (CFOs) of companies in respect of fraudulent financial reporting of 
cases, as such individuals are prone to be implicated in such frauds. Gannaway (2013:12) 
proffers that the leadership of organisations should set a strong ethical tone at the top, which 
their employees should follow, together with a code of conduct followed by awareness training 
for all employees about the tone at the top and the code of conduct. This will encourage 
employees, who may be inclined to commit fraud, to desist from doing so. 
 
Hambleton (2011:19) makes a comparison between the “sickness model” used in the health 
care industry and enforcement against fraud. Another comparison is made between the health 
care “wellness model” and fraud prevention. Hambleton (2011:19) explains that the “sickness 
model” is reactive and treatment occurs after the onset of the sickness, similar to enforcement 
which takes place after the fraud is detected. However, the “wellness model” is proactive in its 
approach, requiring members to participate in wellness programs aimed at keeping them 
healthy, similar to fraud prevention and compliance programs. The prevention of fraud is a 
proactive approach which requires employees to participate in maintaining a healthy 
organisation similar to the “wellness model”. A preventative approach is preferred. 
 
According to Schwartz et al. (2008:1), universities are erroneously perceived to be places 
where ethical standards are of the highest level whereas this is unfortunately not so. Peltier-
Rivest (2014:37) holds that poor internal controls at universities provide opportunities for 
fraud to be perpetrated. Universities are beset with fraud as are other organisations. There is a 
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need to design and implement robust anti-fraud policies and procedures in order to prevent 
fraud from occurring. In this study, the fraud prevention model includes more than sound anti-
fraud policies and procedures.  
 
4.2.2.1 Fraud Policy and Response Plan 
It is essential for organisations to create and implement a fraud policy and response plan. 
According to the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA, 2008:44), 
organisations should address fraud by designing and implementing a fraud policy and response 
plan. The policy should stipulate the action that will be taken once fraud is detected or 
suspected. Such a policy serves multiple objectives. It has an effect on fraud prevention, 
detection and response (investigation). The policy should guide the process of evidence 
gathering to ensure admissibility in courts of law. CIMA (2008:44) also avers that the policy 
should emphasise the commitment of the organisation to high standards of legal, moral and 
ethical conduct as well as spell out the consequences for employees who do not adhere to these 
standards. According to Ernst and Young (EY; 2013:2), it is essential to have a well-defined 
fraud response plan that will ensure that investigations are conducted ethically and effectively. 
The Fraud Policy and Response Plan of UKZN (2015) is attached as Appendix 11 to this 
thesis. The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA; 2009:20) argues that a fraud policy is essential 
for management, in which a strong ethical culture amongst all employees within the 
organisation is stipulated. Krummeck (2000:269) holds the view that a fraud policy should be 
seen to be endorsed by executive and senior management, and communicated throughout the 
organisation for it to be successful.   
 
4.2.2.2 Whistle-Blowing  
The results of a global survey conducted by the ACFE (2014:19) show that 42 percent of 
employee fraud was detected by means of a tip off. This result emphasises the benefit to 
organisations in having a whistle blowing facility together with a relevant policy to address 
fraud. According to Lord (2010:14), most organisations do not have a process of rewarding 
whistle blowers for providing a tip off, despite the fact that tip offs are the most predominant 
means of detecting fraud. In an instance when a person who provides a tip off wishes to remain 
anonymous, the assertion by Lord (2010:14) may not be possible. The ACFE (2014:21) holds 




Nilsen (2010:22) proffers that it is essential in a fraud prevention and detection program to 
ensure the provision of an anonymous, confidential and independent system for reporting 
fraud. Reidy and Theobald (2011:48) hold the view that whistle blowing programs are 
effective tools in combating fraud. According to Reidy and Theobald (2011:48), the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 in the United States of America (USA) compelled organisations to 
implement a whistle blowing program in order to receive and respond to reports about 
fraudulent activities. Subsequently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 compelled the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
reward whistle blowers for reporting transgressions of federal securities legislation in the USA. 
According to the website of the U.S. SEC (2014), the Commission is authorised to provide 
“monetary awards to eligible individuals who come forward with high-quality original 
information that leads to a Commission enforcement action in which over $1,000,000 in 
sanctions is ordered. The range for awards is between 10% and 30% of the money collected”. 
According to Krummeck (2000:271), employees will report fraud only if they trust the system.  
 
4.2.2.3 Ethics 
According to CIMA (2008:28), designing and implementing anti-fraud policies and a code of 
ethics are not sufficient in addressing fraud. Organisations need to inculcate a culture of ethical 
conduct amongst all its employees, from its leadership to the most junior employee. Employees 
should emulate their leadership and management and act ethically. CIMA (2008:28) avers that 
management should not adopt double standards and act unethically, yet expect their 
subordinates to behave otherwise. Reidy and Theobald (2011:50) hold the view that it is 
essential for management to engender a sound ethical culture at the top, which is supported by 
management leading by example and providing awareness training to employees. According to 
Krummeck (2000:271), employees can be prevented from committing fraud if they are 
reminded about the impact their incarceration for fraud will have on their families. This will 
assist in inculcating a sound ethical culture within the organisation.  
 
4.2.2.4 Fraud Awareness 
According to Reidy and Theobald (2011:50), providing fraud awareness training to employees 
is one of the standard fraud prevention methods that organisations utilise. Krummeck 
(2000:269) suggests that organisations should be transparent in their communication with 
employees by providing training to them to make them aware of what they need to look out 
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for, the nature of fraud, the manner in which it was committed and relevant statistics which 
may indicate a pattern of fraud. Krummeck (2000:269) avers that employees will not be 
equipped to assist in the prevention of fraud in the absence of this type of training. Employees 
who are trained to identify fraud schemes will be valuable in reporting fraud when they 
encounter it. Krummeck (2000:271) suggests that the provision of awareness training to 
employees about fraud and unethical conduct should also include highlighting its devastating 
effect on the entire organisation. According to Albrecht et al. (2006:111), Coenen (2008:159) 
and CIMA (2008:24), educating and making employees aware of fraud is an essential fraud 
prevention intervention. This section should be considered when addressing employee fraud 
and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
4.3 FRAUD PREVENTION MODELS 
In order to address employee fraud, various fraud prevention models have been designed by 
various authors and organisations. These models are elaborated on below. For purposes of this 
study, the KPMG Fraud Risk Management Model was chosen and is explained in detail. The 
KPMG model was chosen because of its direct relevance to this research as well as the 
comprehensive approach proposed by the KPMG model in addressing fraud globally.  
 
4.3.1 Fraud-Fighting Model  
Albrecht et al. (2006:111) suggest a fraud-fighting model to combat fraud. They assert that the 
prevention of fraud yields large savings for an organisation. The detection and investigation of 
fraud costs money as it does not address the root causes, which result in recurring frauds with 
inherent losses and risks. Their proposed model to combat fraud suggests six elements, 
namely, tone at the top, education and training, integrity risk and controls, reporting and 
monitoring, proactive detection and investigation and follow-up. First, the tone at the top 
entails having a good code of conduct, and management leading by example, based on this 
code. Second, educating employees about fraud and what they need to do if they encounter 
fraud, is essential. Third, management should assess frauds that have occurred and design and 
implement internal controls that prevent a recurrence. Fourth, reporting and monitoring entails 
the provision of a fraud hotline by which employees can report their suspicion of fraud as well 
as monitor, by means of audits and reviews by both internal and external auditors and 
management. Fifth, proactively detecting fraud entails conducting an analysis of data. Lastly, 
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the investigation and follow-up element entails having a policy and procedure in place that sets 
out how the investigation will be executed. Figure 4.1 below shows the fraud-fighting model: 
Figure 4.1: Fraud-Fighting Model 
 
 
Source: Albrecht et al. (2006:111) 
 
Albrecht et al. (2006:111), Coenen (2008:159) and CIMA (2008:24) propose the following 
common fraud prevention interventions: 
 Education for employees in the form of fraud awareness, and 
 Implementation of adequate internal controls.  
 
It is essential to approach fraud prevention in a holistic manner rather than piecemeal. 
Although fraud awareness training and internal controls are essential interventions in 
preventing fraud, they may not be the only interventions that will result in the successful 
prevention of fraud. Albrecht et al. provide a holistic approach to fraud prevention. In this 
regard, CIMA (2008:24) suggests that prevention initiatives should include the introduction of 
relevant policies, procedures and internal controls combined with fraud awareness training to 
employees.  
 
4.3.2 CIMA’s Anti-fraud Strategy 
CIMA (2008:24) suggests that organisations should develop a strategy to combat fraud. 
According to CIMA (2008:24), there are various ways to prevent fraud which should include 
anti-fraud policies, procedures, preventive internal controls and fraud awareness training. They 
hold the view that fraud prevention techniques, although essential, are unable to totally 
eradicate opportunities to commit fraud. CIMA (2008:24) suggests that the prevention and 
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detection of fraud are equally essential in successfully combating fraud, and should be an 
essential part of the anti-fraud strategy of an organisation. 
  
The anti-fraud strategy of CIMA (2008:25) comprises of four elements: prevention, detection, 
deterrence and response. Figure 4.2 below reflects that these four elements are intertwined. In 
considering a fraud prevention strategy or model, it is essential to include all these elements in 
the strategy or model as they contribute holistically to fraud prevention.  
Figure 4.2: Anti-fraud Strategy 
 
 
Source: CIMA (2008:25) 
 
Another essential aspect of the CIMA anti-fraud strategy is that it is founded on the existence 
of relevant legislation and policies, as well as on sound risk management, corporate 
governance and ethical principles. It is argued that a sound ethical culture within an 
organisation creates a low risk of fraud taking place. According to CIMA (2008:26), when 
minor unethical conduct is condoned, it leads to more significant fraudulent actions committed 
by senior management, also to be condoned. Organisations should be committed to not 
condoning fraud in any manner or form. The existence of high ethical standards in an 
organisation sends a clear message to suppliers, clients, employees and other stakeholders that 
it is committed to honesty and integrity in its business operations (CIMA; 2008:26). In this 
regard, it is suggested that fraud awareness training is provided to all employees, which 
educates them how fraud is committed and how to identify it and report any suspicion of its 
existence. According to CIMA (2008:29), educating employees about fraud does not pose a 
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risk to the organisation. Employees would not use this new knowledge to commit fraud. 
Rather, such intervention would reduce fraud risks in the future. Employees should be 
encouraged to report suspicions about fraud to a whistle blowing facility (CIMA; 2008:30). 
The existence of such a whistle blowing facility has both a prevention and detection effect on 
fraud within an organisation. 
 
Another aspect of fraud prevention involves the implementation of a system of sound internal 
controls. According to CIMA (2008:32), the overall responsibility to prevent and detect fraud 
lies with management and the board of an organisation. Internal controls comprise policies and 
procedures, and typically include aspects such as an approval and authorisation process, access 
restriction and control of transactions, reconciliation of accounts and physical security (CIMA; 
2008:34). The segregation of incompatible duties is essentially part of the internal control 
process. Where the segregation of duties is not possible, CIMA (2008:34) suggests that 
management should exercise additional verification and control, including the periodic 
involvement of internal auditors.   
 
4.3.3 EY Fraud Risk Management Model 
Ernst and Young (EY; 2013:1) suggest six key factors that are essential for an effective fraud 
risk management process in an organisation. These are: 
 trusting the employees is not sufficient to prevent fraud; 
 provide fraud awareness training to employees; 
 communicate the essence of the employee code of conduct; 
 protect whistle-blowers; 
 implement a fraud response plan, and 
 customise the fraud risk management strategies to local conditions. 
 









Figure 4.3: Fraud Risk Management Model 
 
Source: EY (2013:1) 
 
Aspects of the EY Fraud Risk Management Model (2013:1), which specifically address fraud 
prevention, are depicted under the phase that deals with “Setting the tone” in Figure 4.3 above. 
The three aspects are: 
 ethics and conduct; 
 policies to prevent fraud, and 
 training and awareness. 
 
Although this model does not provide additional detail about the various constructs of the 
model, it appears to echo what other fraud risk management models are advocating.   
 
4.3.4 PwC Fraud Wheel 
According to PwC (2009:14), the “fraud wheel” was adapted from the COSO model which 
was originally designed to evaluate internal controls during 1992. In Figure 4.4 below, the 










Figure 4.4: Fraud Wheel 
 
 
Source: PwC (2009:14) 
 
The fraud wheel depicts that the tone and ethical standards of an organisation encompass the 
entire fraud risk management programme. This is followed by a second layer on the fraud 
wheel comprising five aspects, namely: 
 Control environment; 
 Risk assessment; 
 Control activities; 
 Information and communication, and  
 Monitoring. 
 
According to PwC (2009:15), the cornerstone to a sound fraud risk management framework is 
a sound ethical culture with management setting the tone at the top. Then, there are 12 
essential factors that ensure that an organisation has a sound fraud risk management strategy. 
These 12 factors constitute the sub-categories of the five aspects described above:  
 Control environment: 
o sound governance culture; 
o fraud strategy and related policies; 
o robust recruitment and promotion processes, and 
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o response to fraud. 
 Risk assessment: 
o misappropriation risks; 
o financial reporting risks, and 
o other risks. 
 Control activities: 
o control linkage and evaluation. 
 Information and communication: 
o management information to address fraud risks, and 
o communication, awareness and training of employees about fraud risks. 
 Monitoring: 
o internal audit and 
o management oversight. 
 
The fraud wheel provides a comprehensive perspective about the management of fraud risks. 
Although all aspects of the fraud wheel may not be regarded as pure fraud prevention 
interventions, they do contribute to the overall governance of an organisation.  
 
4.3.5 KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Anti-Corruption Strategy 
The Province of KwaZulu-Natal (2008:4) devised and implemented an Anti-Corruption 
Strategy (ACS) because it identified that fraud and corruption had a negative effect on service 
delivery to the citizens of KwaZulu-Natal and needed to be eradicated. The ACS contains three 
appendices. Firstly, Appendix A stipulates how the various departments and public entities in 
the Province should constitute an anti-corruption sub-committee together with a term of 
reference. Secondly, the ACS specifies a “Code of Good Practice” for all departments and 
public entities in the Province, with specific reference to the creation and implementation of 
fraud prevention plans. Lastly, a “Code of Conduct and Business Ethics” is prescribed which 
focuses on sound business and ethical practices by all stakeholders. Figure 4.5 below depicts 







Figure 4.5: Tent Analogy 
 
Source: Province of KwaZulu-Natal (2008:14) 
 
It can be observed from the tent analogy above that the ACS is focused on inculcating an 
ethical culture and creating awareness by means of educating all stakeholders in the Province 
of KwaZulu-Natal as the foundation for the prevention of fraud and corruption. The Province 
of KwaZulu-Natal (2008:13) sets out as its prevention strategy, inter alia, based on the 
implementation of the following interventions: 
 Code of conduct; 
 Whistle-blowing facility; 
 Induction training for new employees on preventing fraud; 
 Recruitment of employees based on sound anti-fraud considerations; 
 Policies on the disclosure of gifts, personal interests and private remunerative 
work, and 
 Key performance areas of employees should include governance. 
 
The Province of KwaZulu-Natal (2008:14) also stipulates that the fraud prevention 
interventions should include, inter alia, the following: 
 Assess fraud risks; 
 Inculcate a sound ethical culture for fraud prevention; 
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 Adopt a zero-tolerance approach to fraud;  
 Blacklist individuals found to be committing fraud and corruption; 
 Provide information to the public about the circumstances that led to fraud as well 
as the fraud prevention measures that have been implemented, and  
 Avert conflicts of interest.   
 
The Province of KwaZulu-Natal (2008:44) advocates, in the ACS, the creation of an anti-
corruption sub-committee in the various departments and public entities in the Province. The 
objective is to ensure synergy among the various entities that are involved in the prevention of 
fraud and corruption in the Province, including external stakeholders such as the South African 
Police Service and the National Prosecuting Authority.   
 
In terms of good practice the ACS provides guidelines to all departments and public entities in 
the Province for designing and implementing fraud prevention plans. In preventing fraud, the 
Province of KwaZulu-Natal (2008:34) stipulates, inter alia, the following interventions: 
 Appoint competent forensic investigative/accounting capacity; 
 Implement strong internal controls to detect fraud; 
 Maintain adequate records of all reported cases; 
 Provide awareness education to stakeholders on relevant fraud prevention 
legislation, fraud risks and “red flags”; 
 Management should set a strong ethical tone and lead by example, and 
 Departments and public entities in the Province should apply the sound 
governance principles espoused in King II.   
 
According to Sindisiwe Cele (personal communication, 21 May 2015), who is a senior 
manager within the Anti-Fraud and Corruption Integrity Management Unit in the Office of the 
Premier in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, the Province has already implemented policies 
relating to whistle-blowing, ethics, conflict of interest and anti-fraud. Each department in the 
Province has a fraud prevention plan which is reviewed annually and amended accordingly. 
The Province does not have a fraud hotline and therefore relies on reports received from the 
National Anti-corruption Hotline which is administered by the Office of the Public Service 
Commission (PSC). The PSC forwards the reports to the relevant Office of Premier of the 
Province. The reports are thereafter forwarded to the relevant Director General of the 
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department, who in turn forwards the report to the relevant Head of Department for attention. 
The PSC expects an update about the report from the Province within 40 days. Investigations 
into fraud and corruption may be referred to the Provincial Treasury department which has an 
investigative capacity. The various departments in the Province have their own investigators 
who probe fraud and corruption. In instances where reports are received about fraud and 
corruption within municipalities these are forwarded to the Department of Co-operative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). The Integrity Management Unit in the 
Province conducts regular “roadshows” as part of the ACS training and awareness campaign in 
the various communities and local districts in the Province. The Integrity Management Unit 
has engaged the services of Ethics South Africa to facilitate workshops at selected departments 
in the Province in order to inculcate a sound ethical culture. The ACS is being reviewed 
currently with the intention to update it and bring it in accordance with latest best practice.    
 
The ACS of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, albeit undergoing review and amendment, 
provides useful information about fraud prevention interventions which could be beneficial to 
Universities in KwaZulu-Natal in combating employee fraud.  
 
4.4 KPMG FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL  
This particular model was chosen for detailed analysis, given the purposes of this study. The 
Fraud Risk Management Model by KPMG (2006:20) proposes essential anti-fraud practices 
that are in use globally by organisations to prevent, detect and respond to fraud. As one of the 
globally recognised “Big 4” auditing and accounting firms, KPMG created this model which 
they utilise to manage fraud risks for their clients.    
Figure 4.6: Fraud Risk Management Model 
 
 




KPMG (2006:2) hold the view that there is no single fraud risk management model or 
approach that can be used for all organisations. Due to the unique nature of each organisation, 
the strategy should be adapted accordingly. As depicted in Figure 4.6 above, there are three 
fundamental factors that are addressed in the KPMG model, namely, prevention, detection and 
response to fraud. In this study, the element relating to prevention is elaborated on as it is 
directly linked to the focus of this research.  
 
There are six constructs to the KPMG fraud risk management model. They are: 
 Defining fraud risk management; 
 Convergence of regulatory challenges; 
 Prevention; 
 Detection; 
 Response, and 
 An ongoing process. 
 
For purposes of this research only two of these constructs, and their sub-constructs were 
examined: 
 Prevention: 
o Leadership and governance 
o Code of conduct 
o Employee and 3rd party due diligence 
o Communication and training 






The constructs of the prevention and the ongoing process are relevant to this research, as 
KPMG (2006:8) deals specifically with the prevention of fraud. These constructs and sub-
constructs of the fraud risk management model were used to explore the methods and 




4.4.1 Fraud Prevention  
The model shown in Figure 4.7 below has been adapted for this study from the KPMG Fraud 
Risk Management model (2006:8). The constructs and sub-constructs are explained below: 
Figure 4.7: Adapted from the Fraud Risk Management model 
 
 
Source: KPMG (2006:8)  
 
4.4.1.1 Leadership and Governance 
According to KPMG (2006:8), leadership and governance requires emphasises to be placed on 
four aspects. These are board or audit committee oversight, senior management oversight, 
Internal Audit function, and fraud and misconduct risk assessment.  
 Firstly, directors of a board (in the case of universities, the members of Council) 
play an essential role in overseeing the implementation of internal controls 
intended to mitigate fraud risks. In some instances, such an oversight role is 
delegated to the audit committee by the board. Directors should ensure that 
internal controls are adequate and effective. Setting the tone for ethical behaviour 
in an organisation is the joint responsibility of the board and management. 
 Secondly, senior management should be responsible for oversight of the fraud risk 
management interventions that are implemented. Their oversight should be 
primarily on prevention, but detection and response to fraud should not be 
overlooked. The chief executive officer (in the case of universities, the Vice-
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Chancellor) is best placed to set an appropriate ethical culture within the 
organisation. S/he is able to lead by example and direct the effort with assistance 
of the senior management team. The chief executive officer should hold members 
of the senior management team accountable for non-compliance to policies and 
procedures. This message should permeate the organisation and serve to 
consolidate an ethical culture within. It is suggested by KPMG (2006:9), that a 
leader in a senior management position be tasked with oversight of all 
interventions that are aimed at combating fraud. Such a leader should be 
responsible for the prevention, detection and response to fraud risks. This leader 
should: 
o Coordinate the fraud risk assessments within the organisation; 
o Design and implement policies and procedures for ethical business practices; 
o Ensure oversight of the fraud risk management initiatives and controls, and  
o Provide a report to the board or the audit committee about the results of the 
anti-fraud initiatives.  
 Thirdly, the Internal Audit department should participate in combating fraud and 
move away from their traditional role of testing for the effectiveness of internal 
controls. It is suggested that the internal audit department should be held 
responsible for: 
o Evaluating the design and effectiveness of internal controls intended to 
prevent or detect fraud; 
o Assisting in the fraud risk assessment process and advising on the adequacy 
and effectiveness of mitigating controls, and 
o Reporting to the audit committee about its findings in this regard. 
 Fourthly, fraud risk assessments assist management in identifying the unique fraud 
risks faced by the organisation, deficiencies in the current internal controls and 
designing appropriate mitigation strategies and controls to address the weaknesses. 
Fraud risk assessments should take place throughout the organisation and not in 
selected areas of operation. The audit committee plays an oversight role in this 
process and ensures that the assessments are an ongoing effort. A typical fraud risk 






Figure 4.8: Fraud Risk Management Process 
 
 
Source: KPMG (2006:10) 
 
 The four-step risk assessment process should:  
o identify the areas of risk that require assessment; 
o list and categorise the risks; 
o rate the risks, and 
o mitigate the risk by enhancing internal controls. 
 
4.4.1.2 Code of Conduct 
As suggested by KPMG (2006:11), a code of conduct is an essential tool with which an 
organisation communicates its standards of ethical conduct to employees. This should include 
communication to clients, suppliers and stakeholders. Such a code sets a strong tone within the 
organisation about the commitment of management to a sound ethical culture. In order for this 
tone from the top to permeate throughout the organisation, it requires that employees are made 
aware of the code and the commitment of management to a culture of integrity. KPMG 
(2006:11) proposes that a code of conduct should include the following aspects: 
 high level support and commitment to the code from senior management; 
 language used should be easily understandable; 
 provide guidance for compliance to relevant policies and procedures; 
 provide guidance to employees on predicted areas of risk; 
 code should be displayed in an aesthetically appealing format to encourage 
readership; 
 provide employees with readily available tools to assist them to make ethically 
acceptable decisions, and  
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 provide an appropriate reporting mechanism which employees could use to report 
or request guidance about concerns, without prejudice to themselves. 
 
A code of conduct is essential to ensure that all employees commit to a single standard of high 
ethical culture within an organisation, without any double standards and selective application. 
 
4.4.1.3 Employee and Third Party Due Diligence 
A requisite aspect of maintaining a sound ethical culture is ensuring that an organisation 
employs people of high integrity. This would include conducting business with suppliers and 
clients who are also committed to operating in an environment of high integrity. According to 
KPMG (2006:12), conducting due diligence on potential employees, suppliers, clients and 
other stakeholders is an integral part of a fraud prevention strategy. Due diligence should be 
undertaken at the commencement of an employment or business association process. The 
prevailing conditions under which employees achieved their performance targets should be 
scrutinised in order to ensure that the results were achieved within the ethical standards of the 
organisation. This would send a clear message to employees that the organisation is cognisant 
not only the results but how they were achieved (KPMG; 2006:12). As the old adage goes “the 
end should not justify the means”: in fraud prevention, this must be understood. 
 
4.4.1.4 Communication and Training 
KPMG (2006:12) suggests that it is essential for employees to be made aware of their 
responsibility in respect of internal controls that are designed to combat fraud. Communication 
and training should be provided to employees in a planned and prioritised manner in order 
ensure that the importance of their responsibilities in this regard is emphasised. It is suggested 
by KPMG (2006:13) that the communication and training initiatives in respect of fraud 
awareness should be: 
 all inclusive, taking into consideration the responsibilities of a job and the area of 
risk; 
 included, where possible, with other training and communication initiatives; 
 conducted using various media and techniques, and  




Providing continuous communication and training to employees to create awareness about 
fraud, serves to inculcate a culture of high integrity and compliance within an organisation. 
Such a process also serves to equip employees to be able to identify fraud within their work 
environment, and to be aware how to report such suspicion.  
         
4.4.2 An Ongoing Process 
It is suggested by KPMG (2006:20) that a fraud risk management strategy is a tool which 
management utilises in order to manage risk within the organisation. The management of fraud 
risks is an ongoing process which requires constant intervention. According to KPMG 
(2006:20), this process comprises four phases. The model reflected below in Figure 4.9 was 
adapted for this study from the KPMG Fraud Risk Management model (2006:20): 
Figure 4.9: Adapted from the Fraud Risk Management model 
 
 
Source: KPMG (2006:20) 
 
4.4.2.1 Assessment 
KPMG (2006:20) suggests that the assessment phase takes into consideration what the 
organisation expects from the mitigating internal controls that were implemented to address 
fraud risks, and also assesses whether those internal controls are adequate and effective. The 
fraud risks faced by organisations differ from each other, and require specific interventions that 
address those risks. The objective is to create a balance between the risk and internal control. 
Due to the continuous evolving nature of fraud risks, organisations are faced with the 
possibility that internal controls that were implemented previously may not be adequate or 
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effective today. It is essential to identify what are the current fraud risks and how they are 
being mitigated. The assessment phase should consider which relevant people, processes and 
systems should form part of the analysis process. Relevant stakeholders should be included in 
the team conducting the assessment. Once the organisation establishes the current state of 
internal controls, it should then identify what the desired state is and set milestones for the 
enhancement of internal controls. The deficiencies that are identified between the current and 
desired states should be taken into consideration when planning the next steps (KPMG; 
2006:20).     
 
4.4.2.2 Design 
The design phase involves crafting internal controls that address fraud risks in a holistic 
manner, such as prevention, detection and responding to fraud risks. These controls should be 
aligned to legal and other regulatory frameworks and based on best practice. The objective is 
to design internal controls that safeguard the organisation from fraud risks. KPMG (2006:20) 
also suggests that the organisation should take into consideration the unique nature of its 
operating environment and design custom made internal controls. This suggests that there is no 
“one size fits all” approach from an internal control perspective. Organisations are unique as 
the fraud risks they face. According to KPMG (2006:21), organisations are remiss if they 
merely design and implement controls to satisfy minimum criteria that are set by regulatory 
frameworks. Organisations should consider other best practices that are being used by similar 
types of organisations, where those internal controls were found to be adequate and effective. 
This will assure management that such best practice is likely to successfully address fraud risks 
in their organisation. 
 
4.4.2.3 Implementation 
Implementation of new or enhanced internal controls requires a structured approach. 
Responsibility for the internal controls should be assigned to employees who have an 
appropriate level of authority and seniority, as well as the required resources to give effect to 
the controls. KPMG (2006:21) suggests that there should be concise and regular 
communication to the relevant employees about when, how and by whom the new internal 
controls would be implemented. It will also be opportune, in this communication, to emphasise 





The evaluation phase involves the appraisal or review of the design, adequacy and 
effectiveness of the internal control. The evaluation is conducted by means of a self-
assessment of the internal control, testing for functionality, ongoing monitoring and individual 
evaluations (KPMG; 2006:20). The existence of an internal control does not mean that it is 
adequate and effective. It is suggested by KPMG (2006:21) that internal controls which have 
been in existence for a long period of time should be reviewed to ascertain whether it is still 
working as intended. The review of internal controls should be prioritised based on the profile 
of the risk that it is intended to mitigate. Compensating controls also contribute to risk 
mitigation, where a particular internal control may be found to be inadequate or ineffective.  
 
KPMG (2006:21) urges organisations to consider the regulatory imperatives together with best 
practices in the relevant industry when evaluating and designing new internal controls. The 
best practice in the relevant industry would reveal which internal controls work well to 
mitigate fraud risks. Other similar organisations in that industry should compare their existing 
internal controls with the best practice. The shortfall or gap between the two scenarios should 
guide any control enhancements that may be required. Consideration should also be given, 
when conducting the evaluation, to whether internal controls have been properly implemented 
or not.  
 
Organisations that design and implement a code of conduct do not necessarily have a high 
ethical culture. It is suggested by KPMG (2006:22) that employees may not be executing their 
tasks in line with the code of conduct. Having an internal control should not be a “tick box” 
exercise but rather a process that guides employee activities in risk mitigation. The Oxford 
Dictionary (2014) defines “tick box” as “denoting or relating to a procedure or process 
carried out purely to satisfy convention, rules, or regulations”.  Fraud prevention in all its 
complexity requires more than this simple check. 
 
According to KPMG (2006:22), there are other ways to evaluate control effectiveness. Firstly, 
it is by conducting forensic analysis of relevant data. Secondly, it is by conducting a survey 
among employees in order to establish the perceptions about fraud risks within the 
organisation. Such a survey would be valuable in determining the status of control 
effectiveness. Evaluating the effectiveness of controls and responding thereto is an ongoing 
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process, according to KPMG (2006:22), which is dictated by changes in the environment in 
which an organisation operates. These changes could be influenced by the markets, external 
scrutiny, regulatory or legislative factors (KPMG; 2006:22). The process to design and 
implement initiatives, to address employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal, should certainly include consideration of these aspects. 
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
The need to address fraud has been in existence from at least 500 B.C. Fraud prevention has 
evolved since those early times as it has kept pace with the changing landscape of economic 
activity and changing fraudulent schemes. This chapter has highlighted the need for the 
prevention of fraud as an essential initiative in the fraud risk management strategy of an 
organisation. The need for a sound ethical culture within an organisation has been emphasised 
by the various fraud risk management models elaborated on in this chapter. In the quest to 
inculcate a sound ethical culture, it is essential for an organisation to design, implement and 
communicate a code of conduct/ethics among all employees, clients, suppliers and other 
stakeholders. The leadership of the organisation should be responsible for setting a high 
standard of ethical behaviour and leading by example. 
 
The existence of current legislation, regulatory frameworks and anti-fraud organisational 
policies and procedures contributes towards the prevention of fraud because violation of these 
poses serious consequences to perpetrators of fraud. This serves as a deterrent to potential 
fraudsters. The significance of whistle blowing mechanisms has been emphasised globally as 
an essential fraud prevention initiative. Although whistle blowing is reactive in nature, it serves 
as a deterrent (threat) to potential fraudsters that they could be reported for suspicion of 
committing fraud. The various fraud prevention models and frameworks that were examined in 
this chapter have served to highlight certain common themes that exist between them. These 
are expounded further in Chapter Nine of this study. Internal controls are an essential arsenal 
in the fight against fraud but are not the only anti-fraud intervention that is relied on by an 










HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNAL CONTROL 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has highlighted that internal controls are an essential ingredient in the 
prevention of fraud and error within an organisation. A common theme that has emerged in the 
previous chapter is that internal control should not be the only intervention that management 
implements to prevent fraud from occurring. There are other interventions that should be 
implemented, in conjunction with adequate and effective internal controls, in order to make an 
organisation less likely to become a victim of fraud. Internal control remains an integral 
contributor towards fraud prevention. Various relevant legislation and frameworks have been 
implemented globally, which illustrates the significance of internal control as an intervention 
mechanism in combating the risk of fraud. An example is the Cadbury report (1992:27), which 
suggested that an effective system of internal control is essential for the efficient management 
of an organisation.  
 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 obliges an audit committee of an organisation that has 
shareholders, excluding non-profit and state-owned companies, to submit a report, which 
should be included in the annual financial statement, inter alia, about the state of internal 
financial controls within the organisation. Apart from ensuring the existence of internal 
controls, it is also essential that the controls are adequate and effective and working as 
intended. In this regard, KPMG (2011:10) found that fraudsters had increasingly exploited 
poor controls to commit fraud. The results of the KPMG survey reflected an increase in this 
type of exploitation from 49% in 2007 to 74% in 2011. In this chapter, internal control is 
expounded, along with its objectives, the value it provides and its limitations. Internal control 
is particularly relevant to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-
Natal. The COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework is elaborated on, as it is globally 
regarded as authoritative on the subject of internal controls.  
 
5.2 DEFINITION OF INTERNAL CONTROL 
The International Standard on Auditing (ISA, 2009:264) defines internal control under the ISA 
315 statement as “The process designed, implemented and maintained by those charged with 
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governance, management and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance about the 
achievement of an entity’s objectives with regard to reliability of financial reporting, 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations.” COSO (2013:1) defines internal control as “a process, effected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives relating to operations, reporting, and 
compliance.”  
 
Jackson and Stent (2010:5/3) show that the definition of internal control by the South African 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) is similar to the definition provided by COSO.  
According to COSO (2013:1), the definition of internal control highlights five essential aspects 
which indicate that internal controls are:  
 aligned with the activities of operations, reporting and compliance in order to 
achieve the objectives of an organisation; 
 a continuing process of tasks and activities; 
 put into effect by people; 
 expected to provide reasonable assurance to the board of directors and 
management that objectives will be achieved, and 
 flexible to ensure applicability to the entire organisation. 
 
5.3 INTERNAL CONTROL THEORY 
According to Lee (1971:150), much has been written by authors in the accountancy fraternity 
about internal controls since the eighteenth century, leading to a misperception that internal 
controls only came into existence then. Auditing and accounting, according to Lee (1971:150), 
have been in existence and were actively practised in established economies before the birth of 
Christ (B.C.). According to Stone (1969:284), the early indication of forms of internal control 
and auditing is found in the annals of the Mesopotamian civilization between the period 3600 
to 3200 B.C. Stone (1969:284) avers that it was during this period that the Sumerians recorded 
business transactions on stone and later on clay tablets around 3200 B.C. It is the first 
indication that internal auditors as well as activities of internal control were in existence during 
these ancient times. “It was customary for summaries to be prepared by scribes other than 
those who had provided original lists of payments. Further, the documents of the period reveal 
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tiny marks, dots, ticks and circles at the side of the figures, indicating that checking had been 
performed” (Most, 1959:563). 
 
Lee (1971:151) suggests that managers of that era understood the need for internal controls and 
how these should be implemented, especially with regard to segregation of accounting duties. 
According to Brown (1905:21), the scribe of the Royal Treasury of the Egyptian Pharaohs took 
meticulous care to record details of the amount received, from whom received, the date and 
how it was utilised. These records related to the receipt of corn, dates, and oxen among other 
things. “Nothing was given out of the treasury without a written order. Peculation on the part 
of the workmen was taken into consideration resulting in one official checking the records of 
another.” Peculation is defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015) as to “embezzle”. 
“When the corn was brought to the storehouses each sack was filled in the sight of an overseer 
and noted down, and when the sacks were carried to the roof of the storehouse and emptied 
through the receiving opening the scribe stationed there recorded the number received” 
(Brown, 1905:21). These rudimentary forms of internal control indicate that there was a need 
at that point in time to take preventative steps to avoid fraud and error. The use of this system, 
according to Brown (1905:21), is depicted on the tomb of Chnemhôtep in Egypt.  
 
The current prevalence of fraud at universities in general requires remedial interventions and at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal, which are part of contemporary complex and sophisticated 
business environments, specific attention is required. 
 
5.3.1 Internal Control during the Roman and Greek Empires 
According to Brown (1905:25), the Greeks had strict regulations to deal with fraud, but the 
spirit of administration was poor. There were checking clerks in the Greek cities at 
approximately 500 B.C. who served as a form of internal control over the receipt and 
expenditure of government funds. The checking clerks were public officials who were required 
to scrutinise and verify the transactions relating to government funds. Brown (1905:25) further 
states that the accounts that were compiled by the public officials were engraved onto stone, 
and displayed in public as a form of transparency regarding the process. According to Stone 
(1969:285), the early Greek civilisation did not want any form of formal accounting practices. 




The Romans, according to Lee (1971:152), were aware of the need for internal control. In this 
regard, Brown (1905:25) points out that the Romans implemented internal controls for the 
collection of taxes. The internal control involved the segregation of duties of the individual 
who imposed the taxes and authorised the expenditure on the one hand, and the individual who 
received and made payments, on the other. The segregation of duties is relevant in employee 
fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
Brown (1905:31) as quoted by Lee (1971:152), summarised the internal control system that 
was in existence during the rule of the Roman Republic, as follows: 
 The Senate was responsible for overall control over public revenue and 
expenditure; 
 Consul and censors were entrusted with the administration and authorisation of 
these receipts and payments and accountable to Senate; 
 The physical collection of receipts and effecting of payments were allocated to the 
quaestors of the treasury. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015) defines 
quaestors as “one of numerous ancient Roman officials concerned chiefly with 
financial administration”; and  
 All expenditure was ordered and authorised by a magistrate based on an official 
order, with supporting documents as proof of the existence and liquidity of the 
debt, the title of the creditor, and the execution of the work indicated on the order.  
 
According to Brown (1905:32), all these regulations and internal controls contributed to the 
prevention of fraud. In cases where the fraud did take place, the regulations assisted in 
prosecuting those implicated. Since the sixth century financial abuse became prevalent, which 
resulted in new laws being passed such as the Calpurnian law in 149 B.C., the Cornelian law of 
Sulla and the Julian law of Augustus (Brown, 1905:32). Fraud has been in existence since 
these early years. 
 
5.3.2 Tally Stick 
The internal control dealing with the segregation of accounting duties came into existence 
during the dark ages, which was the period 1100 to 1200 A.D. (Lee, 1971:151). According to 
Lee (1971:154), a wooden “tally stick” was used during that period and served as a form of a 
financial receipt within the public and private sectors. Robert (1966:78) as quoted by Lee 
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(1971:154) suggests that the tally stick served as an internal control for transactions. The 
manner in which the tally stick was used was that notches were made on the stick which was a 
method to reflect to reflect the value of completed transactions. Differing values were depicted 
by different notches. According to Brown (1905:42), the notches represented pound, shilling 
and pence. After the transactions were completed, and the tally stick was appropriately 
notched, it was split in two. Each half was retained by the transacting parties.  
 
The tally stick was used as an internal control where public officials, such as the Exchequer in 
England, were held accountable for the collection of taxes and spending of public funds. These 
public officials accounted for the money received by means of the tally stick. This system can 
be compared to the current petty cash system in use by universities and other organisations, 
where cash used is accounted for by means of receipts produced. 
 
There were two reasons why wooden sticks were used. Firstly, they were durable and legible. 
Secondly, they were simple enough for illiterate people to use. The tally stick served as 
evidence of what a person owed another or what amount s/he was due. According to Lee 
(1971:154), the internal control involving the tally stick is evidence that there was an effort by 
people entrusted with public funds, to ensure that fraud and error were prevented when 
receiving funds or making payments. This ancient form of internal control indicates that fraud 
and error posed a risk in these formative years. The photograph depicted in Figure 5.1 below 
















Photo 5.1: Medieval Exchequer Tallies. 
 
 
Source: The National Archives, United Kingdom (2014) 
 
5.3.3 Pipe Roll 
Lee (1971:154) holds that in England, a Pipe Roll was used to maintain a record of the 
revenues collected, as well as to compare them with the costs incurred during the period 1100 
to 1135 A.D. Brown (1905:42) provides a description of the aspects that constituted controls in 
respect of the pipe roll. There were six control aspects. First, all large amounts of revenue that 
were due to the Crown were reflected in the “Domesday Book”; and this information was used 
to prepare the Pipe Roll. Second, there were only three copies of the Pipe Roll prepared which 
were compiled independently on an annual basis by the treasurer, the chancellor’s clerk and by 
a selected representative of the King. Third, the three copies of the Pipe Roll reflected the 
particulars pertaining to the revenue due to the Exchequer as well as the actual revenue 
received and payments that were made during the year. Fourth, there were sheriffs who were 
tasked with the collection of revenue within their jurisdictions. They had to justify to the 
Exchequer how much they had collected annually at Michaelmas by producing the tally stick 
as well as the supporting vouchers as evidence of transactions made during the year. The 
supporting vouchers were recorded and evaluated against what was previously reflected as due 
in the Pipe Roll. Fifth, an interim payment would have been made by the sheriff at Easter and a 
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tally stick would have been issued to the sheriff as proof of the revenue paid in. Sixth, the three 
copies of the Pipe Roll were subjected to an audit by officials called “Auditores Compotorum 
Scaccarii”.  
 
This form of internal control had the effect of managing the risk of revenues received by the 
Exchequer as well as collecting the revenues that were due. In the present day, universities 
receive funds from the government, donors and fees from students for tuition. This ancient 
control method of safeguarding funds is of relevance to employee fraud and prevention 
strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
A photograph of a Pipe Roll that was in use in 1194 A.D. is found in Figure 5.2 below: 
Photo 5.2: A Page of a Pipe Roll from the Year 1194 A.D. 
 
Source: Wikipedia (2014) 
 
5.3.4 Middle Ages 
According to Lee (1971:155), internal audit was later promoted during the Middle Ages as a 
preferred way in which to control private businesses. The audit was conducted by the owners 
of the estates or by people who they had appointed to conduct the internal audit. Oschinsky 
(1956:91-98) as quoted by Lee (1971:155), avers that teachers of accounting at the time 
advocated using internal audits as a means to determine whether financial records of the 
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businesses had been drawn up fraudulently. Examples quoted were that the internal auditor 
was required to audit in relation to the amount of salt used for salting a given quantity of meat. 
The auditor would verify the hides and fleeces of cattle that had died during the year and 
compare corn yield in relation to seeds provided and the extent of land in which it was 
cultivated. These measures were aimed at preventing fraud and error.  
 
Brown (1905:99) postulates that businesses were rapidly undergoing change during 1300 A.D., 
which required a modification of the internal control processes. As businesses grew it became 
relevant to improve the accounting procedures to keep up with the changing business 
landscape. This led to double-entry bookkeeping emerging as an internal control technique as 
well as a method to maintain a record of business transactions. The first record of double-entry 
dates back to 1340 in Genoa. Geijsbeek (1914) as quoted by Lee (1971:156), states that during 
the late fifteenth century, internal controls such as the following were in practice: 
 thorough cross-referencing of bookkeeping entries; 
 the appointment of a mercantile officer who acted as registrar in each town for all 
accounting books for businesses in the town. The registrar maintained a register of 
all accounting books issued to businesses and ensured that no duplicate books were 
kept by businesses; 
 in order to prevent fraud, a stores ledger account was maintained for every store of 
goods, and 
 any form of erasure in accounting books was prohibited. All alterations had to be 
done by a further entry. 
 
According to Brown (1905:78), accounts were frequently audited during the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries. Evidence of this is observed during 1298, where the accounts of the city of 
London were audited by its mayor, aldermen and sheriffs. The city of Dublin was audited by 
the burgesses or the Earl of Desmond during 1333. During 1346, the accounts of The 
Worshipful Company of Pewterers were audited by selected company employees in London. 
An audit of the Burgh of Peebles was held in the presence of the provost, council and 
inhabitants of the Burgh during 1457. Auditing is particularly relevant to employee fraud and 










Geijsbeek (1914:12) refers to Simon Stevin, who was born in 1548 near Antwerp in the 
Netherlands. Stevin was multi-skilled in that he was an engineer, accountant, writer and 
auditor, among other things. According to Geijsbeek (1914:12), Stevin wrote a book 
“Verrechning Van Domeine” in 1604, in which he explained the many forms of internal control 
methods. Some examples were: 
 The pay roll of soldiers and public officials were sent directly to the auditors for 
checking; 
 The cook, who prepared meals for these soldiers and public officials, reported 
independently to the auditors about the number of meals they served; 
 In order to prevent errors and theft when collecting taxes and rents, the sub-
treasurer reported to the general treasurer monthly about the receipt of cash and 
expenditure as well as about people who were not making their payment.  
 Arrear rent was reported monthly to the general treasurer so that the property of 
the defaulter could be sold or other suitable payment agreed upon. 
 
According to Lee (1971:157), there are other examples which prove that internal controls were 
regarded as an essential aspect of the book-keeping process. Some examples of this are: 
 Jan Yamey Christoffels who published a book in 1547, wherein he suggested that 
the pages of accounting books should be numbered to prevent fraud and error. 
 Gerald Malynes wrote in Lex Mercatoria in 1656, that fraud could be prevented if 
no spaces are left between journal entries. 
 
Internal control as a method to prevent fraud and error is relevant today, particularly in 
respect of employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
5.4 INTERNAL CONTROL IN THE 21
ST
 CENTURY 
Internal control has evolved over the centuries to what it is currently. Various authors have 
published widely on the issue of internal control in the recent past. According to Rae and 
Subramaniam (2008:106), internal control is a critical corporate governance apparatus in 
organisations. COSO (2013:4) states that standards, structures and procedures constitute the 
internal control environment of an organisation. Wells (2001:90) suggests that internal controls 
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are insufficient to prevent fraud from taking place because they only reasonably assure the 
board of directors and management, and also because there are not many internal controls 
which cannot be manipulated by fraudsters. KPMG (2011:10) reports a significant increase in 
the number of incidents where weak internal controls were exploited by fraudsters. While Rae 
and Subramaniam (2008:104) suggest that a key deterrent of fraud is internal control, fraud 
continues to occur in organisations. Shah and Usman (2013:2) propose that factors such as 
internal control coupled with the education of staff and clients is essential to prevent fraud. 
Flostoiu (2012:25) believes that a fraudster has profound knowledge about the activities of a 
company including its internal control environment and its weaknesses. This makes a fraudster 
a risk to an organisation unless internal controls are robust enough to prevent fraud from 
occurring or at least detect fraud shortly after it occurs. Flostoiu (2012:27) asserts that internal 
control is the most appropriate mechanism to prevent fraud from occurring. Albrecht 
(1998:111) believes that a significant factor that facilitates fraud is not the lack of internal 
controls but rather the failure to uphold existing controls. According to KPMG (2011:21), 
internal control weaknesses increasingly contribute to the commission of fraud. The view of 
KPMG (2011:21) is that an organisation should make itself resistant to fraud and improve its 
fraud prevention programmes.   
 
According to Wells (2002:28), fraud can be prevented with the implementation of fundamental 
internal controls as well as through audits and appropriate oversight. KPMG (2013:3) suggests 
that fraudsters are constantly creating new ways to commit fraud and organisations should 
respond with appropriate ways to defending themselves from this. KPMG (2013:6) argues that, 
although internal controls are essential, controls are reliant on human beings to function. 
 
Seidman (2002:415) argues that frauds are frequently discovered, not by internal controls or 
auditing techniques, but by chance. Kaymaz et al. (2011:171) take the stance that a sound 
corporate culture, coupled with effective internal controls, are essential against employee 
fraud. KPMG (2011:21) emphasises that the challenge for companies is determining how to 
tighten controls and prevent fraud from occurring and also detect and investigate fraud that has 
already occurred. The survey by KPMG (2011:10) also found a significant increase in cases 
where deficient internal controls were exploited by the fraudsters, escalating in 2007 from 49% 
to 74% during 2011. Haugen and Selin (I999:340) assert that weak internal controls create the 
opportunity for fraud to be committed. Internal controls are an essential intervention in 
preventing fraud, but may not be the only intervention required in the prevention of fraud. 
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Internal auditors are generally not skilled to detect fraud. According to Flostoiu (2012:27), an 
internal auditor does not have expertise in the detection and investigation of fraud. 
Organisations cannot rely entirely on their internal audit department to detect or investigate 
fraud. The onus is on management to devise appropriate and adequate systems of internal 
controls aimed at preventing and detecting fraud. 
 
In managing risks, COSO (2013:1) avers that internal controls assist organisations in 
achieving, maintaining and improving its performance. COSO also believes that its framework 
provides management and the board of directors of an organisation, with guidance to 
appropriately address risks with a specific focus on fraud prevention measures. Similarly, the 
Institute of Directors Southern Africa, suggests in King III (2009:44) that management should 
ensure that internal controls are adequate and effective in preventing fraud. KPMG (2011:21) 
supports this view and believes that organisations should tighten internal controls and prevent 
fraud from occurring as well as detect and investigate fraud, should it occur. It is 
management’s responsibility to adequately implement internal controls to manage fraud risks. 
Albrecht and Schmoldt (1988:18) argue that a lack of segregation of duties between employees 
has resulted in many frauds. 
 
There is clearly a need to prevent frauds from recurring in the workplace. The Chartered 
Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA, 2008:24) suggests that the implementation of 
adequate internal controls, policies and procedures, and fraud awareness initiatives will 
contribute to the prevention of fraud. CIMA (2008:24) asserts that fraud prevention is the 
cornerstone for the sustainability of an organisation but many have not adopted an appropriate 
stance for the prevention of fraud. The recovery of stolen funds from the perpetrator or through 
insurance is most often low (CIMA 2008:24). This suggests that prevention is better than cure. 
 
Jackson and Stent (2010:5/3) suggest that there are four aspects of internal control. First, 
internal control is an ongoing process and not an end state. Second, people are required to give 
effect to the internal control.  Third, internal control can only provide reasonable assurance that 
the desired objectives set by management will be achieved. It does not provide absolute 
assurance. Lastly, internal control is intended to provide reasonable assurance to the board and 
management about the achievement of objectives in three inter-related categories, namely:  
 economy, efficiency and effectiveness of its operations; 
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 internal financial control, and  
 compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
 
Internal controls are essential to organisations because of their contribution towards the 
safeguarding of assets against fraud and error. This section is pertinent when considering 
employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. In order to prevent 
fraud organisations should devise and implement other measures as well because internal 
controls alone will not deter a resolute fraudster. 
 
5.4.1 Elements of Internal Control 
According to a report by The Financial Reporting Council (2005), commonly referred to as the 
Turnbull Report (2005:7), the elements of a sound system of internal control include the 
organisation’s policies, procedures, tasks, behaviours and other activities which enable it to: 
 operate effectively and efficiently while addressing risks such as business, 
operational, financial, compliance and others which prevent the organisation from 
achieving its objectives, including protecting assets from fraud, loss and abuse; 
 ensure appropriate quality of reporting based on sound information, and 
 ensure compliance with legislation, regulations, policies and procedures. 
 
Turnbull (2005:7) suggests that the control environment is determined by the internal control 
system implemented by an organisation within its operational structure, which includes control 
activities, procedures that impact information and communications, and the process of 
monitoring. 
 
According to Turnbull (2005:7), the system of internal control of an organisation should: 
 be consolidated within its culture and operations; 
 have the capacity to promptly adapt and respond to emerging risks, and 
 have laid down reporting mechanisms for employees to report control deficiencies 
as well control enhancements. 
 
Turnbull (2005:7) postulates that robust internal control systems are able to minimise the 
effects of risks associated with bad decision-making, error, circumvention of controls, 
overriding of controls and other unforeseeable situations, but is unable to totally eradicate 
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risks. According to Turnbull (2005:8), an organisation receives reasonable assurance from a 
robust internal control system. Absolute assurance cannot be provided to an organisation that it 
will achieve its set objectives.  
 
According to Jackson and Stent (2010:5/4), the ISA statement 315 highlights five components 
of internal control. They components are made up of the control environment, risk assessment, 
control activities, information and communication system and monitoring activities. These five 
components are elaborated on in more detail further in this chapter. 
 
5.4.2 Objectives of Internal Control 
Jackson and Stent (2010:5/4) suggest that there are five objectives of internal control. 
Management designs and implements policies and procedures which assist them to achieve 
objectives in an effective and efficient manner. The objectives of internal control are to ensure 
that: 
 there is adherence to laid down policies and procedures; 
 assets are safeguarded against abuse and theft; 
 fraud and error are prevented and detected; 
 accounting records are accurate and complete, and  
 financial and other information is prepared timeously so that reliance can be placed 
on it to run the organisation. 
 
5.4.3 Characteristics of Internal Control 
In the quest to design and implement a robust system of internal control, the ISA 315 statement 
set out seven essential aspects to achieve sound internal controls. The characteristics of an 
organisation with sound internal control, according to ISA (2009:289), are: 
 Integrity and sound ethical values are communicated and enforced;  
 Management displays commitment to ensuring that there are competent skills and 
knowledge for specified jobs; 
 Individuals that responsible for governance remain independent from management, 
possess the appropriate experience, are involved and receive adequate and timely 
information, scrutinise activities, ask the difficult questions and interact with 
internal and external auditors;  
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 The business philosophy and style of management encompasses sound risk taking, 
financial reporting and interaction with accounting functions and related staff; 
 Organisational structure is geared to plan, execute, control and review activities 
aimed at achieving its objectives; 
 Authority and responsibility are allocated to employees together with established 
reporting lines and authorisation regimes, and 
 Policies and procedures pertaining to human resources, for example recruitment, 
training, counselling, promotion and compensation, are in existence. 
 
5.4.4 Limitations of Internal Control 
Jackson and Stent (2010:5/4) aver that absolute assurance that internal controls will ensure that 
the objectives of an organisation will be achieved, cannot be given. This is due to the inherent 
limitations of internal controls. COSO (2013:137) similarly postulate that internal controls can 
only provide reasonable assurance to the board and management that the organisational 
objectives will be met. According to Jackson and Stent (2010:5/5), the limitation on the effect 
of internal controls is impacted by the following six elements: 
 the cost of the internal control versus the benefit to be derived; 
 internal controls directed at routine transactions only; 
 human error; 
 circumvention of internal controls involving collusion among employees or third 
parties; 
 overriding of internal controls by management, and 
 internal controls not updated timeously when the control environment changes. 
 
Although there are limitations to internal control, it is particularly essential to employee fraud 
and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
5.5 IIA INTER-RELATIONSHIP MODEL 
According to the IIA (2009:19), fraud prevention involves the implementation of relevant 
policies and procedures, providing training to employees and the communication to employees, 
by management, in order to educate them about activities that are fraudulent in nature. The IIA 
(2009:19) holds the view that an organisation will not be able to totally eradicate fraud because 
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it is not cost effective to do so. Opportunities can emerge for determined employees in any 
organisation to collude with others to circumvent or override controls in order to commit fraud.  
 
The IIA Inter-relationship Model, which is depicted in Figure 5.1 below, is intended to 
primarily address fraud. The three-phase approach of this model involves: 
 implementation of preventive controls; 
 conducting detection and monitoring activities, and  
 investigating fraud that has occurred and prosecuting offenders. 
 
The Inter-relationship Model in Figure 5.1 below suggests that lessons learned from detection, 
monitoring and investigation activities should influence the designing of new or the 
enhancement of existing preventive controls: 
Figure 5.1: Inter-relationship Model 
 
Source: IIA (2009:19) 
 
As a fraud prevention model, this is especially relevant to employee fraud and prevention 
strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.   
 
5.6 COSO   
According to the COSO website (COSO 2014), the organisation was formed in 1985 to 
sponsor the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting in the United States of 
America. This was an initiative that was implemented by the private-sector to establish what 
root causes led to fraudulent financial reporting by organisations. COSO was sponsored by the 
following prominent organisations: American Accounting Association, American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Financial Executives International, Institute of Internal Auditors, 
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and National Association of Accountants. Due to the fact that the first chairman of this 
Commission was James Treadway, the Commission was aptly named the “Treadway 
Commission”.  
 
The mission of COSO is to provide leading benchmarks by developing frameworks for 
enterprise risk management, internal control and fraud deterrence with the objective of 
improving the overall performance and governance of organisations as well as the reduction of 
fraud (COSO, 2014). The COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework is cited by various 
influential organisations on the subject of internal control, as evidenced by some organisations, 
such as the IIA (2009:20) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, 
2005:2). 
 
5.6.1 COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework   
The COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework was originally issued in 1992. According to 
the Foreword to the COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework (2013), the original 
framework that was issued in 1992 is regarded globally as a leading framework to design, 
implement, conduct and assess the effectiveness of internal control. The framework was 
revised and updated during 2013. The revision was necessitated by the demands of a changing 
business environment, such as complexity of business operations, stakeholder expectation in 
respect of governance, technological advancement and globalisation of markets. 
 
According to COSO (2013:5), there are five components to the COSO Internal Control 
Integrated Framework, which are applicable to the whole organisation, including different 
divisions, units or other functions. These components are: 
 Control environment; 
 Risk assessment; 
 Control activities; 
 Information and communication, and  
 Monitoring activities. 
 
All five constructs of the framework are essential and relevant. For purposes of this study only 
three constructs were prioritised. These three constructs can be directly linked to the 
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prevention of fraud, which is the focus of this study. Hence, the following three constructs 
were chosen for purposes of this study: 
 Control environment; 
 Risk assessment, and 
 Control activities. 
 
The constructs of the COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework enabled the exploration of 
internal controls, management responsibility as well as the responsibility of auditors and the 
audit committee. COSO (2013:2) describes internal controls as a process which is implemented 
by the board and management of an organisation to assure stakeholders that the objectives of 
the organisation will be achieved. The selected constructs are elaborated on in this chapter as 
they are pertinent to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-
Natal. Figure 5.2 below depicts the Cube that is used by COSO to illustrate the Internal 
Control Integrated Framework: 
Figure 5.2: Internal Control – Integrated Framework Cube 
 
Source: COSO (2013:5) 
 
The COSO (2013:5) framework sets out the three organisational objectives that need to be 
considered in an internal control environment. These objectives are operations, reporting and 
compliance and they permeate throughout the organisation irrespective of the varying 
organisational structure. The internal control process is integrated as each part of it affects the 
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other parts (COSO 2013:6). According to COSO (2013:12), there are seventeen principles in 
total that are linked to the five components. There are twelve principles linked to the three 
chosen components for this study, which are elaborated on further in this chapter. Figure 5.3 
shows the components that constitute internal control: 
Figure 5.3: Adapted from the Internal Control – Integrated Framework 
 
Source: COSO (2013:12) 
 
5.6.2 Control Environment  
The control environment, according to COSO (2013:12), comprises standards, processes and 
structures which form the foundation upon which internal control is constructed in an 
organisation. This is augmented by the board and management setting a strong tone at the top 
about the importance of internal control and level of conduct that is expected from employees. 
The following five principles underpin the control environment component. 
 
5.6.2.1 Integrity and Ethical Values 
The organisation espouses integrity and high ethical values. This principle is premised on the 
four essential points listed below: 
 The tone at the top is set by the board and all levels of management leading by 
example and acting ethically and with integrity. 
 Standards of conduct remind employees and service providers that they are 
expected to act ethically and with integrity. 












 Deviation from the standards of conduct is identified and addressed timeously.    
 
5.6.2.2 Oversight 
The board exhibits its independence from management and oversees to ensure that internal 
controls are developed and remain effective and adequate. This principle is premised on the 
four essential points that are listed below, where the board of directors: 
 Establish and accept responsibility for oversight of internal control within the 
organisation. 
 Determine, maintain and evaluate the expertise of its members to ensure that these 
are appropriate to equip them to ask sceptical questions of management and take 
corrective action. 
 Is made up of independent members who are objective in carrying out their tasks. 
 Play an oversight role over the design, implementation, and conduct of internal 
control by management.     
 
5.6.2.3 Structure, Authority and Responsibility 
In order to achieve organisational objectives, management implements an operational structure 
with clear reporting lines and delegated authority and responsibility to employees; which is 
overseen by the board. The three points on which this principle is premised are: 
 Consideration is given by the board and management to all structures of the 
organisation that contribute to the achievement of organisational objectives.  
 Reporting lines are designed and evaluated by management for all structures. 
 It is the role of the board and management to delegate authority, allocate 
responsibility and segregate duties by means of appropriate systems and processes. 
 
5.6.2.4 Competence 
Suitably competent employees are recruited, trained and retained by the organisation in order 
to achieve its objectives. There are four points on which this principle is premised, which are: 




 The board and management evaluate competence throughout the organisation, as 
well as service providers, based on extant policies and procedures and rectifies 
where required. 
 Competent employees and service providers are recruited, developed and retained. 
 The board and management plan for the succession of employees in essential areas 
of internal control. 
 
5.6.2.5 Accountability 
Employees are held accountable for their internal control responsibilities. There are five 
characteristics on which this principle is premised. The board and management: 
 Establish processes in which to communicate with, and hold people accountable 
for internal controls and initiate corrective action where appropriate. 
 Establish performance measures and rewards for the achievement of objectives. 
 Evaluate performance measures and align incentives and rewards with the 
fulfilment of internal control responsibilities and the achievement of objectives. 
 Assess and address pressures that are linked with the achievement of objectives. 
 Evaluate responsibility for the performance of internal control, compliance with 
standards of conduct and the level of competence when remunerating or punishing 
employees. 
 
5.6.3 Risk Assessment 
According to COSO (2013:13), the ongoing process to identify and classify risks is regarded as 
the risk assessment process which informs the decision-making related to the management of 
the particular risk based on knowledge about internal and external influences. The following 
four principles underpin the risk assessment component. 
 
5.6.3.1 Specific Objectives 
The specific objectives of the organisation are clearly communicated to enable the 
identification and evaluation of risks that impact on the achievement of determined objectives. 
The following thirteen characteristics are related to operations, reporting and compliance: 
 Operational objectives are determined by management. 
 Management considers the level of risk that the organisation is willing to tolerate. 
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 Levels of operations and financial performance are communicated by the 
organisation. 
 Operational objectives are considered by management when allocating resources. 
 External financial reporting objectives are in line with accounting principles for 
similar organisations. 
 Materiality is taken into consideration when preparing the financial statement. 
 External reporting is a reflection of essential transactions and events of the 
organisation. 
 Objectives are determined by considering relevant laws, rules and recognised 
standards and frameworks. 
 Requisite levels of precision and accuracy are considered when reporting. 
 Internal reporting entails complete and accurate information about choices made 
by management and information to operate the organisation. 
 Internal reporting objectives indicate the level of precision and accuracy required 
in non-financial reporting objectives. 
 Laws and rules are integrated into the compliance objectives, as minimum 
standards of conduct. 
 Management considers its tolerance for risks in line with its objectives. 
 
5.6.3.2 Identify and Analyse Risk 
Risks are identified and analysed throughout the organisation, in order to determine how they 
should be addressed. The following five characteristics highlight this principle: 
 Risks are identified and analysed at all levels, including subsidiaries, divisions, 
units and functional departments. 
 Risks from both internal and external sources are identified and analysed. 
 Risk assessment occurs with the involvement of appropriate levels of management. 
 Identified risks are analysed for its significance. 
 Consideration is given to how a risk should be managed. 
 
5.6.3.3 Fraud Risk 
The potential for fraud is taken into consideration during the risk identification and assessment 
process. The four salient characteristics of this principle are: 
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 Consideration of various types of fraud such as fraudulent reporting, asset 
misappropriation and corruption. 
 Incentive and pressure to commit fraud are taken into consideration. 
 Opportunity to commit fraud is taken into consideration. 
 Rationalisation to commit fraud is a means which employees may use to attempt to 
justify their act. 
 
5.6.3.4 Identify and Analyse Change 
Changes that impact the control environment are identified and assessed based on the 
significance of its impact on internal control. The three essential characteristics are: 
 Consideration should be given to changes to regulations, laws, economy and the 
physical environment. 
 Consideration should be given to the impact of new business products, changes to 
existing products, swift growth, business with foreign organisations and new 
technology. 
 Changes in management and their attitudes towards internal control should also be 
considered. 
 
5.6.4 Control Activities 
The control activities, according to COSO (2013:13), are actions that are determined by 
policies and procedures implemented by management to ensure risks are mitigated in order to 
achieve organisational objectives. These activities span across all levels of the organisation, in 
different stages of the processes and including all technology environments. The following 
three principles underpin the control activities component: 
 
5.6.4.1 Select and Develop Control Activities  
Control activities are identified and implemented by management to assist in the mitigation of 
spacing risks and achievement of objectives. There are six essential characteristics of this 
principle, which are: 
 Control activities ensure that risk mitigation is carried out. 
 Control activities are impacted by the characteristics of the organisation, the 
operating environment, business complexity, nature and scope of operations. 
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 Management is responsible for deciding the areas of operation requiring control 
activities. 
 Control activities include various control types as well as a combination thereof. 
 Control activities should be considered at various levels within the organisation. 
 Incompatible duties should be segregated or alternative controls implemented. 
 
5.6.4.2 General Control Activities over Technology 
General control activities are identified and implemented by management over technology to  
assist in the mitigation of risks and achievement of objectives. These four aspects characterise 
this principle: 
 Determine how dependent the organisational processes are and how they 
interrelate in terms of processes, automated control activities and technology 
general controls. 
 Management designs controls over technology infrastructure. 
 Management designs controls to restrict the access of unauthorised employees to 
technology and also to protect the organisation from external threats. 
 Management designs controls over the procurement, development and upkeep of 
technology infrastructure.  
 
5.6.4.3 Policies and Procedures 
Policies and procedures are implemented to ensure that organisational objectives are achieved. 
There are six characteristics that underpin this principle, namely: 
 Management designs policies and procedures which stipulate the processes and 
routine employee activities required to achieve its objectives. 
 Accountability and responsibility are assigned to relevant levels of management 
for control activities. 
 Control activities are carried out timeously by responsible employees as prescribed 
in the policies and procedures. 
 Corrective action is taken by responsible employees after they investigate issues 
emanating from control activities. 




 Policies and procedures are reviewed on a regular basis and amendments are made 
where appropriate. 
 
The COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework is particularly relevant to employee fraud 
and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
5.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of the evolution of internal control over the past centuries, 
albeit in various forms. This chapter has also highlighted that internal control is an essential 
intervention in addressing employee fraud and prevention strategies particularly at universities 
in KwaZulu-Natal. To address employee fraud, various pieces of legislation and frameworks 
have been designed and implemented throughout the world over the years. A significant 
requirement of the various legislation and frameworks is the need for designing and 
implementing sound internal control systems that are adequate and effective. The COSO 
Internal Control Integrated Framework, with its various components and principles, is 
especially relevant to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-
Natal. Complementing the discussion on internal controls, the following chapter elaborates on 
corporate governance and the manner in which it relates to employee fraud and prevention 

























PERSPECTIVES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter elaborates on the history and relevance of sound governance within organisations. 
It is essential to delve into the past in order to obtain an understanding of the historical 
circumstances which have influenced modern-day corporate governance. In this chapter, 
relevant legislation is expounded as pertinent to the governance of universities in South Africa. 
The Batho Pele principles (2010:77) are explained with specific relation to ethical conduct, 
including the African Charter (2011:7) on ethical behaviour. This chapter also elaborates on 
sections of The South African National Development Plan 2030 (NDP), insofar as it relates to 
governance of public higher education institutions. For purposes of this research, four 
constructs were selected from the King III Corporate Governance Framework because of their 
reference to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. These 
four constructs are ethical leadership and corporate citizenship, audit committees, governance 
of risk and internal audit. The constructs are expanded on in this chapter.    
 
6.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORY 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014) defines govern as “the way that a city, company, etc., 
is controlled by the people who run it”. King (2009:18) defines governance as “the processes 
to help directors discharge and be seen to be discharging their responsibilities created by their 
duties”. According to King (2009:18), his definition of corporate governance is much more 
informed than the standard definition that corporate governance is “the way in which 
companies are directed and controlled”. He (2009:1) argues that it does not matter how big or 
small the entity is; it has to be governed. King (2009:17) posits that a corporate company 
cannot be equated to a human being insofar as it does not have a mind with which it can think. 
The company becomes a legal person in law but requires directors in order to operate.    
 
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014), responsibility is defined as “something 
that you should do because it is morally right, legally required”. King (2006:4) holds that 
sound governance of an organisation “is a journey rather than a destination”. In essence, 
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universities in KwaZulu-Natal should consider sound governance as work in progress and not 
as an event.   
 
Companies in South Africa are bound by the Companies Act 71 of 2008, as well as the King 
Reports on Corporate Governance in the quest for sound governance. During 1994, Mervyn 
King, who was a former judge of the High Court in South Africa, formed a committee that 
developed the King Report on Corporate Governance. This report later became popularly 
known as King I. The King I (1994) report provides guidelines to organisations on codes of 
practice and conduct. According to Barrier (2003:69), King I was created after The Institute of 
Directors in South Africa, as well as the former Johannesburg Stock Exchange, requested 
Mervyn King to chair a committee.  
 
Barrier reports (2003:69) that the objective of the committee was to look into addressing issues 
that would hinder former disadvantaged citizens from moving their business activities into the 
mainstream economy in a democratic South Africa. These citizens had no experience or 
literature to guide them through this transition. King I advocated an integrated approach where 
guidelines were provided to boards on how to deal with their stakeholders. It also addressed 
affirmative action. According to Hendricks and Wyngaard (2010:104), King I recommends 
that the interests of stakeholders have to be taken into consideration from a sound social, 
financial, ethical and environmental perspective.     
 
Bendixen and Thomas (2000:65) aver that corporate governance is widely viewed as critical to 
sound business practice. Brown and Brown (1999:96) are of the view that good corporate 
results stem from good governance. This view is shared by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 1999:199), which also believes that sound governance 
will improve corporate performance. According to de Beer and Rensburg (2011:208), the 
management of stakeholder relationships has the potential to assist an organisation in 
achieving its predetermined objectives. OECD (1999:199) holds that organisations who fail to 
adapt to sound governance practices will find difficulty in accessing global capital markets. 
 
The King Committee issued what later became known as King II. According to Hendricks and 
Wyngaard (2010:105), certain practices which were recommended in King II were 
incorporated into legislation, namely, the Companies Act 71 of 2008. According to Kakabadse 
and Korac-Kakabadse (2002:310), King II replicates King I to a large extent and also expands 
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on it in more detail. King III (2009:16) proffers that the code applies to all entities, irrespective 
of size or whether they exist in the public or private sectors. It is mandatory for companies that 
are listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, to apply the principles of the King III 
code. King III (2009:5) advocates the application of the principles of corporate governance on 
a comply-or-explain basis, as they most suitably meet the objectives of an entity.  
 
Casper et al. (1999:104) hold that there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach when it comes to 
corporate governance. Their comparative study of corporate governance in Germany and 
Britain revealed that there is no “one best” system. Each system has its own advantages. King 
III (2009:5) supports this view, as the “one size fits all” principle cannot be found suitable to 
each and every company because they are different from one another in various ways.  
 
Corporate governance as a method to prevent unethical behaviour is particularly relevant today 
in addressing employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
6.3 HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
According to Schall (2011:478), the formation of the Dutch East India Company and the 
English East India Company ushered in the creation of chartered companies which were 
managed by agents appointed as separate legal entities based on a “royal charter”. The legal 
status of these companies was derived from the King. Schall (2011:479) holds that modern day 
entities show some semblance to the manner in which chartered companies operated, namely, 
the separation of powers in running the business in the year 1600. Schall (2011:480) reveals 
that the East India Company had the same elements of modern-day companies. For example, 
the company was operated by the Governor and relevant committees were put together. This 
can be compared to the chief executive officer and the board of directors in modern companies. 
The East India Company traded under one name, rendering the appointed agents and investors 
not being held personally liable. Schall (2011:480) concludes that these chartered companies 
were the earliest indication that there was a separation of powers. This was the origin of a form 
of corporate governance.  
 
According to King (2006:6), the governing of companies took credence in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, despite the fact that contemporary companies came into existence in 1855. 
Schall (2011:478) supports this view that the modern company emerged in the United 
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Kingdom in 1855. King (2006:6) postulates that it was during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries that companies, which were largely family-owned business, were focused on the 
profits generated for their shareholders. There was no consideration for the well-being of other 
stakeholders.   
 
Frederick (2006:5) posits that corporate social responsibility emerged during the twentieth 
century and became an embedded way of doing business by the end of that century. Between 
the 1950s and 1970s, businesses faced pressure from stakeholders to conduct business in a 
socially responsible manner. According to Frederick (2006:5), the protests emanated from 
widely publicised behaviour by businesses which acted unethically and irresponsibly. It was 
widely perceived at that time that businesses operated without consideration for the impact 
they had on society. Frederick (2006:9) holds that Richard Eells coined the phrase “the well-
tempered corporation” in 1960, when he referred, inter alia, to a company which conducted 
business while being mindful of the societal need for “good corporate citizenry”. The original 
documented use of the term “corporate governance” is accredited to Eells (1960:108) to mean 
“the structure and operation of the corporate polity”. 
 
According to Morck and Steier (2005:4), corporate governance is not a standard process 
throughout the world. There are two issues that impact corporate governance globally. Firstly, 
there are companies within the United States of America and the United Kingdom that are 
owned by a wide variety of shareholders, whereas elsewhere in the world large companies are 
owned by a few wealthy families. Secondly, wealthy families own some companies, which 
also own shares in other companies, which in turn also own shares in further hundreds of 
companies, just as in a pyramid. Morck and Steier (2005:4) explain that large family-owned 
companies pose a challenge to corporate governance in a pyramid scenario. 
 
King (2006:7) explains that during the late twentieth century, American and British 
shareholders were becoming concerned about the governance of Anglo-American companies. 
The reason was that the companies that were located in countries in the Far East were 
performing better than British and American companies in the same industry. The Anglo-
American companies had unitary boards with limited stakeholder input, which was in contrast 
to how companies were governed in the Far East. According to King (2006:8), the emergence 
of scandals involving BCCI Bank and Robert Maxwell in the United Kingdom, prompted the 
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country to set up a committee that would design a governance code in respect of financial 
aspects. The committee was chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury.      
 
6.4 CADBURY REPORT 
Corporate governance gained prominence during 1992 after the Cadbury Report was issued. 
The Cadbury Report emanated from a committee that was formed during 1991 in Britain by 
the London Stock Exchange, the Financial Reporting Council as well as the accounting 
fraternity, to address financial reporting and accountability from a corporate governance 
perspective. According to Keasey et al. (2005:5), the process of reforming the corporate 
governance environment in the United Kingdom commenced when the Cadbury Committee 
was formed in 1991.  
 
The committee, which was led by Sir Adrian Cadbury (1992:14), produced the “Report of the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance”. This report is popularly 
referred to as the “Cadbury Report”. The Cadbury Report (1992:43) also addresses the issue of 
fraud and suggests that it is the ultimate responsibility of the board of an organisation, in terms 
of its fiduciary duties, to prevent and detect fraud. The Cadbury Report (1992:25) stipulates 
that the Board of Directors is implicitly required to ensure that there are adequate systems of 
internal control in place to minimise the risk of fraud taking place within their organisations. 
According to Wixley and Everingham (2002:5), the Cadbury Report is claimed to have been 
the catalyst in ensuring sound governance by companies within the United Kingdom.  
 
After the Cadbury Report (1992) was issued in the United Kingdom, it was followed by the 
Greenbury Report (1995), which made recommendations about the remuneration of directors. 
This report was later followed by the Hampel Report (1998), which focused on reviewing the 
implementation of the recommendations made in the Cadbury Report. The Turnbull Report 
(1999), made recommendations about the combined code and internal controls in England and 
Wales. A revised Turnbull Report (2005) was subsequently issued.  
 
6.5 SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION ACT 108 OF 1996  
The values and principles that govern public administration in South Africa is stipulated in 
Section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. According to 
Thornhill (2012:110), Section 195 also sets out the high standard of ethical conduct that is 
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expected within public service. Public administration is expected to be governed by, inter alia, 
the following basic values and principles: 
 Inculcate sound professional ethical conduct; 
 Resources should be used efficiently and effectively, and 
 There must be accountability within public administration. 
 
In order to give effect to these values and principles they should be reflected in policies within 
public administration. In this regard Cloete and Wissink (2000:14) conclude that public policy 
should highlight ethics and values. They postulate that policy management can be considered 
to be effective through sound management, organisational arrangements and governance. 
Universities in KwaZulu-Natal should consider the values and principles contained in Section 
195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 when designing or 
revising related policies that would assist in preventing employee fraud at universities.       
 
6.6 HIGHER EDUCATION ACT 101 OF 1997 
According to King (2006:7), governments around the world have compelled companies to be 
governed in a sound manner by passing relevant legislation to this effect. The intent of 
government is to criminalise poor governance or a lack thereof by companies. Wixley and 
Everingham (2002:3) postulate that corporate governance applies to both the private and public 
sectors. The principles of sound governance are applicable to all entities including universities. 
The Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 is specifically applicable to institutions that are 
involved in higher education in both the public as well the private sectors. This Act should be 
read in conjunction with the Higher Education Laws Amendment Act 21 of 2011. 
  
In dealing with the governance of public universities, chapter four of this Act is relevant as it 
specifically pertains to the governance of public higher education institutions, such as the four 
universities that form part of this research. Section 26 (2) of the Higher Education Act 101 of 
1997 stipulates that every public higher education institution should form governance 
structures such as a council, senate, principal, vice-principal, students’ representative council, 
institutional forum and other structures and offices which may be determined by the statute of 




In terms of Section 27 of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997, the Council of a public higher 
education institution is tasked with governing the institution within the ambit of this Act and 
any other relevant legislation including the statute of the particular institution. Sub-section 27 
(7) of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 stipulates that members who are elected to serve 
on the Council of a public higher education institution should be experienced and 
knowledgeable about governance of the relevant institution. The statute of each public higher 
education institution, such as the University of KwaZulu-Natal (2014:12), sets out the various 
functions of Council, including the appointment of senior management. Council delegates the 
day-to-day administration and management of the institution to the Vice-Chancellor. Such 
responsibility of the Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the institution is aligned to Section 30 of 
the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997. The Vice-Chancellor in turn delegates these tasks to the 
executive management committee of the institution. Council also appoints various oversight 
committees to assist it in governing the institution. Examples of such committees are an audit 
and risk committee as well as a finance committee.  
 
Section 34 of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 stipulates that the council of the relevant 
public higher education institution should determine the disciplinary provisions for the 
institution. Disciplinary provisions are essential in the governance process of a public higher 
education institution. In instances where there is a violation of policies and procedures or 
legislation, it is essential that there are stipulated disciplinary processes and sanctions in place 
for violations or non-compliance.     
 
Section 38 of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 pertains to cooperation between public 
higher education institutions. Of relevance to this research is the need to share best practices 
with other public higher education institutions. Sub-section 38 (2) stipulates that public higher 
education institutions may co-operate with each other in any manner to achieve the optimal 
utilisation of resources and the performance of their functions, and to establish regional or 
national structures to assist and facilitate co-operation.  
 
In terms of Section 41 of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997, the Minister of Higher 
Education requires the council of a public higher education institution to provide a report on 
the overall governance of the relevant institution. The objective is to assure the Minister that 
the institution is operated on sound governance principles. This Act should be considered when 
addressing employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.    
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6.7 COMPANIES ACT 71 OF 2008 
The Companies Act 46 of 1926 was enacted in South Africa to regulate the manner in which 
companies operate in the country. This act was later repealed and replaced by the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973. After the dawn of a new democratic political order in South Africa, a new 
Companies Act was enacted during 2008 and the former Act 61 of 1973 was repealed. There is 
now the Companies Act 71 of 2008 as amended during 2011. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 
sets out various activities which are deemed unlawful and are punishable in terms of this Act. 
The crime of fraud features under various Sections of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 as 
amended. The Act sets out, inter alia, the responsibility of directors of companies to ensure 
sound governance within the Board of Companies that they serve. For example, Section 22 (1) 
prohibits directors from trading recklessly with the intent to commit fraud. 
 
Public higher education institutions are not companies as envisaged in the Companies Act 71 
of 2008. This Act is relevant to public higher education institutions with particular bearing on 
where such institutions have formed companies for the purpose of raising funds for the 
institution concerned. Section 40 of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 provides for a 
public higher education institution to raise funds. The institution concerned should ensure that 
companies that are formed to raise funds on behalf of the institution, operate legally and 
ethically based on sound governance principles.  
 
6.8 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
Vyas-Doorgapersad (2011:240) holds that systems that are implemented to manage employee 
performance contribute towards sound governance in the public sector resulting in a paradigm 
shift to New Public Management (NPM) from New Public Administration. According to Vyas-
Doorgapersad (2011:238), NPM is considered to be a management approach which is premised 
on best practice that is in use in the private sector and implemented within the public sector. 
Vyas-Doorgapersad (2011:239) proffers that the four popular elements of NPM in African 
countries are decentralisation, outsourcing, performance contracting and corporatisation. Vyas-
Doorgapersad (2011:245) avers that NPM may contribute towards sound governance and 
sustainable development in African countries that are experiencing a crisis within the public 
sector. According to Mongkol (2011:40), the NPM concept has been criticised for not being 




Fox et al. (2004:2) hold that public administration should not be “reduced” to public 
management because public administration is defined in broader terms than public 
management. They suggest that public management should rather form part of the wide 
theoretical and practical aspects of public administration. According to Fox et al. (2004:2) the 
prominence of public administration over public management is evident from the curricula that 
was set by the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA) 
for public administration. Of significance to this study is that the curricula should include, inter 
alia, “knowledge of ethical and value systems within which public administrators must 
operate”. This is in accordance with the views of Cloete and Wissink (2000:14) who suggest 
that public policy should give significant attention to ethics and values.    
 
The Division of Public Administration and Development Management within the United 
Nations (2008:70) are tasked with coordinating and implementing a programme on public 
administration in order to achieve its Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of poverty 
alleviation and sustainable development. According to the United Nations (2008:71), 
globalisation has resulted in concerns around governance and public administration among 
countries. Therefore, the focus of the Governance and Public Administration Branch of the 
United Nations is, inter alia, on ethics, transparency and accountability in public 
administration. In order to prevent employee fraud at the university it would be essential for 
management to inculcate an ethical culture.  
 
Ethical behaviour, incompatibilities and conflict of interest as well as the preventing and 
combating corruption are essential principles which universities in KwaZulu-Natal should 
consider when designing and implementing strategies to prevent employee fraud.  
 
6.9 AFRICAN CHARTER  
The African Charter was adopted by the African Union (AU) in Ethiopia on 31 January 2011.  
With relevance to this study the preamble to AU African Charter (2011:2) stipulates, inter alia, 
that the Member States are committed to: 
 Enhancing professionalism and ethics on the African continent, and 




The African Charter (2011:3) defines ethics in public service as the standards of accountability 
by which the work and conduct of public servants are evaluated. Chapter 3 of the African 
Charter (2011:7) was chosen for purposes of this study. It deals with the code of conduct for 
public servants. Articles 10, 11 and 12 are relevant in particular to this study as they relate to 
the following:    
 Article 10 – Ethical Behaviour; 
 Article 11 – Incompatibilities and Conflict of Interest, and 
 Article 12 – Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
 
6.9.1 Ethical Behaviour 
In inculcating ethical behaviour, Article 10 of the African Charter (2011:7) stipulates that 
public servants shall in their official capacity: 
 Abide by established policies, procedures and ethical codes of conduct;  
 Not receive nor request any gifts, donations or rewards in cash or kind, and   
 Carry out their official duties impartially and without personal gain. 
 
6.9.2 Incompatibilities and Conflict of Interest 
To obviate incompatibilities and conflicts of interest Article 11 of the African Charter (2011:8) 
stipulates that public servants shall in their official capacity: 
 Not participate in transactions where they have vested interests;  
 Abide by legislation that prohibits conflicts of interest;  
 Not participate in any activity that is incompatible with their functions;  
 Maintain confidentiality for documents and information entrusted to them, and  
 Not unduly benefit from offices that they had occupied previously.  
 
6.9.3 Preventing and Combating Corruption 
In preventing and combating corruption Article 12 of the African Charter (2011:8) stipulates 
that governments shall: 
 Enact legislation and design and implement strategies;  
 Ensure that the public service sector makes public servants aware about the anti-
corruption strategies that are implemented;  
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 Implement systems to manage accountability and integrity in the country that are 
underpinned by ethical values and behaviours, and 
 Recognise and reward ethical leadership.  
 
6.10 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2030 
The South African National Development Plan 2030 (NDP, 2012:25) was produced by the 
National Planning Commission (NPC) which was chaired by Minister Manuel, a Member of 
Parliament of South Africa. The NPC was appointed by President Zuma in 2010 with the 
mandate to compile a vision and national development plan for South Africa. The NPC 
comprised 26 commissioners who had specific expertise in areas that were the focus of the 
NPC. Since the birth of democracy in 1994 in South Africa, the NDP (2012:25) reflected that 
progress in the country was stifled mainly because of the failure to implement policies and the 
absence of broad partnerships in the country.  
 
The NDP highlighted nine challenges for South Africa, one being the need to address the high 
levels of corruption in the country. The NDP (2012:56) suggests that corruption should be 
addressed by means of three interventions: prevention, deterrence and education. Firstly, the 
NDP (2012:56) suggests that prevention, which entails the use of systems, inter alia, 
information technology and audit, makes the perpetration of fraud and corruption difficult. 
Secondly, deterrence has the effect of letting people know that they are likely to be detected 
and punished if they are involved in fraud and corruption. Lastly, educating people about 
social values will assist in emphasising that corruption is dishonesty and a criminal offence, 
thereby reducing this scourge in South African society. Corruption is linked to fraud, which is 
the focus of this research.  
 
The NDP (2012:394) suggests that a framework should be created for the prevention of crime. 
In developing this framework organisations should consider three key factors. These are to 
identify the following: 
 the root causes; 
 the opportunity to commit the crime, and  




These three factors are similar to the factors of the fraud triangle of pressure (cause), 
rationalisation (justifying the lapse in ethics) and opportunity. According to the NDP 
(2012:394), there are five factors that will ensure success of the crime prevention process. 
These are accountability, leadership, coordination, monitoring and reporting. The criminal 
justice system, according to the NDP (2012:394), is focused on deterring crime by punishing 
offenders, in the form of incarceration, in order to prevent future crimes as well as to remove 
the criminal from society.  
 
According to the NDP (2012:445), individuals who are entrusted with public funds should be 
held accountable. Whistle-blowers should be afforded protection from any type of harm for 
reports that are made in good faith. The procurement of goods and services should be 
continually monitored. Poor governance, according to the NDP (2012:446), effectively 
undermines development in South Africa. The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act 12 of 2004 is but one of the effective laws that can assist universities in the fight against 
fraud and corruption.  
 
The NDP (2012:449) encourages the creation and implementation of “integrity pacts” between 
organisations and their suppliers, where both parties agree not to request or pay bribes or 
collude with competitors in order to be awarded a contract. The NDP (2012:450) advocates 
that whistle-blowers require more protection beyond protection from “occupational 
detriment”. It (2012:451) holds that it is not uncommon for individuals who were found guilty 
of corruption in one department to resurface in another department. Similarly, university 
employees who resign before facing disciplinary action may resurface at another university and 
continue their fraudulent conduct. The NDP (2012:452) suggests that guilty employees should 
be held personally liable for losses arising out of corrupt activities. Universities can rely on 
Section 37D (1) (b) (ii) of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, to recover losses that it has 
suffered, from the pension fund of the guilty employee. The NDP should be considered where 
it pertains to higher education, particularly in addressing employee fraud and prevention 
strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.     
 
6.11 BATHO PELE PRINCIPLES 
The South African government first introduced the Batho Pele (people first) principles by 
means of a White Paper on Public Service Delivery during 1997. According to Thornhill 
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(2012:111), the Batho Pele principles are an indication of the commitment of government to 
ensuring that public servants place the citizens of South Africa first in service delivery. The 
eight Batho Pele principles (2010:11) comprise of consultation, service standards, access, 
courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress and value for money. Public 
servants should: 
 Consult and provide choices to people about the quality and extent of service that 
they can receive;  
 Tell people about the standard of service they can expect to receive;  
 Provide equal access to services which people are eligible for; 
 Treat people with courtesy; 
 Provide all relevant information to people about the services they receive; 
 Be open and transparent with people about how the government department 
operates, including how much it costs and the name of the person in charge; 
 Promptly remedy situations where service is not delivered according to expectation 
or offer an apology or explanation, and 
 Provide services that are economical and efficient. 
 
Section 8 of the Batho Pele principles (2010:77) relate to the right of citizens to access to 
higher education. The Batho Pele principles refer specifically to the Higher Education Act 101 
of 1997 insofar as fairness and transparency in the allocation of funding, especially for 
previously disadvantaged students, is concerned. Thornhill (2012:111) postulates that public 
servants should treat people fairly and reasonably by executing their official tasks with 
integrity. According to Thornhill (2012:116), professional codes of ethics for public servants 
are rapidly becoming a norm.    
 
6.12 KING CODES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Shortly after the Cadbury Report was released, South Africa commenced a process to address 
corporate governance in the country. Wixley and Everingham (2002:3) postulate that the 
corporate governance model used in South Africa is derived from the Anglo Saxon model of 
the United Kingdom, as opposed to the system used in certain other parts of Europe, namely 
the two-tier system, such as the two-tier system used in Germany, which has two boards of 
directors. First, there is the supervisory board which does not have any executive authority 
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except to appoint or remove a manager on the board. Second, there is the management board, 
which is responsible for the day-to-day management of the entity. 
 
According to the website of the Institute of Directors South Africa (IODSA 2014), Professor 
Mervyn King, was a former judge in the High Court in South Africa, who was approached in 
1992 to set up a committee to compile guidelines for corporate governance in South Africa. 
During 1994, the initial King Report on Corporate Governance, popularly known as “King I”, 
was released. According to King (2006:8), the scope of the King Committee was wider than 
that of the Cadbury Committee because it too was tasked with addressing issues in addition to 
those of financial governance in a new democratic South Africa.  In the King I (1994) Report, 
guidelines were provided to organisations on codes of practice and codes of conduct. During 
2002, a second report (King II) on Corporate Governance was released followed by King III, 
which was released during 2009. King III focuses on providing a framework to organisations 
for effective leadership, sustainability and corporate citizenship.  
 
Ncayiyana and Hayward (1999:8) posit that the council of a university should operate within 
best practice norms as espoused in the King Report on corporate governance. These authors 
also suggest that members of council should be mindful of certain values and traditions that 
exist within higher education institutions. These values and traditions are academic freedom, 
independence of the institution and consultation with all stakeholders with respect to relevant 
decisions that are made by council. According to Ncayiyana and Hayward (1999:5), higher 
education institutions should be allowed to function autonomously, with freedom, sufficient 
resources and responsibility.   
 
6.12.1 King I 
The first King Report on Corporate Governance was issued in 1994 (King I) by the IODSA 
(1994), making it the first code for corporate governance in South Africa. According to 
Jackson and Stent (2010:4/3), the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) made it mandatory 
for all listed companies to indicate in their annual financial statements a declaration by the 
directors that they have complied with the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct enshrined 




King I applied to companies listed on the JSE, large state-owned enterprises, financial 
companies, insurance companies, as well as large unlisted companies with shareholder equity 
of over R50 million. Although not mandatory, King I provided guidance on corporate 
governance which was suitable for all companies in South Africa. 
The essential aspects of King I covered the makeup of the board of directors, terms of office 
for executive directors, directors’ remuneration, frequency of board meetings, annual reporting, 
auditing, affirmative action and code of ethics.  
 
6.12.2 King II 
The IODSA (2002) issued King II in 2002 with the purpose of reviewing the relevance of King 
I in relation to developments around the world. According to Jackson and Stent (2010:4/3), 
King II was envisaged to also provide recommendations to companies about reporting in 
respect of ethical accounting and auditing practices as well as safety, health and environmental 
issues. King II was not a prescriptive code for corporate governance to adhere to, but was a 
requirement for companies listed on the JSE.   
 
King II was expanded to include State departments at national, provincial and local 
government levels. The essential aspects of King II covered directors’ responsibilities, risk 
management, internal audit, reporting on sustainability, accounting and auditing as well as 
legal compliance and enforcement. 
 
According to Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse (2002:310), King II provides more detail on 
the various aspects of King I. Some of the aspects relate to the roles of the chairperson and 
chief executive officer, disclosing remuneration of directors, term of office of non-executive 
directors, role of the audit committee and remuneration committee, use of information 
technology, role of internal audit and risk management as well as non-financial aspects such as 
safety, health, environment and ethics. 
 
According to Jackson and Stent (2010:4/4), the Companies Act 71 of 2008, which came into 
existence in 2008, places emphasis on corporate governance as part of the reform of the 
corporate environment in South Africa. Once again, the Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
(JSE) made it mandatory for all listed companies to indicate in their annual financial 
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statements a declaration by the directors that they have complied with the Code of Corporate 
Practices and Conduct enshrined in King II. 
 
6.12.3 King III      
According to Jackson and Stent (2010:4/4), the King code of governance for South Africa 
(King III) was created during 2009. The IODSA (2009) issued King III pursuant to the 
promulgation of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, as well as due to global changes in corporate 
governance. King III embodies many sound governance principles that were contained in the 
previous two King reports on corporate governance. The difference with King III is that it 
applies to all public, private and non-profit entities that operate in South Africa.  
 
The “apply or explain” basis, for the implementation of the code on corporate governance, 
emanated out of King III. The term “apply or explain” means that, when directors choose not 
to implement a governance recommendation, they need to explain the reasons why it is not 
applicable. In this regard, Jackson and Stent (2010:4/5) hold that the “apply or explain” basis 
does not afford directors an excuse to violate any laws. Legislative compliance does not 
operate on the “apply or explain” basis. Directors cannot attempt to justify a violation of the 
law on the basis that it was done in the best interests of the entity. King III is not enforced 
through any legislation. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 contains many corporate governance 
principles that were contained in King II.  
 
According to Wixley and Everingham (2002:9), compliance with King III is voluntary to all 
private sector entities and certain public sector entities in South Africa, except for companies 
that are listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). There are nine constructs 
(principles) to the King III IODSA (2009:16) corporate governance framework. They are: 
 Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship; 
 Boards and directors; 
 Audit committees; 
 Governance of risk;  
 Governance of information technology; 
 Compliance with laws, codes, rules and standards; 
 Internal audit; 
 Governing stakeholder relationships, and 
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 Integrated reporting and disclosure. 
 
For purposes of this research, the following four relevant constructs of this framework were 
chosen: 
 Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship; 
 Audit committees; 
 Governance of risk, and  
 Internal audit. 
 
Each of these four constructs contains various governance elements. The governance elements 
in turn contain various governance principles. These chosen governance elements and 
principles of the King III corporate governance framework have simplified our understanding 
about fraud prevention from a holistic perspective.  
 
The selected corporate governance constructs, elements and principles are explained further in 
this chapter. Figure 6.1 below depicts the four constructs of King III that were chosen for this 
study: 
Figure 6.1: Adapted from the King Code of Governance for South Africa (King III) 
 
 
















Table 6.2 below reflects the governance elements and principles associated with the four 
chosen constructs of King III: 
Table 6.2: Chosen Constructs of the King Code of Governance for South Africa (King III) 





Responsible leadership, the 
board’s responsibilities and 
ethical foundation. 
The board should provide effective leadership based on ethical foundation. 
The board should ensure that the company is, and is seen to be, a 
responsible corporate citizen. 




Existence of audit 
committees. 
The board should ensure that the company has an effective and 
independent audit committee.  
Membership and resources of 
the audit committee. 
Audit committee members should be suitably skilled and experienced, 
independent, non-executive directors.  
The audit committee should be chaired by an independent, non-executive 
director. 
Responsibilities of the audit 
committee. 
The audit committee should oversee integrated reporting. 
The audit committee should ensure that a combined assurance model is 
applied to provide a co-ordinated approach to all assurance activities. 
Internal assurance providers. The audit committee should satisfy itself of the expertise, resources and 
experience of the finance function. 
The audit committee should be responsible for overseeing of internal audit. 
The audit committee should be an integral component of the risk 
management process. 
External assurance providers. The audit committee is responsible for recommending the appointment of 
the external auditor and overseeing the external audit process. 
Reporting. The audit committee should report to the board and shareholders on how it 
has discharged its duties. 
Governance of 
risk 
The board’s responsibility for 
risk governance. 
The board should be responsible for the governance of risk. 
The board should determine the levels of risk tolerance. 
The risk committee or audit committee should assist the board in carrying 
out its risk responsibilities. 
Management’s responsibility 
for risk management. 
The board should delegate to management the responsibility to design, 
implement and monitor the risk management plan. 
Risk assessment. The board should ensure that risk assessments are performed on a 
continual basis. 
The board should ensure that the frameworks and methodologies are 
implemented to increase the probability of anticipating unpredictable risks. 
Risk response. The board should ensure that management considers and implements 
appropriate risk responses. 
Risk monitoring. The board should ensure continual risk monitoring by management. 
Risk assurance. The board should receive assurance regarding the effectiveness of the risk 
management process. 
Risk disclosure. The board should ensure that there are processes in place enabling 
complete, timely, relevant, accurate and accessible risk disclosure to 
stakeholders.  
Internal audit The need for and role of 
internal audit. 
The board should ensure that there is an effective risk-based internal audit. 
Internal audit’s approach and 
plan. 
Internal audit should follow a risk-based approach to its plan. 
Internal audit should provide a written assessment of the effectiveness of 
the company’s system of internal control and risk management. 
The audit committee should be responsible for overseeing internal audit. 
Internal audit’s status in the 
company. 
Internal audit should be strategically positioned to achieve its objectives. 
 
Source: IODSA (2009:16) 
 
6.12.3.1 Ethical Leadership and Corporate Citizenship 
In ensuring ethical leadership and corporate citizenship, the board of a company should:  
 Provide direction for the company strategy and operations; 
 Be mindful of the impact of the company operations on people, profit and planet;  
 Engender an ethical culture within the company by getting management to devise 
and implement a code for ethical conduct; 
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 Be accountable to all stakeholders, and  
 Execute its responsibilities with responsibility, accountability, fairness and 
transparency.   
 
6.12.3.2 Audit Committees 
In terms of good governance and compliance with the Companies Act 71 of 2008, audit 
committees should be established for all companies. The audit committee should:    
 Report directly to the board of the company; 
 Meet independently with internal and external auditors; 
 Have suitably skilled and experienced members who are independent, non-
executive directors; 
 Monitor the accuracy and completeness of the financial reporting of the company;  
 Maintain oversight in respect of integrated reporting; 
 Ensure that it receives combined assurance from internal and external auditors as 
well as from management; 
 Be satisfied with the competence of the finance function of the company; 
 Maintain oversight of the internal audit function; 
 Play an integral role in the process to manage risks, including fraud risks, insofar 
as it relates to financial reporting; 
 Oversee the external audit process and recommend the appointment of external 
auditors, and 
 Report to the board and shareholders about its activities. 
 
6.12.3.3 Governance of Risk 
The governance of risk has to be considered within the risk management process, and in this 
regard the board should:  
 Take responsibility for the governance of risk and ensure the existence of a risk 
management policy and plan that is widely publicised and implemented; 
 Ensure that management identifies and measures risks and implements mitigating 
controls to obviate the risks; 
 Determine the levels of risk that the company is willing to tolerate for key risks; 
 Be assisted by the audit and risk committee in carrying out its risk responsibilities; 
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 Ensure that management designs, implements and monitors the risk management 
plan; 
 Monitor and ensure that assessments are performed of the various types of risks on 
an annual basis; 
 Be assured by management that risk management frameworks and methodologies 
have been implemented which enhance the predicting of all types of risks; 
 Ensure that all risks are ranked and rated and that management has devised 
adequate responses to the identified risks; 
 Ensure that management monitors the identified risks on an ongoing basis; 
 Be assured by management about the effectiveness of the risk management 
process, which should be assessed by internal audit; 
 Ensure that the internal audit function does not take on responsibility for any risk 
management functions, and 
 Issue a statement in the integrated report on how it executed its roles and 
responsibilities in respect of risk management. 
 
6.12.3.4 Internal Audit 
The internal audit projects should be risk-based, and in order to ensure that the internal audit 
function is effective, the board should:  
 Ensure that all internal audit projects are based on identified risks within the 
company; 
 Ensure the internal audit function provides a written assessment of the 
effectiveness of the internal control environment and the risk management process; 
 Maintain oversight of the internal audit function, and 
 Ensure that the Chief Audit Executive reports administratively to the Chief 
Executive Officer of the company and functionally to the audit committee. 
 








6.12.4 King IV 
According to the website of the IODSA (2015), King III is in the process of being succeeded 
by King IV. The reasons proffered by the IODSA for embarking on King IV, is that there have 
been changes in the corporate governance environment coupled with legislative and regulatory 
changes globally. Another reason tendered is that non-profit organisations, public sector 
entities and non-listed companies have experienced difficulty in customising King III to their 
needs. Enhancements to King III will make it easy for such entities to adapt the code to their 
unique circumstances.  King IV will be simplified so that it can be interpreted easily. King IV 
aims to be unique in that the governance principles will be distinguished from practice 
recommendations. King IV is anticipated to be released during 2016. 
 
6.13 SUMMARY          
This chapter dealt with the theory and history of corporate governance both in South Africa 
and globally. It also showed conclusively that corporate governance forms an integral part of 
the fraud risk management process, which is essential in addressing employee fraud and 
prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. The Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 
and Companies Act 71 of 2008 are a number of the various pieces of legislation that were 
created to address governance within tertiary institutions and companies in South Africa. These 
various pieces of legislation and King III set out the governance structures as well as the roles 
and responsibilities expected from these structures and incumbent members, such as board 
members and the audit committees. The chosen governance elements and principles of King III 
are relevant to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. This 
chapter also highlighted the relevance of aspects of the Batho Pele principles, National 
Development Plan 2030 and African Charter with respect to addressing fraud and corruption, 
especially within the context of employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal. The following chapter elaborates on the research methodology employed for 













7.1  INTRODUCTION 
In ensuring the success of a research project, the methodology that is followed has to be 
expansive to stand up to academic scrutiny. The research methodology employed in this study 
was designed to derive a valuable contribution to the existing body of knowledge. Fraud, 
which is the subject of this research, is a topic that requires circumspection when it is dealt 
with in society in general and at universities in particular. This situation is exacerbated when it 
forms part of a research project such as this, and consequently, the research methodology that 
was used for this study is elaborated on in detail in this chapter.    
 
This chapter consists of a number of relevant sections, listed below: 
 the relationship between objectivity and the type of research being conducted; 
 the general research design; 
 the particular research approach; 
 the research strategy; 
 data collection methods; 
 data quality control; 
 data analysis; 
 sampling techniques; 
 validity and reliability; 
 ethical considerations; 
 pilot survey; 
 brief reference to presentation of data, interpretation and articulation of the results 
of the statistical analysis, and 
 a summary to the chapter. 
 
7.2 OBJECTIVITY AND TYPE OF RESEARCH 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015) defines objective as being “based on facts rather 
than feelings or opinions”. The researcher is an experienced forensic investigator who has been 
involved in investigations into fraud within the public and private sectors. This experience in 
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seeking the truth advantageously positioned the researcher to collect data objectively. The 
research was carried out objectively in order to obtain results that could be relied upon and 
replicated within the research community. The research entailed searching the literature as well 
as conducting an empirical survey to objectively find facts about employee fraud and 
prevention strategies.  
 
Literature was sourced from the latest relevant books, academic journals, legislation, published 
and unpublished research as well as other literature sources. The objective of the literature 
search was to ascertain what current and relevant studies had been conducted in relation to the 
topic of this study. Arising from the literature search, a selection of theoretical criteria was 
extracted from pertinent models and frameworks.  
 
The empirical survey entailed the collection of data from participants by means of a survey 
questionnaire which was distributed electronically to them. The objective was to glean the 
knowledge and experience of participants about fraud committed by employees and the 
strategies implemented by universities to prevent fraud from occurring. Denscombe (2002:70) 
asserts that gaining access to documents and people is a prerequisite for research, otherwise a 
researcher will make subjective assumptions about the topic. The making of assumptions in a 
study brings into question the objectivity of the research. 
   
In the quest to collect data about employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal, data were also collected from other sources such as fraud case files and 
interviews that were held with knowledgeable individuals within the KwaZulu-Natal province. 
The use of various methods to collect data ensured that the collected data were accurate and 
based on objectivity.  
 
7.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The appropriate selection of a research design is critical to the success of research, which is a 
view that is supported by Leedy (1993:114). Mouton (2001:55) explains that the design of a 
research is a plan that will guide how the research should be conducted. According to Maxfield 
and Babbie (1995:4), an empirical design produces knowledge based on experience or 
observation. Welman and Kruger (1999:11) suggest that the empirical cycle includes the 
designing of a research strategy, collection of data and the analysis and interpretation of the 
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results thereof.  According to Leedy and Ormrod (2001:91), a research design affords structure 
to the research procedures, data collection and their analysis. Mouton (2001:153) explains that 
structured electronic questionnaires are a source of data in empirical studies.  
 
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014), empirical means “based on testing or 
experience”. Mouton (2001:148) is of the view that an empirical design will involve field 
studies whereby primary data about the personal experience and knowledge of the respondents 
are collated. The empirical design was appropriate for this study because it involved a survey 
questionnaire which was distributed electronically to participants in order to collect data about 
their knowledge and experience involving fraud committed by employees at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal. This strategy ensured that data were collected objectively and systematically 
from a randomly selected representative sample, and were then processed and analysed to offer 
findings that were representative of the total possible research population. 
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001:158) hold that multiple types of methods may be employed by 
researchers in collecting data in any single study. Data were gathered using the following 
techniques: review of literature, interviews with knowledgeable individuals, the analysis of 
fraud case files and the empirical phase using a survey questionnaire. According to Mouton 
(2001:149), an empirical research design involves going out to establish the personal 
knowledge and experience of the respondents on the ground. The empirical design facilitated 
an understanding as to how and why fraud was committed by university employees, the nature 
of fraud, its extent and impact, the efficacy of internal controls and the factors which led to the 
commission of fraud. The advantage of this design was that it allowed for the in-depth probing 
of the participants’ responses.    
 
7.4 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This research adopted a quantitative as well as a qualitative approach for the purpose of 
gathering data. The use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches is known as 
triangulation (Leedy 1993:143).  The survey questionnaires, in-depth interviews, literature 
review as well as the review of case files ensured that concise data were collected. According 
to Leedy (1993:143), the advantage of the triangulation approach is that both the qualitative 
and quantitative methods are implemented to warrant accurate conclusions from the research. 
Such an approach positively impacted the validity and reliability of this research. 
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7.4.1  Quantitative Approach 
Quantitative data were gathered by means of a survey questionnaire that was distributed 
electronically to all participants. According to Brynard and Hanekom (2006:37), the main 
source of quantitative data are questionnaires. Both quantitative and qualitative data were 
gathered by means of the survey questionnaire in order to answer all the research questions. A 
quantitative approach entailed gathering data from participants on their biographical 
information as well as other data which was numeric in nature to ensure that it could be 
analysed and quantified. According to Leedy (1993:144), the evaluation of the quantitative 
data requires total objectivity. For Welman and Kruger (1999:8), a quantitative approach 
provides a positivist view which entails the study of observable human behaviour.  
 
7.4.2  Qualitative Approach 
Qualitative data were collected by means of the survey questionnaire also. The qualitative data 
were collected from participants by means of the open-ended questions contained in the survey 
questionnaire. The purpose of the open-ended questions was to provide participants the 
opportunity to explain their responses in the quest to obtain qualitative data. Qualitative data 
included the response of participants about their personal experience and knowledge about 
fraud which had occurred at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. Meaningful responses from this 
section that added value to the study were described in the relevant contexts in answering the 
research questions. Those that did not add value were discarded.  
 
7.4.3  Research Approach followed in this Study 
The survey was carried out using a structured self-administered survey questionnaire (Babbie 
1998: 257-263), which was distributed electronically to all participants. The questionnaire 
included a section that required the biographical details of the participants such as their age and 
gender. The structured dependent variable questions were both closed-ended and open-ended. 
Closed-ended questions were based on a five-point Likert scale. The purpose of open-ended 
questions was to afford the participants the opportunity to expand on their answers for the 
purposes of clarification or to express an opinion on the issue. The options of “yes” or “no” 
and multiple choice answers were also provided in the questionnaire. The draft questionnaire 
was discussed and agreed on with the supervisor and statistician. A pilot empirical survey 
questionnaire was initially produced and used in a preliminary survey as a precursor to hone 
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the actual questionnaire for optimum scientific acceptability when the empirical phase was 
embarked upon. After completion of the pilot study, the questionnaire was amended 
accordingly. The final version of the questionnaire was sent out by electronic mail to the 
executive managers and senior managers of the four universities located in KwaZulu-Natal 
province.  
 
7.5 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The research strategy entailed a comprehensive search of the latest and relevant literature 
relating to employee fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. The 
literature search formed the prelude to this study as it provided a foundation of knowledge on 
available theoretical concepts as well as models and frameworks. The research strategy also 
entailed the gathering of quantitative and qualitative data by means of survey questionnaires 
and face-to-face interviews with knowledgeable individuals as well as the gathering of data 
from fraud case files. As part of the qualitative approach, knowledgeable individuals were 
interviewed on a face-to-face basis using a survey questionnaire which contained closed-ended 
and open-ended questions. Data collected from the three methods (survey questionnaire, face-
to-face interviews and the fraud cases files) were captured onto three spreadsheets and 
provided to the statistician for analysis. The analysed data received from the statistician were 
interpreted and incorporated into this study.   
 
7.5.1 Questionnaires   
The survey was carried out using a structured self-administered survey questionnaire (Babbie 
1998:257-263), which was distributed electronically to all participants using the electronic 
software called QuestionPro. The questionnaire included a section that required the 
biographical details of the participants. The structured questions were both closed-ended and 
open-ended. The purpose of questions that were open-ended was to afford the participants the 
opportunity to expand on their answers for clarification or to express an opinion on the issue. 
The options of “yes” or “no” and multiple choice answers were also provided in the 
questionnaire. There were a total of 59 closed-ended questions and a total of 6 open-ended 
questions. According to Welman and Kruger (1999:155), the summated or Likert scale is 
popularly used in the social sciences. The Likert scale usually embodies a five-point scale, 
where the options are Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree or Strongly 




As part of the literature review phase, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
knowledgeable individuals who are skilled and experienced in conducting forensic 
investigations into employee fraud within universities, particularly universities in KwaZulu-
Natal. The implication of interviewing these knowledgeable individuals was that data was 
collected from them based on their experiences in investigating fraud at universities. Using the 
non-probability purposive sampling method, two categories of knowledgeable individuals were 
identified, who had investigated frauds that had occurred at universities. These knowledgeable 
individuals were either permanently employed by universities or those in the private sector to 
whom forensic investigations are outsourced by universities. Three out of the four universities 
in KwaZulu-Natal outsourced their investigations into employee fraud to forensic auditing 
companies as they did not have the capacity within the university to investigate such cases. 
The fourth university employed 5 skilled and experienced permanent employees to conduct 
these investigations. Additionally, there were 4 experienced and skilled directors identified 
who are employed within four separate forensic auditing companies and who are known to 
possess experience and skill in conducting forensic investigations into employee fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal.         
 
The interviews with these 9 knowledgeable individuals were conducted on a face-to-face basis 
at their convenience. The questionnaire that was used for the electronic self-administered 
survey was appropriately adapted and used for the face-to-face interview process as well. The 
questionnaire was adapted by adding a further 5 open-ended questions. A total of 59 closed-
ended questions and 11 open-ended questions were put to the knowledgeable individuals. All 
the knowledgeable individuals were asked the same questions. The questionnaire included a 
section that required the biographical details of the participants. The structured questions were 
both closed-ended and open-ended. The purpose of open-ended questions was to afford the 
participants the opportunity to expand on their answers for clarification or to express an 
opinion on the issue. The options of “yes” or “no” and multiple choice answers were also 
provided in the questionnaire.  
 
7.5.3 Fraud Case Files 
Another method to collect data from the literature included the review of fraud case files. 
During communication with the four universities in KwaZulu-Natal it was found that fraud 
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case files were only available at one university because the other three universities outsourced 
investigations into employee fraud to forensic auditing companies. Data from case files 
involving employee fraud at these three universities were not available to be reviewed due to 
the confidential nature of the investigations. The face-to-face interviews with directors of four 
forensic auditing companies in KwaZulu-Natal, such as KPMG, PwC, Deloitte and Sizwe 
Ntsaluba Gobodo contributed towards addressing this deficiency because data about 
investigations into employee fraud at the three universities that outsourced such investigations 
could be collected from these directors.  
 
There were 12 cases of employee fraud investigated at one of the four universities in KwaZulu-
Natal. Pertinent data were collected from these fraud case files which were then captured onto 
a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The data were coded and analysed. Themes were identified 
from the analysed data based on information collated from the review of literature and the 
survey. The frequency distribution of individual themes was ascertained. The analysed data 
were included in the literature chapters of this study.  
 
Data were collected from case files pertaining to fraud cases that were investigated by forensic 
investigators employed by universities located in KwaZulu-Natal during 2013. The 12 cases 
related to fraud committed by employees of the university. Six of these cases related to fraud 
that was committed against the university where the employee colluded with the supplier to 
commit the fraud. The other 6 fraud cases related to employees who acted on their own in 
order to enrich themselves. The types of documents that were analysed were forensic reports 
that were issued for each fraud case that was investigated by these forensic investigators. The 
reason for specifically choosing forensic reports was because all the data pertaining to the 
fraud cases are embodied in the forensic report. The purpose of reviewing and analysing the 
fraud case files was to establish the following:  
 What was the cause of the fraud? 
 What was the nature of the fraud committed by employees? 
 What was the modus operandi of the perpetrator? 
 What was the motive of the perpetrator?  
 What measures were in place to prevent fraud? 
 Why did the existing measures become deficient? 
 What other factors led to the commission of fraud? 
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 What new measures have been implemented to prevent fraud from recurring? 
 
The objective was to collect data from the forensic reports that would assist in answering the 
research questions. Data were collected about fraud cases from one university where fraud case 
files were available. It was possible to gain access to these case files because such cases were 
investigated internally by university employees tasked with investigating fraud cases. It was 
not possible to gain access to fraud case files at three other universities because fraud cases 
were investigated by external forensic auditing companies that were appointed by these 
universities for such a purpose. Fraud case files, pertaining to cases that were investigated by 
forensic investigators employed by universities in KwaZulu-Natal during 2013, were reviewed. 
Fraud cases that were investigated during 2013 were chosen because there were certain cases 
that were investigated during 2014 which were still in progress when this study was 
undertaken and were therefore sub judice. The specific type of document that was reviewed 
was the forensic report that was issued for each fraud case investigated by these forensic 
investigators. The reason for specifically choosing forensic reports was because all the data 
pertaining to the fraud case are usually embodied in the forensic report. The objective was to 
collect data from the forensic reports to assist in answering the research questions.    
  
7.6 PILOT SURVEY USING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The survey questionnaire was compiled after an in-depth literature search. The survey 
questionnaire was forwarded to the statistician for review. After various amendments were 
effected, the statistician provided approval for the distribution of the survey. A pilot survey 
questionnaire was initially produced and used in a preliminary survey as a precursor to hone 
the actual questionnaire for optimum scientific acceptability when the empirical phase was 
embarked on. Welman and Kruger (1999:146) believe that a pilot study is carried out on a 
reduced quantity of participants emanating from the identified population in order to detect any 
flaws, ambiguity or embarrassing questions. A pilot survey was conducted whereby three 
participants were requested to manually complete the survey questionnaire and provide 
feedback whether any questions were unclear or ambiguous. The pilot survey did not result in 
any significant changes to the questionnaire. This indicated that the statistician had rigorously 
interrogated the questionnaire before granting approval for the survey to commence. Minor 




7.7 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
The data collection instruments, as well as the methods used for quantitative and qualitative 
data analysis, were agreed upon in consultation with a statistician. There were different 
instruments and techniques used, which are elaborated on below. The data collection 
instruments, as well as the methods used for collecting quantitative and qualitative data, were 
different from each other. These different instruments and techniques are elaborated on next. 
  
7.7.1 Quantitative Data Collection 
The data collection instrument that was used for the collection of quantitative data was a 
survey questionnaire. The questionnaire contained three different types of questions such as:  
 questions requiring a “yes” or “no” answer;  
 answers based on the Likert scale. The Likert scale used was a five-point version, 
with the options of Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree or 
Strongly disagree, and   
 open-ended questions providing an opportunity for the participants to proffer their 
personal views on the relevant issue. 
 
There were a total of 59 quantitative questions (independent variables) in the survey 
questionnaire. The electronic survey, which was hosted online by QuestionPro, was made 
accessible to 114 randomly selected participants. These participants were sent an electronic 
mail through QuestionPro requesting them to participate in the survey and were provided an 
electronic hyperlink to access the online survey questionnaire.  
 
7.7.2 Qualitative Data Collection 
The data collection instrument that was used for the collection of qualitative data was the self-
administered survey questionnaire. The online survey questionnaire was sent to executive and 
senior managers at four universities that are located in KwaZulu-Natal province. Executive and 
senior management comprised two strata of employees at the four universities in KwaZulu-
Natal. Executive management included Vice-Chancellors, Deputy Vice-Chancellors and 
Executive Directors. The senior management cadres included Directors and Deans. The survey 
questionnaire was hosted online by QuestionPro. An email was sent out to a total of 114 
randomly selected participants requesting their participation in the online survey questionnaire. 
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The online survey was accessible to participants for a period of approximately six weeks. 
Weekly reminders were sent out to participants requesting their participation in the survey.  
 
The survey questionnaire contained open-ended and closed-ended questions. The purpose of 
open-ended questions was to provide participants the opportunity to explain their responses in 
the quest to obtain qualitative data. According to Seaman (1987:169), among the guidelines for 
a qualitative research design were discovery, description, and analysis of collected 
information. Leedy (1993:139) observes that the interviewing of participants, in order to gather 
data, is regarded as qualitative research. Qualitative data includes the response of participants 
about their experience and knowledge about fraud which had occurred at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal. As noted, the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches is known as 
triangulation (Leedy; 1993:143).  The survey questionnaires, in-depth interviews, literature 
review as well as fraud case files ensured that reliable data were collected. According to Leedy 
(1993:143), the advantage of pursuing the triangulation approach is that both the qualitative 
and quantitative methods are implemented to warrant accurate conclusions from the research. 
Such an approach could positively impact the validity and reliability of the research. 
 
7.7.3 Administration of the Survey Questionnaire 
The draft questionnaire was discussed and agreed on with the supervisor and statistician prior 
to distribution. After a pilot survey was conducted, with changes made, the final version of the 
questionnaire was made accessible to executive and senior managers at the four universities 
located in KwaZulu-Natal. The survey was electronically set up on the Internet using the 
online research software QuestionPro. An electronic mail (email) was distributed to the sample 
of executive and senior managers through QuestionPro containing a hyperlink to the online 
survey. The purpose of the email to the selected sample was to invite them to participate in the 
online survey. 
 
The online survey was available to the randomly selected sample for a period of six weeks. 
Regular emails were sent to potential respondents during this period reminding them to 
participate in the study or to complete the survey that they may have started but had not 
completed. A challenge experienced during the online survey was that it was not possible to 
identify all the respondents who had participated in the survey. This was because QuestionPro 
did not receive the email addresses of all the respondents who completed the survey. The only 
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means of identifying which respondents had completed the survey was by means of their 
Internet Protocol (IP) address. This is a numeric IP address that identifies the location of the 
respondent. The IP address is not sufficient to identify who the respondents are that had 
completed the survey or who had not. This resulted in reminders being sent to all respondents, 
including the respondents that had completed the survey. 
 
There were 69% of respondents who opened the surveys with the presumed intent to complete 
the questionnaire. A total of 31% of potential respondents did not respond to the survey.  
Based on the number of respondents who opened the online survey 82% completed the survey. 
There were 18% of respondents that opened the survey but did not complete any questions. 
One respondent replied to a reminder email, boldly stating “I don’t like the questions”, with no 
further explanation. After six weeks had elapsed, the data pertaining to the results of the survey 
was downloaded onto a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and provided to the statistician for 
analysis.    
 
7.8 DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS   
7.8.1 Quantitative Data Collection 
The data collection instrument that was used for the collection of quantitative data was a 
survey questionnaire. The questionnaire contained three different types of questions such as:  
 questions requiring a “yes” or “no” answer;  
 answers based on the Likert scale. The Likert scale used was a five-point version, 
with the options of Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree or 
Strongly disagree, and   
 open-ended questions providing an opportunity for the participants to proffer their 
personal views on the relevant issue. 
 
7.8.2 Qualitative Data Collection 
The data collection instrument that was used for the collection of qualitative data was the self-
administered survey questionnaire. The survey questionnaire contained open-ended and 





7.9 DATA QUALITY CONTROL 
Denscombe (2002:100) shows that validity involves accurate questions and answers. Leedy 
and Ormrod (2001:98) postulate that a measuring instrument which measures what it is 
supposed to measure, is valid. The survey questionnaire was formulated based on the research 
aims, key concepts, research questions as well as the insight gained from an in-depth literature 
search. According to Welman and Kruger (1999:138), this is to guarantee that the measuring 
instrument measures what it was meant to measure.  
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001:98) found that content validity measures the knowledge and skills 
which participants have acquired. The survey questionnaire ensured content validity because 
the participants from the sample population are all experienced members of executive and 
senior management at the four universities who possess a wealth of knowledge about fraud 
risks. According to Mason (1998:148), utilising many methods to collect data enhances the 
validity of the research, such as the data collection methods employed in this study.  
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001:99) and Babbie (1998:129) believe that research results are reliable 
only if the same measuring instrument produces consistent results from different sources. This 
view is supported by Welman and Kruger (1999:143), who assert that the results which can be 
adapted to diverse instances, users and experiments, are reliable. Denscombe (2002:100) holds 
that reliability is ensuring that the processes and systems used for collecting the data are 
consistent and that the findings are not distorted. Consistency in data collection was 
maintained during this study to ensure that the findings were not distorted.  
 
Babbie (1998:130) cautions that bias may influence the reliability of an instrument. In order to 
prevent bias, the exact same survey questionnaire was made accessible to all participants so 
that the results may be replicated by another researcher. A pilot study was conducted in order 
to test the measuring instrument and establish if there were any flaws or ambiguous or 
embarrassing questions. The preliminary collected data were discussed with the statistician to 
establish whether the questionnaire met the requirements of validity and reliability. 
 
7.10 DATA ANALYSIS 
According to Mouton (2001:108), the purpose of analysing data is to understand how it relates 
to concepts, constructs and variables, and to identify any themes, patterns or trends in the data. 
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The collected data, which could be numerically presented, were analysed with the assistance of 
the statistician. In collaboration with the statistician, the data were interpreted by means of 
recognised statistical methods and analytical instruments as set out below. According to Leedy 
(1993:139), the numerical data should be coded and calculated and then presented in the form 
of tables and graphs. The manner in which the quantitative and qualitative data were analysed 
is elaborated on below. 
 
7.10.1 Analysis of Data from Questionnaires 
The data were analysed by the statistician by means of the following tests:  
 Descriptive statistics including means and standard deviations, where applicable. 
Frequencies have been represented in tables or figures. 
 Chi-square goodness-of-fit-test: a univariate test, used on a categorical variable to 
test whether any of the response options are selected significantly more/less often 
than the others. Under the null hypothesis, it is assumed that all responses are 
equally selected. 
 One sample t-test: used to test, in this study, whether the average value is 
significantly different from a value of 3 (the central score). This is applied to 
Likert scale questions.  
 
7.10.2 Analysis of Data from In-Depth Interviews 
The analysis of data collected from the in-depth interviews with knowledgeable individuals, 
was subjected to thematic analysis. Thematic analysis pinpointed, examined and recorded 
themes within the collected data which were useful to describe a phenomenon linked to a 
research question in order to find common themes or patterns. These themes were then 
analysed. There are six steps in the coding process of thematic analysis, which require one to: 
 Be familiar with the collected data; 
 Generate initial codes; 
 Search for themes among the codes; 
 Review the themes; 
 Define and name the themes, and  




7.10.3 Analysis of Data from Fraud Case Files 
The data collected from fraud case files were then subjected to content analysis. Content 
analysis was used to review content which was documented in writing. Holsti (1968:608) 
defines content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by systematically and 
objectively identifying special characteristics of messages”. There are four steps in the content 
analysis process:  
 Clearly define the phenomenon; 
 Define the universe of the media and choose the sampling method; 
 Describe the manner in which units of analysis are to be coded, and 
 Train the coders.  
 
7.11 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE 
A randomly selected representative sample was chosen from the 4 universities that are located 
in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The sample comprised of all members of executive and 
senior management at the 4 universities. Although information regarding fraud may be 
regarded as sensitive, no specific details such as names of fraudsters were requested from the 
participants. The questions were not designed to establish the specific details about the fraud 
cases; rather the questions were aimed at establishing the causes of employee fraud and 
prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. Most questions in the questionnaire 
aimed to establish what strategies were in place to prevent fraud at universities. Some 
repetition of detail may ensue when explaining the methodology used.  
 
Figure 7.1 below depicts the different research populations such as the total research 












Figure 7.1: Research population 
 
 
Source: Ferreira (2007)  
 
7.11.1 Total Research Population 
The total possible research population was staff employed at the four chosen universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal, which is listed in Table 7.1 below: 
Table 7.1: Total population of staff employed at 4 universities located in KwaZulu-Natal province 







Source: Department of Higher Education and Training (2015) 
 
The total possible research population and sample population were determined in collaboration 
with the institutional statistician. The total target population comprised all members of 
executive and senior management strata from the 4 universities that are located in the province 
of KwaZulu-Natal. The executive management cadre is predominantly made up of Vice-
Chancellors, Deputy Vice-Chancellors and Executive Directors. The senior management cadre 
is made up of Directors and Deans.  
 
 148 
The websites of these 4 universities reflected that there were 33 members of executive 
management and 88 members of senior management. The target population was 121 
individuals. Although these executive managers and senior managers are employees of the 
universities, they are also de facto employers on behalf of their universities. As executive and 
senior management, they are accountable to their university council for the overall 
management of the university in pursuit of fulfilling predetermined organisational objectives. 
In their roles of executive and senior management of the universities, they are entrusted with 
fulfilling their fiduciary duties. These include implementing adequate systems of internal 
control to mitigate any risks, including fraud.  
 
According to COSO (2013:28), senior management are responsible for establishing policies 
and procedures which management and staff have to comply with in order to execute their 
responsibilities for internal control. Internal controls are implemented to prevent fraud from 
occurring. In essence, executive and senior management are regarded as employers. These 
participants provided relevant data pertaining to this study as they are the faces of the four 
universities. They are accountable for fraud that occurs in their areas of responsibility. In 
consultation with the relevant statistician, the survey questionnaire was distributed to executive 
managers and senior managers located at the 4 universities in KwaZulu-Natal. These 
participants were requested to respond to the questionnaire in their organisational capacities as 
de facto employers.  
 
7.11.2 Sample Size 
Welman and Kruger (1999:47) postulate that a population size is generally too large to include 
all members in the study, thus necessitating that a sample of the population be selected in 
consideration of practicality and economy. A random sample was selected for this study and 
was representative of the total possible research population, which is a form of probability 
sampling, of executive managers and senior managers at the 4 universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
As noted, although these executive managers (Vice-Chancellors, Deputy Vice-Chancellors and 
Executive Directors) and senior managers (Directors and Deans) are employees of the 
universities, they are de facto employers on behalf of their universities.  
 
The sample comprised all members of executive and senior management at the 4 universities. 
As executive and senior management they are accountable to their university council for the 
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overall management of the university in pursuit of fulfilling predetermined organisational 
objectives. In their roles of executive and senior management of the universities, they are 
entrusted with fulfilling their fiduciary duties. These include implementing adequate systems 
of internal control to mitigate any risks, including fraud. There were a total of 33 individuals 
from executive management and a total of 88 from senior management at the 4 universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal. The sample of potential participants totalled 121. During the process of 
collating the electronic mail (email) addresses of the identified respondents, it was found that 
there were 7 vacant posts among the selected sample.  
 
The sample of 114 was not considered to be too large, necessitating that all 114 members of 
the selected sample be requested to participate in this survey by completing the online survey 
questionnaire. Table 7.2 below reflects the number of executive and senior management staff 
that were employed at the 4 universities, as listed on the respective websites: 
Table 7.2: Target population of executive and senior management employed at 4 universities in KwaZulu-Natal  
TARGET POPULATION UKZN UNIZULU DUT MUT TOTAL 
Executive Management 13 7 10 3 33 
Senior Management 51 17 10 10 88 
TOTAL 64 24 20 13 121 
 
Source: Websites of UKZN, UNIZULU, DUT and MUT (2015) 
 
Participants provided relevant data pertaining to this study as they are the faces of the 
universities. They are accountable for any fraud that occurs in their areas of responsibility. In 
consultation with the relevant statistician, the survey questionnaire was distributed to the 
identified target sample. These participants were requested to respond to the questionnaire in 
their organisational capacities as de facto employers.  
 
The target population in this study was 114 and the response population was 65. This equates 
to a response population of 57% as a percentage of the target population. According to 
Seidman (1991:45), a response rate of 25 participants is sufficient, but aspects such as time and 
money would impact on determining when there are enough respondents in a study. Welman 
and Kruger (1999:64) concur and state that a sample of 15 should be a minimum that may be 
used, but suggest that a sample of 25 or more would be desirable for the purpose of analysis. 
Newman (2000:216) suggests that using a big sample size does not mean that the sample is 
representative of the population because of other factors that need to be considered. According 
to Newman (2000:217), equally increasing a sample size in smaller and larger samples 
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produces more accuracy in smaller samples. The number of surveys in this study totalled 65, 
which was more than twice the sample recommended by Welman and Kruger (1999) and 
Seidman (1991).  
 
Seidman (1991:45) also suggests that the point of saturation reached with the information 
sought will also play a role in determining when to terminate the survey. This usually occurs 
after a number of interviews when similar themes or responses are being received and no new 
information is emerging. This is the point of information saturation. The responses received in 
the online survey in the current study indicate that the point of information saturation was 
reached as no new information had emerged as the survey progressed towards its closure.  
 
Although the collection of data by means of face-to-face interviews from selected 
knowledgeable individuals forms part of the process of literature reviews, the methodology on 
how they were selected and interviewed is elaborated in this section. There were 4 directors of 
forensic auditing firms, namely, KPMG, Deloitte, PwC and Sizwe Ntsaluba Gobodo in 
KwaZulu-Natal, who were identified to participate in this study. There were also 5 forensic 
investigators permanently employed at one of the universities in KwaZulu-Natal, who were 
also identified to participate in the study.   
 
A total of 9 knowledgeable individuals were purposefully identified by the researcher based on 
his awareness of their roles in investigating fraud at universities. These participants are 
members of reputable forensic investigation organisations who are also members of 
professional bodies that are bound by professional codes of conduct. This prevented bias. 
Welman and Kruger (1999:63) point out that purposive sampling is a form of non-probability 
sampling. These knowledgeable individuals, who work within the province of KwaZulu-Natal, 
contributed to this study based on their experience of investigating employee fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal. In-depth, face-to-face interviews were held with these 
identified directors and forensic investigators. These participants are regarded as experts in the 
forensic investigation field and known to be skilled and experienced with investigating 







7.12 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY TESTS 
The selected sample is representative of all executive and senior managers at the four 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal because all 114 members of the executive and senior 
management strata were selected. This excludes the 7 vacancies that existed when the survey 
was conducted. Details about the sample were obtained directly from the websites of the 4 
universities.     
 
The multiple methods used to collect and analyse data from the literature searches, survey 
questionnaire, face-to-face interviews and fraud case files had a positive impact on the validity 
and reliability of the outcome of research. The in-depth literature review provided data that 
were sourced from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data were obtained from the 
survey questionnaires, face-to-face interviews with knowledgeable individuals and from fraud 
case files. This data were taken into consideration when compiling the survey questionnaire. 
After the survey questionnaire was compiled, it was reviewed by the supervisor of this research 
as well as the statistician. All suggested amendments were incorporated into the final survey 
questionnaire. The provision of the online survey questionnaire ensured that all participants 
were asked the same questions, which enhanced the validity and reliability of the collected 
data. 
 
The process of compiling this thesis has been subjected to continuous review by the supervisor 
of this study. The recommendations and suggestions of the supervisor that were made during 
the review process were considered and necessary amendments were made to the thesis. The 
collected data were analysed by a registered statistician. The thesis was subsequently edited by 
a professional language editor to ensure it was of a standard acceptable for this level of study. 
A letter from the language editor is attached as Appendix 6 to this thesis. 
 
7.13 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Ethical clearance was obtained from the Ethics Committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
(UKZN) prior to the commencement of the collection of data. Permission was obtained from 
the four universities located in the province of KwaZulu-Natal for the research to proceed.    
The online survey contained an introductory page where the participants were provided with a 
document that set out the purpose of the research. The document reflected that their 
participation was voluntary and that they would not be reimbursed for it. Participants were also 
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informed that it was their right to choose not to answer certain questions and to withdraw from 
participating at any time. They were assured of their anonymity and the confidentiality of the 
information they provided. Their consent was required before they were allowed to continue 
and participate in the online survey. In this regard, they were required to tick a box before they 
were allowed to continue with the survey. It is therefore evident that the participants who 
completed the survey would have provided their consent to participate in the online survey 
hosted by QuestionPro.     
 
In order to enable the participants to consent sufficient information was provided to them in the 
introductory page of the online survey. The participants were assured, inter alia, that their 
privacy rights would be guaranteed and that their identities would not be revealed. 
 
7.14 PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS  
The data that was collected from the participants was analysed with the assistance of the 
statistician. The data collated from the empirical survey, incorporating the survey 
questionnaires and face-to-face interviews, were also analysed. After analysis of the empirical 
data, all the data were interpreted and presented in the form of tables, figures and charts which 
are explained in the next chapter. Analysis instruments and techniques were decided on in 
collaboration with the statistician after completion of the empirical survey. An explanation of 
the instruments used for statistical analysis is provided in the next chapter together with a 
presentation and explanation of the results and findings of this study.  
 
7.15 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, it is recorded that multiple methods were used in the study to collect, analyse 
and interpret data. The research design for this study ensured validity and reliability of the 
research findings. The participation by senior members of the 4 universities in KwaZulu-Natal 
in this study provides confidence about the findings that have emanated from the research on a 
topic as sensitive as employee fraud at universities. The validity and reliability of the data is 
further enhanced by the involvement of knowledgeable individuals who have contributed to 
this study. Primary data collected from fraud case files further contributed towards validity and 
reliability. The next chapter contains a presentation and explanation of the results and findings 





     
INTERPRETATION, PRESENTATION AND ARTICULATION OF THE RESULTS 
OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the results and findings emanating from the responses provided by the 
respondents to the survey questionnaire are interpreted, presented and appropriately articulated. 
The results and findings are reported based on their relevance to the topic of this study, the 
problem statement, research questions, objectives and selected theoretical criteria. This chapter 
also explains the responses of the respondents relating to the following research focus areas as 
encapsulated in the questionnaire: 
 Causes of employee fraud; 
 Nature and extent of employee fraud;  
 Measures that are currently in place to prevent fraud, and  
 Additional fraud prevention measures that could be recommended. 
 
The results of the online survey are elaborated on and presented in the form of figures and 
tables. The purpose of presenting the results by means of figures and tables is to simplify the 
understanding of the responses of the respondents. The results are reported and elaborated on 
in this chapter.  
       
8.2 ANALYTICAL METHODS 
Data that were collected from the review of relevant literature and the responses provided by 
respondents to questions posed in the survey questionnaire are explained in this chapter. The 
result of the online survey was downloaded from QuestionPro onto a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. The data were checked by the researcher to ensure that the results on 
QuestionPro were accurately downloaded onto the spreadsheet. The responses provided by 
the respondents relating to the open-ended questions were grouped into themes and coded. 
Coding lists were compiled for each of the open-ended questions. The spreadsheet, which 
contained the coded closed-ended and open-ended questions, was submitted to the 
institutional statistician for analysis and reporting.         
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Analysing the data provides an understanding of how the data relates to concepts, constructs 
and variables. Data analysis also enables the identification of themes, patterns or trends in the 
data. The data from closed-ended questions were numerically presented and analysed by the 
statistician. The coded numerical data were calculated and presented in the form of tables and 
figures. All data and calculations were personally checked and verified by the researcher to 
ensure accuracy. The interpretation of the results from the survey was integrated with data that 
were collected from the in-depth literature review. Stated differently, the statistical results were 
combined with qualitative data collected from the literature review, interviews with 
knowledgeable individuals and fraud case files, by the triangulation method. This method 
enriched the quality of the findings of this study. 
 
The manner in which the quantitative and qualitative data were analysed by the statistician is 
elaborated on below: 
 Descriptive statistics including means and standard deviations, where applicable. 
Frequencies have been represented in tables or figures. 
 Chi-square goodness-of-fit-test: a univariate test, used on a categorical variable to 
test whether any of the response options are selected significantly more/less often 
than the others. Under the null hypothesis, it is assumed that all responses are 
equally selected. 
 One sample t-test: used to test, in this study, whether the average value is 
significantly different from a value of 3 (the central score). This is applied to 
questions that were answered by responding to a relevant Likert-scale number.  
 
The data collected from the open-ended questions were subjected to thematic analysis. 
Thematic analysis pinpointed, examined and recorded themes within the collected data that 
were useful to describe a phenomenon linked to a research question in order to find significant 
themes or patterns. Before these themes were analysed, the researcher followed the following 
six steps to code the data for the thematic analysis process: 
 Become familiar with the data; 
 Create initial codes; 
 Search for themes among the codes; 
 Review the themes; 
 Define and name the themes, and  
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 Produce the final report. 
 
The statistician also performed bivariate analysis on certain questions chosen by the researcher 
to determine how they correlate with each other. Pearson’s correlation was used because the 
questions were ordinal in scale. Where the scale was strictly ordinal (never to always), the 
statistician checked the results with Spearman’s correlation. 
 
8.3 INTERPRETATION, PRESENTATION AND ARTICULATION OF THE 
RESULTS 
The purpose of the results about the qualification of the participants is to understand what 
levels of qualification of the members of senior and executive management are. The first 
section of the online survey contained questions relating to the biographical details of the 
respondents. The biographical information obtained from the survey reflects that the gender 
of the respondents is significantly male. This implies that there are fewer female employees 
who occupy senior and executive management positions at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
There is a significant number of senior and executive management personnel, whose level of 
qualification is a doctoral degree. It is not uncommon for academic employees in senior and 
executive management positions, such as Deans and Deputy Vice-Chancellors, to be in 
possession of doctoral degrees. The results indicate that the chosen strata of employees are 
adequately qualified to hold senior and executive management positions. Figure 8.1 below 
reflects the gender and qualifications of the respondents: 
 
 


























































































As senior and executive management it is expected that they possess adequate and 
appropriate experience in preventing fraud at universities. There are significantly more senior 
managers at universities in KwaZulu-Natal than executive managers. A significant number of 
these managers have been in their current positions for 3 years, while the largest percentage 
of managers have been in their current positions for more than 5 years. The job category and 
duration of managers in their current positions are depicted in Figure 8.2 below:   
 
 
Figure 8.2: Job category and length of time in current position 
 
The detailed results and findings emanating from the survey are elaborated on in detail in the 
sections below. The results and findings are reported below in four sections which are related 
to the following four research questions of this study: 
 What are the causes of employee fraud? 
 What is the current nature and extent of fraud committed by employees? 
 What fraud-prevention measures are currently in place to manage fraud at 
universities in general and those in KwaZulu-Natal in particular? 
 What additional fraud prevention measures could be recommended to universities 
for implementation on various levels? 
 
8.3.1 Results and Findings on the Causes of Employee Fraud 
There is agreement amongst respondents that universities have been victims of employee 
fraud and that dishonesty is a trait of fraudsters who exploit their superior’s trust. There is 
significant agreement amongst the respondents about the causes of employee fraud at 

















































































 Greed is the motive of fraudsters; 
 Inadequate internal controls lead to employees committing fraud; 
 Poor ethical culture leads to employees committing fraud, and 
 Other factors lead to employees committing fraud. 
 
Knowledgeable individuals who were interviewed during this study indicated significant 
agreement about the causes of employee fraud as outlined above. This implies that university 
management and knowledgeable individuals are in agreement to a significant extent about 
what causes employee fraud. A review of 12 fraud case files at one of the universities reveals 
that there are multiple causes of employee fraud. The significant causes are dishonesty, 
personal gain, collusion, circumvention of internal controls, non-compliance with policies and 
procedures, and poor internal controls. These results that are depicted in Figure 8.4 later in 
this section, indicate that there is corroboration between the views of the respondents and 
knowledgeable individuals; data collected from fraud case files indicate that dishonesty, 
personal gain and deficient controls led to the fraud.  
 
8.3.1.1 Universities as Victims of Fraud 
The respondents agree, to a significant extent, that universities in KwaZulu-Natal are victims 
of employee fraud. The result of this question correlates with the findings of the survey by 
PwC (2011:18), where 56% of perpetrators of fraud were employees of the company that they 
defrauded. To understand what causes employee fraud, there should be confirmation of the 
existence of fraud. This finding confirms that universities in KwaZulu-Natal have been 
defrauded by their employees. 
 
8.3.1.2 Dishonesty 
Respondents significantly agree that dishonesty is a distinguishing characteristic of fraudsters. 
Dishonesty impacts on integrity and morality. Dishonesty also manifests itself when fraud is 
committed. The fraudster misrepresents material facts and deceives his/her employer in order 
to receive an undue benefit. This dishonest act results in the committing of a crime. 
According to Albrecht and Schmoldt (1988:16), dishonesty is prevalent in society. 




8.3.1.3 Exploitation of Trust 
Fraudsters exploit their superior’s trust in order to commit fraud against their employer. There 
is significant agreement by the respondents to this question. In this regard, Albrecht 
(1998:111) holds that trustworthy employees should not be regarded as a control measure. 
Cressey (1973:30) holds the view that trusted employees violate their employer’s trust when 
they have a financial difficulty. Consequently, employers should be aware that trusted 
employees are capable of committing fraud against them. Universities in KwaZulu-Natal in 
particular, and universities in general, should implement control measures to mitigate this 
type of risk. 
 
8.3.1.4 Motive 
The responses of the respondents reflect significant agreement with the statement that greed is 
the motive of the fraudsters. Jones and Jing (2011:859) and Wells (2001:89) concur that the 
motive to commit fraud is greed. Albrecht et al. (2006:33) holds that the motive (pressure) to 
commit fraud is linked to finances or vices such as addiction to alcohol, drugs and/or 
gambling. Work-related motive may be a disgruntled employee who is not considered for a 
promotion and intends for the fraud to be a form of retaliation against the employer. Another 
motive is trying to placate a family member by buying him/her gifts. Albrecht et al. (2006:33) 
aver that the motive of employees who commit fraud could be greed, living an unaffordable 
lifestyle or unplanned financial need. A review of the data collected from the fraud case files 
revealed that greed is the motive in all the cases. The fraudsters were employed in positions 
within the organisation and were paid a salary for their services. They committed fraud to 
enrich themselves. Universities should consider the motives of fraudsters, especially greed, 
when designing and implementing fraud prevention strategies.   
 
8.3.1.5 Inadequate Internal Controls 
Internal controls are widely regarded by organisations as a fraud prevention measure. 
Respondents agree significantly that inadequate internal controls lead to employees 
committing fraud. According to the IIA (2009:19), an organisation cannot eradicate fraud 
because of the cost of implementing fraud prevention internal controls. Employers should 
consider reviewing current fraud prevention internal controls and ensure that these are 
adequate and functioning as intended. 
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8.3.1.6 Poor Ethical Culture 
The response to this question shows that there is significant agreement by the respondents 
that a poor ethical culture exists at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. This poor ethical culture 
leads to employees committing fraud against their universities. According to COSO 
(2013:12), organisations should advocate integrity and sound ethical values. Management and 
the board of directors should set a sound ethical tone at the top (lead by example), design and 
implement a code of conduct, and monitor and measure compliance with this code during 
employee performance reviews. 
 
8.3.1.7 Figures and Table Depicting the Causes of Employee Fraud  
There is significant agreement from the respondents about the causes of employee fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal. Knowledge about the causes of employee fraud should be 
used by universities when amending or designing their fraud prevention strategies. Figure 8.3 
below depicts the results which indicate that the scores are above the mean for all seven 
questions in this section: 
Figure 8.3: Mean results about the causes of employee fraud 
 
 
Table 8.1 below reflects the results of the One-sample t-test analysis on the causes of employee 












































































Table 8.1: Results from One-sample t-test analysis on the causes of employee fraud 
Question Result of Analysis One-sample t-test 
B1 Significant agreement (t (63) = 6.505, p<.0005, M = 3.94, SD = 1.153) 
B2 Significant agreement (t (62) = 11.496, p<.0005, M = 4.29, SD = .888) 
B3 Significant agreement (t (61) = 11.796, p<.0005, M = 4.23, SD = .818) 
B4 Significant agreement (t (62) = 12.932, p<.0005, M = 4.22, SD = .750) 
B5 Significant agreement (t (61) = 5.816, p<.0005, M = 3.85, SD = 1.157) 
B6 Significant agreement (t (62) = 9.676, p<.0005, M = 4.13, SD = .924) 
B7 Significant agreement (t (62) = 5.981, p<.0005, M = 3.70, SD = .927) 
 
The results above reflect that there is significant agreement by the respondents to all seven 
questions in this section. The results emanating from the analysis of data collected from 
knowledgeable individuals similarly indicate significant agreement to all these seven 
questions. 
 
An analysis was conducted of the data collated from fraud case files. Figure 8.4 below reflects 
the frequency distribution of themes relating to the causes of employee fraud which are 
identified from the fraud case files:  
Figure 8.4: Causes of employee fraud extracted from fraud case files 
 
 
Figure 8.4 above indicates that dishonest employees who commit fraud for personal gain will 
circumvent internal controls and/or not comply with university policies and procedures to 









management oversight over operations which will be essential to identify any deficient internal 
controls and take corrective action to enhance them.   
 
Respondents and knowledgeable individuals concur that the poor ethical culture prevailing at 
universities contributed towards employees committing fraud. There is also significant 
agreement from the respondents and knowledgeable individuals that fraudsters exploit the trust 
of their superiors to commit fraud. This implies that there are dishonest employees who breach 
the trust placed on them by their superiors in order to commit fraud. It is essential that 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal inculcate a sound ethical culture which will dissuade employees 
from committing fraud. 
   
8.3.1.8 Bivariate Analysis   
The statistician conducted bivariate analysis on the following two questions: 
 B6 I believe that poor ethical culture led to employees committing fraud.  
 D10 Management is responsible for preventing fraud at the university.  
 
There is a strong positive correlation between these two questions (r = 0.370, p=.005). Those 
who agree that management is responsible for preventing fraud at the university, also agree 
that poor ethical culture led to employees committing fraud. Management at universities 
should strongly consider addressing the poor ethical culture among employees as this should 
form an integral part of the fraud prevention strategy.  
 
8.3.1.9 Themes Relating to Deficient Internal Controls 
Thematic analysis was conducted on question F4, which was intended to ascertain which 
internal controls are found to be deficient and provide the opportunity for fraud to be 
committed. The results indicate that the following deficient internal controls are significant 
contributors to providing the opportunity for fraud to be committed by employees: 
 Non-compliance with policies and procedures, and  
 Lack of management oversight. 
The knowledgeable individuals hold a similar view that the internal controls which are found 
to be deficient and provide the opportunity for fraud to be committed, are non-compliance 
with policies and procedures as well as a lack of management oversight.  
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The review of fraud case files revealed that there are two specific reasons why existing 
internal controls are rendered deficient. These are due to the dishonesty of the employees as 
well as collusion between employees and/or external parties.  
 
This finding implies that respondents are of the view that policies and procedures exist within 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal; however, employees are not complying with them due to 
dishonesty and collusion among employees and external parties. The respondents also 
responded that management do not provide oversight over operations at the universities. 
When these two themes are jointly considered, there may be a correlation that employees are 
not complying with policies and procedures because there is a lack of management oversight. 
Employees may be aware of the lack of management oversight and therefore do not comply 
with policies and procedures. Policies and procedures are a type of internal control that is 
implemented by universities in KwaZulu-Natal to prevent fraud. Universities should ensure 
that there is compliance by enhancing management oversight over operations.    
 
Figure 8.5 below shows the frequency distribution of six different themes of deficient internal 
controls that emerge after thematic analysis of this question (F4): 
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The figure above indicates that non-compliance with policies and procedures is the significant 
theme affecting the internal control environment of universities in KwaZulu-Natal and 
resulting in fraud. 
 
Knowledgeable individuals were asked an open-ended question during the face-to-face 
interviews. They were asked whether they were able to provide any other causes of employee 
fraud. After analysis of their responses, two significant themes emerge. The themes are 
‘Employee Motive’ and ‘Behaviour’.  
 
With regard to the motive of the fraudsters, they responded that the employees: 
 Are living beyond their means; 
 Commit fraud out of necessity; 
 Are under personal financial pressure; 
 Have a dependency on dual income which ends due to termination of employment 
of their spouse, and 
 Are greedy. 
Regarding employee behaviour, they expressed that the employees are: 
 Arrogant; 
 Negligent; 
 Incompetent, and 
 Submit falsified qualifications when they are employed. 
 
This implies that the thorough vetting of prospective employees is essential in ensuring that 
universities do not employ personnel who have a propensity to commit fraud based on 
predisposed financial pressures, incompetence or falsified qualifications. According to Wolfe 
and Hermanson (2004:42), vetting and investigating or affirming the background of 
prospective employees will assist in understanding the capability of a person to commit fraud.  
 
8.3.2 Results and Findings on the Nature of Employee Fraud 
In this section, responses pertaining to the nature of employee fraud are expounded. 
Questions C1 to C14 were analysed to determine the percentage of responses that relate to 
“Never”, “Rarely”, “Sometimes”, “Often” and “Always” responses per question. The closed-
ended questions in this section of the online survey required the respondents to provide their 
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views on the nature of employee fraud committed at universities in KwaZulu-Natal in relation 
to the following:    
 The university suffered financial loss due to frauds; 
 Fraudsters work in a finance or procurement related role; 
 Fraudsters collude with other employees and/or third parties to commit fraud; 
 Fraudsters circumvent internal controls to commit the fraud; 
 Internal controls are over-ridden by the fraudsters to commit the fraud; 
 Fraudulent events are disguised to appear normal; 
 Frauds relate to procurement of goods/services; 
 Frauds relate to expense claims; 
 Frauds relate to the falsification of documents/records; 
 Frauds relate to a misuse/misappropriation of university resources; 
 Solicitation of bribes;  
 Frauds relate to a conflict of interest; 
 The value of each fraud is below R100 000, and 
 Management commits fraud. 
 
A review of data from the fraud case files shows that the collusion between the employee and 
others as well as the falsification of documents are the two significant features of fraud. This 
result corroborates the views of the respondents that collusion and falsification of documents 
are characteristics of employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
8.3.2.1 Financial Loss 
The results of analysis of this question indicated that universities in KwaZulu-Natal, 
significantly more than expected, suffered financial loss ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ due to frauds 
committed. This implies that employee fraud significantly result in financial loss to 
universities. According to Snyman (1987:460), the victim (university) does not need to suffer 
actual loss because the definition of fraud includes actual or potential prejudice (loss) to the 
victim. Emanating out of the face-to-face interviews conducted with knowledgeable 
individuals, these experts are, significantly more than expected, of the view that universities 




The result of this question indicates that universities suffered actual loss. When employees 
collude with each other to commit fraud, the ACFE (2012:43) holds that the financial loss 
emanating out of such incidents are higher than when an employee commits the fraud on 
his/her own. The global survey by the ACFE (2012:5) found that the value of the loss was 
greater where the fraudster was employed for a longer period of time.  
 
It follows then that fraud prevention measures should be targeted at early detection of fraud in 
order to minimise financial loss. According to Laufer (2011:402), victims of fraud such as 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal may suffer further prejudice attributed to legal costs, negative 
publicity and poor employee morale resulting from the fraud committed by an employee. 
Victim organisations, such as universities, spend money on legal fees and costs to institute 
formal disciplinary procedures against employees who commit fraud. These costs do not 
include the actual financial loss suffered as a result of the misappropriated funds. The hidden 
cost inherent in a fraud is not clearly visible, according to the ACFE (2014:8), because the 
situation can be compared to the proverbial iceberg. Only the direct loss of the fraud is clearly 
visible above the surface, while hidden costs lurk below the surface. Employee fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal cost these institutions more than just the actual loss. 
Universities should measure the financial loss due to employee fraud by also including costs to 
institute disciplinary, criminal and civil proceedings against the fraudster.  
 
8.3.2.2 Finance or Procurement 
Universities in KwaZulu-Natal are ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ victims of fraud that is committed by 
employees who worked in a finance or procurement related role. The global survey by the 
ACFE (2014:55) also found that a significant number of fraudsters were employed in 
procurement and finance departments. The result indicates that universities should maintain 
closer scrutiny and oversight over areas of operations which involve finance or procurement 
processes. Finance and procurement related roles entail receiving and payment for goods 
and/or services, and employees working in such roles should be regarded as gatekeepers for 
university funds and assets. Universities should enhance recruitment and selection procedures 






8.3.2.3 Collusion  
Respondents agree that ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’, the fraudsters collude with other employees 
and/or external parties to commit fraud. The ACFE (2012:43) found that employees who 
collude with others to commit fraud inflict larger financial losses against their employers 
compared to fraudsters who act alone. According to KPMG (2006:8), fraud prevention internal 
controls are inadequate and ineffective when there is collusion between employees to commit 
fraud. During the designing and implementing of fraud prevention strategies, universities 
should remain cognisant about the risk of employees colluding with colleagues or external 
parties to commit fraud. Internal controls are rendered superfluous when there is collusion 
between employees to commit fraud; therefore universities should consider alternative 
measures to prevent fraud that occurs through collusion.    
 
8.3.2.4 Circumvention of Internal Controls 
Internal controls are circumvented ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ by fraudsters to commit fraud. The 
views of the respondents indicate that internal controls are not infallible. Jackson and Stent 
(2010:5/5) postulate that there are limits to the effectiveness of internal controls due to certain 
elements; one of which is the circumvention of internal controls. According to the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary (2015), circumvent is defined as “to get around something in a clever and 
sometimes dishonest way”. Knowledgeable individuals hold that internal controls are 
circumvented ‘often’ or ‘always’ by fraudsters to commit fraud. Universities should take into 
consideration the risk of employees circumventing internal controls to commit fraud, when 
designing and implementing fraud prevention controls, by enhancing management oversight 
over operations at universities.  
 
8.3.2.5 Over-riding of Internal Controls 
Respondents hold the view that employees ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ do over-ride existing 
internal controls with the intention to commit fraud. According to Turnbull (2005:7), strong 
internal controls can minimise risks that an organisation is exposed to, but it cannot obviate 
risks linked to the over-riding of internal controls. In the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015), 
over-ride is defined as “to stop an action that is done automatically by using a special 
command”. COSO (2013:4) postulates that the over-ride of internal controls by management 
could lead to the failure of the internal control environment. Management is responsible for 
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designing, implementing and monitoring internal controls. The views of the knowledgeable 
individuals are that employees ‘often’ or ‘always’ over-ride existing internal controls with the 
intention to commit fraud. The responses of the respondents implies that Universities have 
been susceptible to over-ride of internal controls by management, who are tasked with 
preserving the internal control environment. In this scenario, universities should rely on an 
independent audit and risk committee to maintain oversight over the internal control 
environment to prevent the over-ride of internal controls by management.  
 
8.3.2.6 Disguise 
Respondents hold the view that fraud is ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ disguised to appear normal. The 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2014) defines fraud as “deceit or trickery”. The fundamental 
element of the crime of fraud is a misrepresentation. According to the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary (2015), to misrepresent is to “give someone a false idea about something”. Fraud is 
difficult to detect when it is disguised as something it is not. This means that employees should 
be trained to identify fraud schemes within their work environment.  
 
Krummeck (2000:271) suggests that organisations provide awareness training to employees 
about fraud and unethical conduct. This view is supported by Albrecht et al. (2006:111), 
Coenen (2008:159) and CIMA (2008:24), who hold that educating employees about the nature 
and extent of fraud contributes to the prevention of fraud. According to PwC (2009:15), EY 
(2013:1) and CIMA (2008:29), organisations should provide fraud awareness training to all 
employees. Universities should embark on a continuous fraud awareness training program 
where employees are educated about fraud and how to recognise and report it. CIMA 
(2008:29) suggests that employees who are trained about fraud would not use this knowledge 
to commit fraud themselves. On the contrary, employees will be empowered to identify fraud 
and report it to the relevant authority. Universities should consider embarking on a sustained 
fraud awareness training program as part of their fraud prevention strategy. 
 
8.3.2.7 Procurement  
The results of this question reflect that the respondent’s response is that fraud ‘sometimes’ or 
‘often’ involves the procurement of goods/services. A similar result emanates when the 
respondents are asked whether fraudsters worked in a finance or procurement related role. 
According to results of the global survey conducted by the ACFE (2014:55), fraudsters were 
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predominantly employed in seven departments, one being procurement. Integral to a sound 
procurement process is a strong internal control environment. Regular audits should be 
conducted to ensure compliance with procurement policies and procedures. According to King 
III (2009:16), the audit committee should satisfy itself with the competence of the finance 
function of the organisation. According to PwC (2009:15), a sound control environment should 
include resilient recruitment and promotion processes. Universities should therefore consider 
appointing employees in the procurement department only after a rigorous recruitment and 
vetting process.    
 
8.3.2.8 Expense Claims 
The respondents hold the view that ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’, fraud at universities relates to the 
submission of expense claims. According to the ACFE (2014:71), a fraudulent expense claim 
involves an employee submitting claims for fraudulent expenses related, for example, to non-
existent meals or inflated travel expenses. The ACFE (2014:15) found that employees involved 
in fraudulent expense claims were also involved in other fraud schemes such as cheque fraud 
and procurement fraud. Universities should scrutinise expense claim forms before authoring 
payment to employees. Should expense claim fraud be detected, universities should investigate 
to establish whether the employee also perpetrated other fraud schemes, as suggested by the 
ACFE.    
 
8.3.2.9 Falsification of Documents 
Respondents hold the view that the frauds ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ relate to the falsification of 
documents. This result implies that employees are falsifying documents in order to perpetrate 
fraud against universities. The falsification of documents can be perpetrated in various ways. 
Universities should remain sceptical of all documents that are presented for approval. Fraud is 
a misrepresentation and is therefore not easily detectable. Universities should remain vigilant 
about the potential for falsified documents being used to perpetrate fraud.       
 
8.3.2.10 Asset Misuse/Misappropriation 
The views of the respondents are that the misuse/misappropriation of university resources are 
‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ linked to fraud. The implication is that employees commit fraud by 
misusing or misappropriating (stealing) university assets. Universities should therefore ensure 
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that accurate records are maintained of all assets and that the disposal of obsolete assets are 
regularised.  
 
8.3.2.11 Solicitation of Bribes 
The respondents are of the view that ‘sometimes’ fraud relates to the solicitation of bribes from 
suppliers or students. The result is not significant. Universities should nevertheless consider 
the solicitation of bribes as a risk when developing or enhancing the fraud prevention strategy. 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004, is appropriate legislation 
which universities can rely on to combat fraud and corruption, coupled with a sound code of 
ethics.   
 
8.3.2.12 Conflict of Interest 
The views of the respondents are that fraud ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ relates to a conflict of 
interest. Section 34 of The Higher Education Act (Act 101 of 1997) as amended, relates to 
employees conducting business with the university in which they are employed. The Act 
prohibits employees from contracting directly or indirectly with the university at which they 
work unless the Council of the relevant university agrees that the goods/services are unique, 
the company is a sole provider of the service and it is in the best interests of the university. 
Section 34 of this Act also places an onus on employees to make a written declaration to the 
university about any business that may constitute a conflict of interest or potential conflict of 
interest to the university before they take up their position at the university.  
 
Knowledgeable individuals are also of the view that fraud ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ relates to a 
conflict of interest. Universities should implement a system that would facilitate compliance 
with Section 34 of The Higher Education Act (Act 101 of 1997), such as the implementation of 
a register to record declaration of interests by employees. 
 
8.3.2.13 Value of Loss 
The result to the question, that the value of each fraud was below R100 000, shows that 
respondents hold the view that this is the case ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’. In terms of Section 34 of 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (Act 12 of 2004), there is an onus on 
persons who are in positions of authority to report corrupt transactions, including fraud, 
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involving an amount of R100 000 or more, to any police official. The ACFE (2014:65) found 
in the global survey that organisations do not report employee fraud to the police mainly 
because they fear negative publicity or that the ensuing disciplinary punishment is adequate.  
 
The views of the knowledgeable individuals are that ‘rarely’ or ‘sometimes’ the value of each 
fraud is below R100 000. This may be the case because universities may be reluctant to engage 
external forensic auditing firms to investigate the fraud due to the low value of the loss and the 
high cost of the investigation. Universities should ensure that instances of fraud, amounting to 
the stipulated value, are reported to the police without undue delay. In effectively combating 
fraud, all incidents, irrespective of the value involved, should be reported to the police. Such an 
approach by the university could serve as a deterrent to other employees who may consider 
committing fraud.      
 
8.3.2.14 Management 
Respondents hold the view that within management are ‘sometimes’ the people who commit 
fraud. This result implies that universities are vulnerable to employee fraud committed by its 
management. According to the result of a global survey by KPMG (2011:4), 64% of 
employees who committed fraud held management and senior management positions. The 
global survey by PwC (2014:46) reveals that the trend of 62% of management and senior 
management committing fraud has not significantly changed over recent years.  
 
Knowledgeable individuals hold the view that management are ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ the 
employees who commit fraud at universities. University management has a fiduciary duty to 
protect public funds entrusted to them from fraud and abuse. In this regard, it is the 
responsibility of management to design and implement strong fraud prevention internal 
controls. The fraud prevention strategy of universities in KwaZulu-Natal should consider this 
risk by implementing strong mitigating internal controls and other relevant anti-fraud 
interventions. 
    
8.3.2.15 Figure and Tables Depicting the Nature of Employee Fraud  





Figure 8.6: Nature of employee fraud  
 
 
The results of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicate that significantly more than 
expected respondents ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ indicate the nature of employee fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal. The results of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests are 
provided in Table 8.2:  
Table 8.2: Results from Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests about the nature of employee fraud 
Question Result of Analysis Chi-square goodness-of-fit test 
C1 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=57) = 33.614, p<.0005) 
C2 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=57) = 66.421, p<.0005) 
C3 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=55) = 52.182, p<.0005) 
C4 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=57) = 46.947, p<.0005) 
C5 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=56) = 47.214, p<.0005) 
C6 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=56) = 48.821, p<.0005) 
C7 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=56) = 49.536, p<.0005) 
C8 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=54) = 80.815, p<.0005) 
C9 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=55) = 55.818, p<.0005) 
C10 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=56) = 40.786, p<.0005) 
C12 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=55) = 33.182, p<.0005) 
C13 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=53) = 63.509, p<.0005) 
 
The results of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test for the following two questions (C11 and 
C14) indicate that significantly more than expected respondents indicate ‘sometimes’ that the: 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
C1 The university suffered financial loss due to frauds committed
since 2013
C2 The fraudsters worked in a finance or procurement related role
C3 The fraudsters colluded with other staff and/or third parties to
commit fraud
C4 The fraudsters circumvented internal controls to commit the
fraud
C5 The internal controls were over-ridden by the fraudsters to
commit the fraud
C6 The frauds were disguised to appear normal
C7 The frauds related to procurement of goods/services
C8 The frauds related to expense claims
C9 The frauds related to the falsification of documents/records
C10 The frauds related to a misuse/misappropriation of university
resources
C11 The frauds related to solicitation of bribes from
suppliers/students
C12 The frauds related to a conflict of interest
C13 The value of each fraud was below R100 000
C14 The fraudsters were members of management
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always
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 Frauds relate to solicitation of bribes from suppliers/students, and 
 Fraudsters are members of management. 
 
The results of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests for questions C11 and C14 are provided in 
Table 8.3 below: 
Table 8.3: Results from Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests about the nature of employee fraud 
Question Result of Analysis Chi-square goodness-of-fit test 
C11 Sometimes (χ
2
 (4, N=56) = 63.286, p<.0005) 
C14 Sometimes (χ
2
 (4, N=55) = 79.818, p<.0005) 
 
The results of global fraud surveys, such as the PwC (2014:44) survey, confirm that male 
employees in management positions predominantly commit fraud as compared to their female 
colleagues. This does not imply that female managers do not commit fraud. To the contrary, 
global surveys such as ACFE (2014:49) reflect that 33% females commit fraud as compared to 
67% of male employees. 
 
During the face-to-face interviews that were conducted with knowledgeable individuals, they 
were asked an open-ended question. They were asked whether they were able to provide any 
other types of employee fraud. The analysis of their responses to this question resulted in the 
emergence of two significant themes, ‘Employment Fraud’ and ‘Unknown’. The theme 
‘Unknown’ meant that the response is that they do not know of any other types of employee 
fraud. 
 
Regarding the theme of ‘Employment Fraud’, the knowledgeable individuals provided the 
following responses, that employees: 
 Capture non-existent employees on the payroll system and receive their salaries; 
 Receive additional salaries without due authorisation; 
 Falsify their curricula vitae (CV); 
 Are selling intellectual property belonging to the university; 
 Misappropriate funds from self-funded teaching programmes; 
 Use university credit cards for personal benefit, and 




In summary, the results and findings in this section imply that the nature of employee fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal have resulted in financial loss to universities due to fraud 
committed by employees. Universities also suffer further prejudice due to legal costs, negative 
publicity and poor employee morale emanating from fraud. Management oversight is essential 
over finance and procurement activities. In this regard, universities should strengthen 
recruitment and selection procedures for positions within the finance and procurement 
departments. 
  
Another type of fraud is the collusion between employees, or employees colluding with 
external parties, to commit fraud. This is a realistic risk faced by universities in KwaZulu-
Natal. The circumvention of internal controls is another area of risk which requires the 
enhancement of management oversight of operations at universities to prevent it. It is essential 
for an independent audit and risk committee to monitor the over-riding of internal controls by 
management. Employees should be educated about fraud through sustained fraud awareness 
training for all employees. Universities should subject prospective employees applying for 
positions in procurement departments, to a rigorous recruitment and vetting process. It is 
essential for universities to scrutinise expense claims because it is one of the methods used to 
commit fraud. The disposal of assets is an area that is susceptible to fraud and requires accurate 
record keeping. A code of ethics is essential to address the poor ethical culture prevailing at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal. A conflict of interest policy, together with a register to record 
declarations of interest, are essential contributors to fraud prevention. Universities should 
report all incidents of fraud to the police irrespective of the value involved.  
 
8.3.3  Results and Findings on Current Fraud Prevention Measures 
This section expounds on the measures that have been implemented by universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal to prevent employee fraud. The objective of questions D1 to D19 was to 
understand the measures that are currently in place at universities in KwaZulu-Natal to 
prevent fraud. The respondents were required to answer questions in this section by providing 
their views about the following fraud prevention measures that are currently in place at 
universities:    
 Fraud is investigated by internal university employees; 
 Management designs and implements internal controls; 
 There are adequate anti-fraud policies; 
 
 174 
 Fraud prevention workshops are held;  
 Internal controls are robust; 
 Management designs internal controls in a structured manner; 
 Internal controls prevent fraud; 
 Incompatible duties are adequately segregated; 
 University conforms to universal governance principles; 
 Management is responsible for preventing fraud; 
 Internal auditors are responsible for preventing fraud; 
 External Auditors are responsible for preventing fraud; 
 Audit & Risk Committees are responsible for preventing fraud; 
 Fraud risks are managed in a systematic manner; 
 Fraud risk management process is effective; 
 Adequate action is taken to recover losses from fraudsters; 
 Disciplinary action is taken against fraudsters;  
 Fraudsters are criminally prosecuted, and 
 Fraud awareness training is provided to employees. 
 
8.3.3.1 Investigate Internally  
The respondents indicate significant agreement with the statement that allegations of fraud are 
usually investigated by internal university employees. This indicates that fraud cases are not 
usually outsourced by universities in KwaZulu-Natal to external forensic investigating 
companies. There is also significant agreement by knowledgeable individuals that allegations 
of fraud are usually investigated by internal university employees. Universities should ensure 
that employees who conduct fraud investigations are suitably qualified and experienced to 
investigate fraud and testify at disciplinary, civil and criminal proceedings. Investigations into 
fraud are complex and require competent investigators who are familiar with relevant 
legislation and university policies. According to Albrecht et al. (2006:111), there should be a 
policy and procedure that sets out how investigations will be conducted. 
 
8.3.3.2 Design and Implementation 
There is significant agreement by the respondents that management is generally responsible for 
designing and implementing internal controls. There is also significant agreement by 
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knowledgeable individuals that management is generally responsible for designing and 
implementing internal controls. According to COSO (2013:15), internal control is the total 
responsibility of management.   
 
8.3.3.3 Anti-fraud Policies 
Respondents significantly agree that the universities in KwaZulu-Natal have adequate policies 
which address fraud risks. This implies that management has designed and implemented anti-
fraud policies. Universities should ensure that employees are aware of these policies and that 
they comply with them. According CIMA (2008:44), it is essential for organisations to combat 
fraud by designing and implementing a fraud policy and response plan. One of the objectives 
of such a policy would be to set out the action that will be taken once fraud is detected or 
suspected. 
 
8.3.3.4 Structured Approach 
There is significant agreement by the respondents that management adopts a structured 
approach when designing internal controls. There are various frameworks and models that are 
available to assist management with designing internal controls. Universities should strive 
towards identifying potential fraud risks and design adequate and appropriate anti-fraud 
internal controls. The structured approach espoused by COSO (2013:32) is one example that 
should be considered by universities when designing and implementing internal controls.  
 
8.3.3.5 Governance Principles 
The respondents are in significant agreement that universities in KwaZulu-Natal conform to 
universal governance principles of fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency. 
This specifically means that universities in KwaZulu-Natal have aligned their activities to the 
same governance principles espoused in King III (2009:6). 
 
8.3.3.6 Management Prevents Fraud 
There is significant agreement among respondents that management is responsible for 
preventing fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. There is also significant agreement by 
knowledgeable individuals that management is responsible for preventing fraud at universities. 
Management should ensure that fraud is prevented at universities in a holistic manner and not 
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piecemeal. According to COSO (2013:39), management is responsible for designing, 
implementing and monitoring internal controls, including controls to prevent fraud. 
 
8.3.3.7 Audit and Risk Committees 
Respondents are in significant agreement that audit and risk committees are responsible for 
preventing fraud at the university. This implies that audit and risk committees are taking 
responsibility for a role for which management should be responsible. This finding is contrary 
to the paragraph above where the respondents agree that management is responsible for fraud 
prevention at universities. Should the respondents hold the view that management and audit 
and risk committees are jointly responsible to prevent fraud at universities, this is contrary to 
COSO (2013:39), which stipulates that the role of the board of directors (by implication, the 
audit and risk committee, as it is a sub-committee of the board) is, inter alia, to maintain 
oversight over the management process of designing and implementing internal controls. The 
view of COSO is further supported by King III (2009:34), which stipulates that audit 
committees should maintain oversight over internal controls and not design and/or implement 
them. Universities should not expect audit and risk committees to be responsible for fraud 
prevention as this is the responsibility of management. 
 
8.3.3.8 Fraud Risk Management System 
There is significant agreement by respondents that universities in KwaZulu-Natal manage 
fraud risks in a systematic manner. This implies that universities have adopted a structured 
approach towards fraud risk management. Universities should ensure that a comprehensive 
fraud risk management strategy and plan is in place, such as the strategy suggested by CIMA 
(2008:24) to combat fraud. There are various ways, according to CIMA (2008:24), to prevent 
fraud, including designing and implementing anti-fraud policies, procedures, preventive 
internal controls and fraud awareness training.  
 
8.3.3.9 Disciplinary Action 
Respondents hold the view that universities ‘sometimes’ and ‘often’ take disciplinary against 
fraudsters. Universities are preventing fraud by taking disciplinary action against employees 
who commit fraud. Such an intervention has a deterrent effect on other employees which 
dissuades them from committing fraud. Universities should ensure that they are consistent in 
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the application of disciplinary measures against employees who commit fraud. This implies 
that the value of the fraud should not determine the severity of the punishment. The 
disciplinary code of the university should stipulate that employees who commit fraud will be 
dismissed from employment if found guilty, irrespective of the value of the loss. According to 
COSO (2013:53), management should take disciplinary action against employees who fail to 
carry out their responsibilities relating to the execution of internal controls. 
 
8.3.3.10 Criminal prosecution 
Respondents hold the view that universities criminally prosecutes fraudsters ‘sometimes’. This 
implies that there are instances where employees who commit fraud are not prosecuted. Fraud 
is a criminal offence in terms of Schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of 1977). 
Universities that do not report fraud to the police, where the amount is R100 000 or more, are 
guilty of an offence in terms of The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (Act 
12 of 2004). Universities should criminally prosecute employees who commit fraud because 
this will serve as a deterrent to other employees who may contemplate committing fraud. 
Universities should institute criminal action against employees who commit fraud in addition 
to taking disciplinary action and civil litigation against them.      
 
8.3.3.11 Fraud Awareness Training  
Respondents agree that the university ‘sometimes’ provides fraud awareness training to 
employees. The implication is that fraud awareness training is not being provided to all 
employees on a sustained basis. The benefit of providing fraud awareness training to 
employees is significant. Authors such as Reidy and Theobald (2011:50), Krummeck 
(2000:269), Albrecht et al. (2006:111) and Coenen (2008:159), and CIMA (2008:24), hold the 
view that educating and making employees aware of fraud is an essential part of the fraud 
prevention intervention. Universities should ensure that the provision of sustained fraud 
awareness training forms part of the fraud prevention strategy.  
   
8.3.3.12 Figures and Tables on Fraud Prevention Measures 
There is significant agreement amongst the respondents about the measures that are currently 
in place to prevent employee fraud from occurring at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. All 
respondents agree that: 
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 Allegations of fraud are usually investigated by internal university employees; 
 Management is generally responsible for designing and implementing internal 
controls; 
 The university has adequate policies which address fraud risks; 
 Management adopts a structured approach when designing internal controls; 
 Universities conform to the universal governance principles of fairness, 
accountability, responsibility and transparency in the way in which they operate; 
 Management is responsible for preventing fraud at the university; 
 Audit and Risk Committees are responsible for preventing fraud at the university, 
and 
 The university manages fraud risks in a systematic manner. 
 
The result of the analysis is reflected in Figure 8.7 below and it indicates that the scores for 
most questions are above the mean in this section. The questions relate to the fraud 





















Figure 8.7: Current fraud prevention measures at universities in KwaZulu-Natal 
 
 
The results of analysis from the One-sample t-test on the current fraud prevention measures at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal are reflected in Table 8.4 below. Only the results containing 
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Table 8.4: Results from One-sample t-test analysis on the current fraud prevention measures  
Question Result of Analysis One-sample t-test 
D1 Significant agreement (t (55) = 6.784, p<.0005, M = 3.89, SD = .985) 
D2 Significant agreement (t (55) = 17.570, p<.0005, M = 4.39, SD = .593) 
D3 Significant agreement (t (55) = 4.040, p<.0005, M = 3.55, SD = 1.025) 
D6 Significant agreement (t (55) = 2.500, p=.015, M = 3.36, SD = 1.069) 
D9 Significant agreement (t (55) = 4.774, p<.0005, M = 3.68, SD = 1.064) 
D10 Significant agreement (t (55) = 10.512, p<.0005, M = 4.16, SD = .826) 
D13 Significant agreement (t (54) = 3.649, p=.001, M = 3.49, SD = .998) 
D14 Significant agreement (t (53) = 3.758, p<.0005, M = 3.46, SD = .905) 
 
In the section below, the fraud prevention measures that are currently in place at universities 
in KwaZulu-Natal are elaborated on. Questions D17 to D19 were analysed to determine the 
percentage of responses that relate to ‘never’, ‘rarely’, ‘sometimes’, ‘often’ and ‘always’ per 
question. The result of these percentages is provided in the Figure 8.8 below:  
Figure 8.8: Disciplinary action taken by universities  
 
 
The results of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicate that significantly more than 
expected respondents indicate that ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ the: 
 The university takes disciplinary action against fraudsters. 
 
The result of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test is provided in Table 8.5 below: 
Table 8.5: Results from One-sample t-test analysis on the current fraud prevention measures  
Question Result of Analysis Chi-square goodness-of-fit test 
D17 Sometimes or often (χ
2
 (4, N=56) = 31.143, p<.0005) 
 
The results of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test for the following two questions (D18 and 
D19) indicate that significantly more than expected respondents indicate ‘sometimes’ that the 
university: 
.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0100.0
D17 The university takes disciplinary action
against fraudsters.
D18 The university criminally prosecutes
fraudsters.
D19 The university provides fraud awareness
training to staff.
Percentage 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always
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 Criminally prosecutes fraudsters, and 
 Provides fraud awareness training to employees. 
 
The results of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests for questions D18 and D19 are provided in 
Table 8.6 below: 
Table 8.6: Results from Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests about the current fraud prevention measures 
Question Result of Analysis Chi-square goodness-of-fit test 
D18 Sometimes (χ
2
 (4, N=55) = 45.455, p<.0005) 
D19 Sometimes (χ
2
 (4, N=56) = 25.964, p<.0005) 
 
8.3.3.13 Themes of Enhanced Internal Controls 
An open-ended question (F5) in the online survey questionnaire aimed to establish the 
respondents’ view on enhanced internal controls that are in place to prevent fraud from 
recurring at universities. Eight themes emerged among the responses provided by the 
respondents. The results indicate significantly that policies and procedures are implemented 
after fraud is detected at universities. An equally significant theme that emerged is that senior 
management and executive management are not aware of enhanced internal controls that are 
implemented after the detection of fraud. Emanating from the analysis of the results of 
interviews with knowledgeable individuals are the same two themes that are significantly 
high. Knowledgeable individuals hold the view that policies and procedures are implemented 
to prevent a recurrence of fraud. They also hold the view that no enhanced internal controls 
are implemented to prevent a recurrence of fraud. This result is concerning as fraud could 
probably recur if internal controls are not enhanced to prevent future frauds from taking 













Figure 8.9: Measures implemented by universities  
 
 
8.3.3.14 Management Response to Other Factors  
Another open-ended question (F6) in the survey questionnaire required the respondents to 
express their view about how management addressed other factors that led to fraud being 
perpetrated by employees at universities. Eight themes emerged from the responses of the 
respondents. The significant themes that emerge are ‘Policies and Procedures’, ‘Unknown’, 
and ‘Risk Mitigation’. The significant themes that emerge from the responses of the 
knowledgeable individuals are similar to the results from the respondents, except that 
knowledgeable individuals responded that no actions is taken by management to address the 
other factors that lead to fraud  being committed. The respondents differ in that they indicate 
that they are not aware (unknown) what action is taken by management. The results of a 
review of fraud case files show that the significant factor that provides the opportunity to the 
employee to commit fraud, is the lack of management oversight over the operations at the 
university. 
 
Regarding the theme of ‘Policies and Procedures’, the different views of respondents are that 
management implemented the following: 
 Enhanced internal controls; 
 Regular review of policies and procedures; 
 Principles and guidelines; 
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 Delegation of authority; 
 Aggregation of cost centres, and  
 Segregation of duties.  
 
Regarding the theme of ‘Risk Mitigation’, the various responses of respondents are that 
management implemented the following: 
 Investigations are conducted; 
 Fraudsters are criminally prosecuted; 
 Put in place strong internal fraud investigation capacity, and 
 Took a zero-tolerance approach to fraud.  
 
The frequency distribution of these themes is depicted in Figure 8.10 below: 
Figure 8.10: Management intervention after incidents of fraud 
 
 
The result which indicates that it is ‘Unknown’ by the respondents how management addressed 
the other factors which led to fraud being committed, should be of concern to universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal. This implies that management, who is responsible for preventing the 
recurrence of fraud, is unaware of what interventions are implemented after discovery of fraud 
at the universities. Universities should ensure that adequate and appropriate management 
intervention takes place after fraud is discovered to prevent a recurrence. Universities should 
also communicate the lessons learned and the risk mitigating interventions that were 
implemented after discovery of the fraud, to other members of management. This would serve 
the purpose of ensuring that a similar type of fraud does not occur in another department 
within the university. 
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Knowledgeable individuals were asked to respond to an open-ended question during the face-
to-face interviews that were conducted with them. They were asked whether they were aware 
of other fraud prevention measures that are in place at universities. The analysis of their 
responses reflected one significant theme. The themes are ‘None’, meaning that they were not 
aware of other fraud prevention measures that are in place at universities. 
 
A review of the fraud case files showed that the following measures were in place at the 
university before the fraud was committed: 
 Segregation of duties; 
 Delegation of authority, and  
 Policies and procedures. 
 
The review of the fraud case files revealed that the following interventions were implemented 
after the fraud was detected at the university.  
 Management oversight has been enhanced; 
 Code of conduct implemented; 
 Fraud awareness training provided to employees; 
 Blacklisting of suppliers; 
 Enhanced internal controls, and 
 Regular analysis of data. 
 
The results and findings in this section imply that universities have implemented various fraud 
prevention measures. Universities should ensure that investigations into employee fraud are 
conducted by suitably competent individuals. It is the responsibility of management to design, 
implement and monitor internal controls. In this regard, management should ensure that there 
are adequate and effective anti-fraud policies in place and that all employees are aware of these 
policies and procedures. Management should ensure that internal controls are designed in a 
structured manner and in line with global best practice. Universities in KwaZulu-Natal 
conform to sound governance principles. It is the responsibility of management and not the 
audit and risk committee, which is an independent oversight body, to prevent fraud at 
universities. These institutions should ensure that they manage fraud risks in a systematic 
manner by means of a comprehensive fraud risk management strategy and plan. It is essential 
for management to take disciplinary action against employees who commit fraud, irrespective 
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of the value of the financial loss incurred. Universities should criminally prosecute perpetrators 
of fraud. They should ensure that they provide sustained fraud awareness training to all 
employees. The findings indicate that the respondents and knowledgeable individuals are of 
the view that universities in KwaZulu-Natal implemented policies and procedures after fraud 
was detected. Equally, the results also indicate that management were not aware of any 
enhanced measures that are implemented after incidents of fraud are detected. It is essential for 
universities to enhance internal controls after fraud is detected to prevent any recurrence.  
   
8.3.4  Results and Findings on Additional Fraud Prevention Measures 
There is significant agreement amongst the respondents about the additional fraud prevention 
measures that should be implemented at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. In this section, there 
is significant agreement by all respondents to the statements listed in E1 to E14 that: 
 The university should have an internal audit department; 
 The university should have an independent audit and risk committee; 
 The university should have a code of ethics for all employees; 
 The university should provide an anonymous whistle blowing hotline to enable 
employees and students to report suspicions of fraud; 
 Executive Management should regularly communicate a strong ethical culture to 
employees; 
 Management should investigate matters reported to it via the whistle-blowing 
facility; 
 The university should conduct adequate ongoing identification and assessment of 
significant fraud risks (including root cause analysis and implementing mitigating 
controls); 
 Management should design and implement internal controls and monitor these on 
an ongoing basis; 
 Governance at the university should be based on current best practice; 
 The university should conduct due diligence when employing people; 
 The university should conduct due diligence when contracting with 3rd parties; 
 The university should create awareness about the existence of the whistle-blowing 
facility to employees and students; 
 The university should conduct forensic data analytics in order to detect fraud 
amongst large volumes of data, and 
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 The university should conduct surprise fraud audits. 
 
The responses to the various questions have been grouped together insofar as they relate to 
similar aspects. These groups are elaborated on in the section below.  
  
8.3.4.1 Audit  
There is significant agreement by respondents that governance should be based on current best 
practice. Knowledgeable individuals are similarly in significant agreement that governance at 
the university should be based on current best practice. The current best practice such as those 
espoused by King III (2009:44) and COSO (2013:148), advocate the existence of an internal 
audit department and an independent audit and risk committee. Respondents also agree 
significantly, that universities should ensure that the internal audit function and audit and risk 
committee are in place. There is significant agreement by the knowledgeable individuals that 
universities should have an internal audit department. Universities should ensure that the 
internal audit departments, as well as the audit and risk committees, operate independently 
from management.   
 
8.3.4.2 Ethics 
The results of analysis of the responses of respondents indicate that there is significant 
agreement that the university should have a code of ethics for all employees and that executive 
management should also regularly communicate a strong ethical culture to employees. The 
knowledgeable individuals are in significant agreement that executive management should 
regularly communicate a strong ethical culture to employees. King III (2009:16) advocates that 
the board of directors should engender an ethical culture within the organisation with the 
assistance of management, who should create and implement a code for ethical conduct. 
According to CIMA (2008:28), management should act ethically and not adopt double 
standards by expecting their subordinates to conduct themselves differently. The view of 
CIMA is supported by Reidy and Theobald (2011:50), who aver that management should 
stimulate a sound ethical culture from the leadership level through leading by example and 
providing awareness training to employees. Universities in KwaZulu-Natal should ensure that 





8.3.4.3 Whistle-blowing  
There is significant agreement among the respondents that the university should provide an 
anonymous whistle-blowing hotline facility to enable employees and students to report 
suspicions of fraud. The respondents also agree significantly that the university should create 
awareness about the existence of the whistle-blowing facility to employees and students. There 
is significant agreement also by the respondents that management should investigate matters 
reported to it via the whistle-blowing facility. Knowledgeable individuals held a similar view 
as mentioned above. According to Nilsen (2010:22), it is essential to provide an anonymous, 
confidential and independent system for reporting fraud as part of the fraud risk management 
process. Reidy and Theobald (2011:48) concur with the view that whistle-blowing programs 
are effective to combat fraud. Krummeck (2000:271) holds that employees must trust the 
system in order to report fraud. Universities should ensure that they implement a whistle-
blowing facility that is trusted by employees and students because it operates independently, 
anonymously and confidentially.   
 
8.3.4.4 Fraud Risk Assessment 
The respondents reveal significant agreement that the university should conduct adequate 
ongoing identification and assessment of significant fraud risks, including conducting root 
cause analysis and implementing mitigating controls. According to PwC (2009:14), the fraud 
risk management program should incorporate an assessment of fraud risks. KPMG (2006:8) 
concur that emphasis must be placed on fraud risk assessment as part of leadership and 
governance. According to KPMG (2006:10), the fraud risk assessment process should identify 
the areas of risk by listing and categorising them, and thereafter rate the risks and mitigate 
them through enhanced internal controls. It will be beneficial to universities to conduct 
continuous fraud risk assessments and to enhance or implement internal controls to mitigate 
the risks. 
 
8.3.4.5 Due Diligence  
There is significant agreement among the respondents that the university should conduct due 
diligence when employing people and when contracting with external parties. The 
knowledgeable individuals are significantly in agreement with this statement as well. 
According to KPMG (2006:12), the fraud risk management process should include conducting 
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due diligence on potential employees, suppliers, clients and other stakeholders as part of the 
fraud prevention process. KPMG suggest that due diligence should be conducted at the 
commencement of an employment or business relationship process. Universities in KwaZulu-
Natal should conduct continuous due diligence on all stakeholders in the quest to prevent 
fraud.  
 
8.3.4.6 Forensic Data Analytics  
Respondents reflect significant agreement that universities should conduct forensic data 
analytics in order to detect fraud amongst large volumes of data. This statement is also of the 
view of the knowledgeable individuals who were interviewed. KPMG (2006:22) suggests that 
conducting forensic analysis of data also reflects on the effectiveness of internal controls. 
According to the ACFE (2014:5), the results of their survey showed that many of the effective 
anti-fraud controls, such as data analysis, are overlooked by many organisations. The survey 
found that the presence of this control correlated with frauds that were 60% less costly and 
50% shorter in duration. Universities should ensure that forensic analysis of data is conducted, 
which will contribute to the overall fraud risk management process.    
 
8.3.4.7 Surprise Fraud Audits 
Respondents are in significant agreement that the university should conduct surprise fraud 
audits and that management should design and implement internal controls and monitor these 
on an ongoing basis. This significant agreement is reiterated by the knowledgeable individuals. 
According to the ACFE (2014:5), surprise audits and a dedicated anti-fraud department 
resulted in the reduction of loss due to fraud. Turnbull (2005:7) holds that the internal control 
environment includes, inter alia, the process of monitoring. Surprise fraud audits are a form of 
monitoring. Surprise fraud audits will be of benefit to universities in KwaZulu-Natal as a fraud 
prevention and detection measure.   
 
8.3.4.8 Figures and Tables on Additional Fraud Prevention Measures 
Figure 8.11 below depicts that all the result scores are above the mean for questions in this 
section. The questions below relate to additional global best practice fraud prevention 




Figure 8.11: Global best practice measures that should be implemented  
 
 
The results of analysis from the One-sample t-test on the global best practices to prevent 
fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal are reflected in Table 8.7 below. All the results show 
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Table 8.7: Results from One-sample t-test analysis on global best practices to prevent fraud  
Question Result of Analysis One-sample t-test 
E1 Significant agreement (t (53) = 8.373, p<.0005, M = 4.13, SD = .991) 
E2 Significant agreement (t (53) = 10.445, p<.0005, M = 4.28, SD = .899) 
E3 Significant agreement (t (53) = 25.126, p<.0005, M = 4.65, SD = .482) 
E4 Significant agreement (t (51) = 11.766, p<.0005, M = 4.46, SD = .896) 
E5 Significant agreement (t (53) = 16.906, p<.0005, M = 4.63, SD = .708) 
E6 Significant agreement (t (53) = 16.774, p<.0005, M = 4.57, SD = .690) 
E7 Significant agreement (t (53) = 25.126, p<.0005, M = 4.65, SD = .482) 
E8 Significant agreement (t (53) = 23.597, p<.0005, M = 4.59, SD = .496) 
E9 Significant agreement (t (51) = 20.600, p<.0005, M = 4.62, SD = .565) 
E10 Significant agreement (t (53) = 24.403, p<.0005, M = 4.69, SD = .507) 
E11 Significant agreement (t (52) = 21.418, p<.0005, M = 4.64, SD = .558) 
E12 Significant agreement (t (52) = 19.623, p<.0005, M = 4.55, SD = .574) 
E13 Significant agreement (t (53) = 15.891, p<.0005, M = 4.50, SD = .694) 
E14 Significant agreement (t (53) = 13.710, p<.0005, M = 4.37, SD = .734) 
 
The results emanating from the analysis of data collected from the knowledgeable individuals 
similarly indicate significant agreement on all 14 statements listed above.  
 
8.3.4.9 Bivariate Analysis   
Bivariate analysis of questions D1 and E6 were conducted. The questions relate to allegations 
of fraud that are usually investigated by internal university employees and management 
investigation into matters reported to it through the whistle-blowing facility respectively. There 
is a strong positive correlation between these two questions (r = 0.374, p=.005). The 
respondents who agree that allegations of fraud are usually investigated by internal university 
employees also agree that management should investigate matters reported through the 
whistle-blowing facility. Krummeck (2000:271) holds that employees who are confident that 
the system works will report fraud. Universities should ensure that allegations of fraud that are 
reported are investigated and resolved. 
 
8.3.4.10 Themes on Management Interventions to Prevent Fraud   
An open-ended question (F1) in the online survey questionnaire aimed to establish the 
respondents’ view on the type of interventions that management should embark on to prevent 
incidents of employee fraud at universities. Five themes emerge among the responses 
provided by the respondents. The significant themes are ‘Internal Controls’, ‘Risk Mitigation’ 
and ‘Training’. The themes emanating from the analysis of the responses of the 
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knowledgeable individuals are similar to the three significant themes found from the 
respondents.   
 
Under the theme of ‘Internal Controls’ the respondents provide the following views in respect 
of interventions that management should embark on to prevent fraud: 
 Enhanced internal controls; 
 Less restrictive controls; 
 Simplified internal controls; 
 Continuous monitoring; 
 Disciplinary action; 
 Vetting of employees;  
 Delegation of authority, and 
 Compliance with policies and procedures. 
 
Management indicated that internal controls are an intervention that should be embarked 
upon to prevent employee fraud. Management is of the view that internal controls should be 
enhanced but should be less restrictive and simple. It would be essential for management to 
continually monitor the internal controls to ensure that they are adequate and functioning as 
intended. Employees who violate internal controls should be subjected to disciplinary action. 
Management is also of the view that employees should be adequately vetted prior to 
employment. Employees should be given written delegations of authority which stipulate the 
limits of the delegation per employee. Management held the view that employees should 
comply with policies and procedures. This implies that management has an essential role to 
play in designing, implementing and monitoring internal controls at universities in order to 
prevent employee fraud. 
      
Under the theme of ‘Risk Mitigation’ the respondents provide the following views in respect 
of intervention that management should embark on to prevent fraud: 
 Surprise audits; 
 Internal and external audits; 
 Develop and implement fraud prevention strategy and monitor its effectiveness; 
 Whistle-blowing; 
 Regular fraud risk assessments;  
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 Zero tolerance to fraud; 
 Thorough investigation; 
 Criminal prosecution of fraudsters; 
 Active management oversight; 
 Conducive environment that is alert to employee circumstances; 
 Identification of high risk individuals; 
 Proper remuneration of employees, and 
 Recognition for good service, clean audits and well-run divisions. 
 
Management also indicated that risk mitigation is an essential intervention that would prevent 
employee fraud at universities. Management holds that audits are essential in preventing 
fraud. When developing, implementing and monitoring a fraud prevention strategy, 
management should include whistle-blowing and fraud risk assessments. Employee fraud 
could be prevented at universities by means of thorough investigations and the criminal 
prosecution of fraudsters. This implies that universities should not tolerate fraud in any 
manner or form. Management oversight over operations is essential to identify employees that 
are prone to commit fraud due to personal circumstances. Employees should be appropriately 
rewarded and recognised in order to prevent employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-
Natal.   
 
Under the theme of ‘Training’, the respondents provide the following views in respect of 
interventions that management should embark on to prevent fraud: 
 Continuous fraud awareness, and 
 Ethics training. 
 
This theme indicates that management should provide adequate training to employees about 
fraud risks and ethics, on a continuous basis.   
 







Figure 8.12: Fraud prevention initiatives  
 
 
The responses of management about the interventions that should be implemented by 
universities to prevent employee fraud indicate a strong inclination towards internal controls, 
risk mitigation and training.   
 
8.3.4.11 Themes about Internal Controls that Prevent Fraud   
A further open-ended question (F2) aimed to establish the respondents’ view on examples of 
internal controls that prevent employee fraud from occurring at universities. There are nine 
themes that emerge from the respondents’ responses. The four significant themes that emerge 
are ‘Policies and Procedures’, ‘Delegation of Authority’, ‘Segregation of Duties’ and 
‘Management Oversight’. Analysis of the data collected from the interviews held with 
knowledgeable individuals revealed three significant themes. The themes are similar to those 
mentioned above, excluding the delegation of authority. These themes are explained below.   
 
The theme of ‘Policies and Procedures’ that emanate from the views of the respondents about 
examples of internal controls that prevent employee fraud, are as follows: 
 Compliance;  
 Disciplinary process; 
 Enhanced internal controls; 
 Passwords;  
 Vehicle log books;  
 Roles, responsibilities and accountability; 
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 Stock take;  
 Asset verification; 
 Audit trail, and   
 Dedicated human resources. 
 
It is the view of the respondents that compliance with policies and procedures of the 
university is essential to prevent employee fraud. The respondents hold the view that 
employees who do not comply with policies and procedures should be subjected to 
disciplinary action against them. The respondents hold that internal controls should be 
enhanced. Some suggest internal controls include the use of passwords for printing, 
photocopying and office telephones. Employees who use university vehicles should be 
provided with a log book that should be filled in for trips undertaken in that vehicle. The 
roles, responsibilities and accountability of employees should be clearly stipulated. 
Respondents responded that regular stock taking and physical verification of assets are 
essential internal controls that could prevent employee fraud at universities. Documents 
relating to the procurement of goods or services should be safeguarded to ensure that there is 
an audit trail of the process. The respondents also hold that there should be sufficient 
employees allocated to carry out tasks, because the practice of having fewer employees 
execute multiple tasks renders the university prone to fraud. 
    
The next theme that emanates about internal controls that prevent employee fraud from 
occurring was ‘Delegation of Authority’. Respondents are of the view that authority should 
be delegated appropriately to employees with due consideration being given to having 
multiple approvers within the various operations of universities.   
 
‘Segregation of Duties’ is a further theme that was identified from the views provided by the 
respondents. Segregation of incompatible duties is essential in preventing employee fraud at 
universities. 
 
The theme of ‘Management Oversight’ entailed the following: 
 Physical access control;  
 Controlled distribution of assets;  
 Continuous monitoring; 
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 Reconciliations;  
 Verification of data in financial forms, and  
 Communication with the Finance Department. 
 
The respondents are of the view that management should implement internal controls for the 
physical access to goods and other assets. The distribution of assets should be subject to 
stringent controls in order to prevent employee fraud at universities. Management should 
continuously monitor the internal controls that are in place to ensure implementation and 
compliance. Respondents hold that regular reconciliations should form part of management 
oversight over the operations at universities. Another essential internal control that is 
identified by the respondents is that management should verify information that is reflected in 
financial documents before authorising payment. In this regard, regular communication with 
the Finance Department is found to be essential.  
 
The frequency distribution of these themes is depicted in Figure 8.13 below: 
Figure 8.13: Internal controls that prevent fraud   
 
 
The identified themes indicate that internal controls are vital for the prevention of employee 
fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal in particular and at universities in general. One of the 
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8.3.4.12 Themes about Other Fraud Prevention Interventions   
The respondents were asked an open-ended question (F3) and to express their views about 
other interventions that would prevent employee fraud, apart from internal controls. Although 
ten themes emerged, only the top four themes are elaborated on below. These four themes are 
‘Training’, ‘Risk Mitigation’, ‘Ethics’ and ‘Management Oversight’. There are two 
significant themes that are identified from the responses received from the knowledgeable 
individuals. These are risk mitigation and ethics.    
 
The theme of ‘Training’ emanate as the most significant intervention, apart from internal 
controls, to prevent employee fraud at universities. The views of the respondents are that 
there should be continuous fraud awareness training provided to employees. 
‘Risk Mitigation’ is another theme that emerged from the responses of the respondents. The 
following specific issues were provided by respondents when asked what other interventions 
would prevent employee fraud:  
 Blacklisting of fraudsters;  
 Employee wellness;   
 Support for employees in financial distress;  
 Criminal prosecution, and 
 National register.  
 
The respondents held the view that fraudsters should be blacklisted in order to prevent them 
from securing employment at other universities. Some respondents went so far as to suggest 
that a national register should be implemented in order to deter other employees from 
committing fraud. Respondents were also of the view that universities should criminally 
prosecute employees who commit fraud. They suggested that universities should be aware of 
the personal circumstances of employees such as their gambling, drug and alcohol addiction, 
as well as those who are under financial stress. Albrecht (1998:113) holds that such types of 
pressure contribute towards employees committing fraud because they do not have anyone to 
speak to about their problem. Universities should consider providing employee wellness 




The theme of ‘Management Oversight’ emerged from the responses received. The following 
specific suggestions are provided by the respondents as other interventions that would prevent 
employee fraud:  
 Continuous monitoring;  
 Segregation of duties, and 
 Management oversight. 
 
The respondents held that management should regularly oversee operations and monitor the 
internal control environment continuously. The segregation of duties is essential, especially 
when there are incompatible duties being carried out by one employee. Such a situation 
provides an unscrupulous employee with an opportunity to commit fraud without being 
detected. This implies that management should be vigilant and ensure that incompatible 
duties are adequately segregated or other internal controls implemented. 
 
Another intervention that would prevent employee fraud is identified as the theme of ‘Ethics’. 
Respondents hold that the following aspects contribute to fraud prevention at universities: 
 Code of ethics; 
 Ethics training; 
 Sound ethical culture;  
 Zero tolerance to fraud, and 
 Trusting the employees more (which will lead to an improved anti-fraud culture.) 
 
The view of the respondents was that employee fraud can be prevented at universities by 
inculcating a sound ethical culture. The respondents suggested that designing and 
implementing a code of ethics and providing employees with continuous training about the 
ethical culture of the university, would lead to the prevention of fraud. Respondents were of 
the view that universities should not tolerate fraud in any form. This implies that universities 
should act consistently against fraudsters irrespective of the value of the loss, the nature of the 
fraud or the position of the employee. One respondent was of the view that universities 
should trust employees explicitly because this would lead to an enhanced anti-fraud culture. 
This view is contrary to the findings of global studies, such as the ACFE (2014:53), which 
found that employees who have worked for a long period of time become highly trusted, 
resulting in a relaxation of the review and monitoring of their work. Such employees are 
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familiar with the anti-fraud internal controls that are in place at universities and are in many 
instances aware of the loopholes in them as well. These trusted employees are in a position to 
exploit the weaknesses in the internal controls to commit fraud. 
 
The frequency distribution of the themes is depicted in Figure 8.14 below: 
Figure 8.14: Other fraud prevention interventions   
 
 
The figure above indicates that management has identified essential fraud prevention 
interventions that could be implemented at universities. The figure also indicates that there 
are various interventions that universities in KwaZulu-Natal should implement to prevent 
employee fraud.   
 
Knowledgeable individuals were interviewed on a face-to-face basis. They were asked an 
open-ended question to determine whether they are aware of other global best practice fraud 
prevention measures that could be implemented at universities. Two significant themes 
emerge after analysis of their responses. The themes are ‘None’ and ‘Data Analysis’. The 
theme of ‘None’ meant that they are not aware of other global best practice fraud prevention 
measures that could be implemented at universities.  
 
With regard to the theme of ‘Data Analysis”, the knowledgeable individuals provided the 
following responses, namely, that universities should: 
 Conduct trend analysis to detect for favouritism towards suppliers; 
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 Analyse data for purchases against actual usage. 
 
The results and findings of this section indicate that universities in KwaZulu-Natal should 
implement additional fraud prevention measures. Governance at universities should be based 
on current best practice. In this regard, universities should have an independent audit and risk 
committee and internal audit department. It is essential for universities to have a code of ethics 
for employees which must be regularly communicated by executive management, who should 
also lead by example. Whistle-blowing is essential in addressing fraud. Universities should 
ensure that an independent whistle-blowing facility is provided. There should be regular 
awareness campaigns undertaken to highlight the existence of the facility to employees. It is 
essential that management investigates the allegations that are received through the whistle-
blowing facility. Another fraud prevention measure that universities should implement is the 
continuous assessment of fraud risks. There is significant agreement among respondents that 
the university should conduct due diligence when employing people and when contracting with 
external parties. Universities should conduct forensic data analyses as these will assist in 
detecting fraud, according to the significant agreement by respondents and knowledgeable 
individuals. Respondents and knowledgeable individuals are also in significant agreement that 
surprise fraud audits are essential in the prevention and detection of fraud.    
 
The frequency distribution of themes arising out of the open-ended questions indicates that the 
respondents and knowledgeable individuals held the view that ‘Internal Controls’, ‘Risk 
Mitigation’ and ‘Training’ are three significant themes that address the type of interventions 
that management should embark on to prevent employee fraud at universities. The frequency 
distribution of themes, about internal controls that prevent fraud, shows that the respondents 
and knowledgeable individuals held the view that policies and procedures, segregation of 
duties and management oversight are the three significant themes.  
 
Arising out of the responses received from the respondents about other interventions that 
would prevent employee fraud, four significant themes emerged from the frequency 
distribution. These are ‘Training’, ‘Risk Mitigation’, ‘Ethics’ and ‘Management Oversight’. 






8.4 SIMILARITY OF CERTAIN FINDINGS  
An analysis of the results emanating out of the survey questionnaire, face-to-face interviews 
and fraud case files reveal certain similar findings. These results validate the similar findings 
which emanate from different data sources. These similarities in the findings relate to the 
research focus areas of: 
 Causes of employee fraud; 
 Nature and extent of employee fraud;  
 Measures that are currently in place to prevent fraud, and 
 Additional fraud prevention measures that could be recommended. 
 
These findings have been grouped together insofar as they relate to similar themes and/or 
where they refer to a combination of focus areas of this research. The grouped findings are 
explained further in the sections below. 
 
8.4.1 Nature of Employee Fraud and Current Prevention Measures  
There is agreement between the respondents and knowledgeable individuals that universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal have been victims of known employee frauds and have suffered financial 
losses due to these frauds. There is a differing view between the respondents and 
knowledgeable individuals insofar as the value of the loss to fraud is concerned. The latter are 
not in agreement that the value of the loss to each fraud is below R100 000. This result implies 
that knowledgeable individuals are unaware of the cost of the fraud being incurred by 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal because frauds are investigated internally by management. 
Management may hold their view that the value of the loss due to fraud incidents is below 
R100 000 based on the incidents of employee fraud of which they are aware. Similarly, the 
knowledgeable individuals may hold their view that the value of the loss due to fraud is more 
than R100 000 based on the incidents of employee fraud that they have investigated at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal. Irrespective of the value of the loss suffered, it is essential for 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal to ensure that adequate action is taken to recover losses from 





There is agreement between the respondents and knowledgeable individuals that management 
is responsible for preventing fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. Best practice such as that 
advocated by COSO (2013:15), is that designing and implementing internal controls is solely a 
management responsibility. This research has confirmed that management is responsible for 
designing and implementing internal controls in order to prevent fraud.  
 
Respondents and knowledgeable individuals are also in agreement that management itself can 
be a perpetrator of fraud. Global surveys such as those conducted by PwC (2014:46) have also 
found that 62% of management and senior management have committed fraud. This result is of 
specific concern taking into consideration that management is tasked with preventing fraud but 
are the very same employees who are committing fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.    
 
8.4.2 Nature and Causes of Employee Fraud 
The respondents and knowledgeable individuals are in agreement that employee fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal relates to the falsification of documents. This finding is also 
confirmed by an analysis of the frequency distribution of themes that emerged from the review 
of the fraud case files. The knowledgeable individuals are also in agreement with the 
respondents that the frauds at universities relate to conflicts of interest that arise between 
employees and the business that are awarded by them on behalf of the universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal to suppliers with whom a conflict of interest existed. It is essential for 
universities to be cognisant of these factors when designing and implementing fraud 
prevention strategies. 
 
8.4.3 Nature and Causes of Fraud and Current and Required Prevention Measures 
There is agreement by both the respondents and knowledgeable individuals with the statement 
that fraudsters circumvent internal controls in order to commit fraud at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal. This finding is contrary to the views expressed by the respondents that current 
internal controls that are in place at universities are resilient against fraud. The circumvention 
of internal controls by employees, in order to commit fraud, provides an opportunity for 
dishonest employees to carry out this deed. Another finding that differs from the views of the 
respondents, that current internal controls are resistant to fraud, is the view that respondents 
agree that inadequate controls led to employees committing fraud. It is essential that 
universities implement enhanced internal controls after the discovery of employee fraud, such 
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as what is found after an analysis of the fraud case files during this research. Such enhanced 
internal controls will obviate a recurrence of similar fraud.       
 
Both the respondents and the knowledgeable individuals are in agreement that internal controls 
are over-ridden by the fraudsters to commit the fraud. In order to mitigate instances where 
management over-rides internal controls to commit fraud, the audit and risk committee should 
maintain oversight over the internal control environment. One of the themes that emanated 
from the frequency analysis of the themes from open-ended questions in the survey, face-to-
face interviews with knowledgeable individuals and fraud case files, is the ‘Delegation of 
Authority’. Appropriate delegation of authority limits to management should be considered as 
an essential fraud prevention intervention.   
 
Respondents and knowledgeable individuals are in agreement that fraudsters collude with other 
employees and/or third parties to commit fraud. Respondents are in agreement that employees 
solicit bribes from suppliers in order to collude in perpetrating fraud against universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal. This result implies that internal controls are rendered ineffective and 
inadequate where there is collusion, which is also the view of KPMG (2006:8). Universities 
should consider this risk when designing anti-fraud internal controls. In this regard, an analysis 
of the fraud case files revealed that the university had blacklisted the suppliers that were found 
to have colluded with university employees to commit fraud. Universities should also ensure 
that suppliers abide by a code of ethics in their interaction with the universities.    
 
8.4.4 Causes of Employee Fraud and Current and Required Prevention Measures 
A lack of management oversight is found to be one of the causes of employee fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal, according to the views of the respondents and knowledgeable 
individuals. These views are corroborated by the findings emanating from the analysis of fraud 
case files where the lack of management oversight is found to be one of the causes of 
employee fraud. The result from the analysis of the fraud case files revealed that management 
enhances oversight over operations after fraud is discovered at the university. It is essential for 
management to be proactive and enhance oversight over operations at universities in KwaZulu-
Natal. An analysis of the themes that emanate from the open-ended questions revealed that 
both the respondents and knowledgeable individuals agree that management oversight should 
be implemented to prevent fraud. According to COSO (2013:81), poor management oversight 
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provides employees with the opportunity to commit fraud. This research has confirmed that 
management oversight is essential for the prevention of employee fraud.  
 
According to the respondents, another cause of employee fraud is the existence of a poor 
ethical culture at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. Respondents are also of the view that the 
university should have a code of ethics for all employees and that executive management 
should regularly communicate a strong ethical culture to employees. An analysis of the fraud 
case files reveals that one of the interventions that management implemented after the 
discovery of fraud was a code of conduct for employees. Results of the analysis of the open-
ended questions, to which the respondents and knowledgeable individuals provided their 
views, indicate that a code of ethics is essential as a fraud prevention intervention. According 
to COSO (2013:35), a code of conduct is essential for an organisation because it stipulates 
what is considered right and wrong. CIMA (2008:28) advocates that organisations should go 
beyond just designing and implementing a code of ethics by inculcating an ethical culture, 
starting from management who needs to lead by example. According to KPMG (2006:11), a 
code of conduct communicates the standards of ethical conduct of the organisation to 
employees, clients, suppliers and stakeholders. 
 
8.4.5 Current and Required Prevention Measures 
Both the respondents and knowledgeable individuals are in agreement that fraud is investigated 
by internal university employees. According to KPMG (2006:20), it is essential for 
organisations to respond to allegations of fraud by investigating them. The process of 
investigating fraud also serves the purpose of preventing fraud from taking place, because 
employees will be aware that there is a likelihood that they may be caught out should they 
consider committing fraud against the university.   
 
Another fraud prevention intervention that emanated from the research is the need for fraud 
awareness training. Respondents are of the view that fraud awareness training is provided to 
employees at the university. The result from the analysis of fraud case files corroborates the 
view of the respondents that fraud awareness training is provided to employees. The analysis 
of the views to open-ended questions by the respondents and knowledgeable individuals 
reveals that the provision of fraud awareness training to employees is an essential initiative that 
universities should implement in order to prevent fraud. According to KPMG (2006:13), 
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training should be provided continuously to employees in order to make them aware of fraud 
risks as this will also assist in inculcating a culture of high integrity and compliance within the 
organisation. Training also empowers employees to identify fraud within the university and 
how to report it to the appropriate authority.   
 
Respondents hold that fraud risks at universities in KwaZulu-Natal are managed in a 
systematic manner. They suggest that universities should conduct adequate ongoing 
identification and assessment of significant fraud risks, including root cause analysis and 
implementation of mitigating internal controls. KPMG (2006:20) suggests that the risk 
assessment process should identify the control deficiencies in the current state and consider 
what interventions will be necessary for the desired state. This implies that fraud risk 
assessments are an essential intervention in ensuring that fraud risks are managed in a 
systematic manner at universities in KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
Respondents and knowledgeable individuals are in agreement that management designs and 
implements internal controls in a structured manner. Respondents hold that management 
should also monitor the internal controls on a continuous basis. The themes emanating from 
the analysis of open-ended questions that the respondents and knowledgeable individuals were 
asked, reveal that ‘Internal Controls’ are essential for preventing fraud at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
Respondents held the view that internal and external auditors are currently responsible for 
preventing fraud at universities. The respondents were also of the view that it is essential for 
universities to have an internal audit department, which is a view that is also shared by the 
knowledgeable individuals. Respondents and knowledgeable individuals also held that audits 
are essential to prevent fraud at universities. Although audits ensure good governance at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal, it is not the responsibility of internal or external auditors to 
prevent fraud at universities. According to COSO (2013:39), it is the sole responsibility of 
management to design, implement and monitor internal controls.  
 
Respondents held that that audit and risk committees are responsible for preventing fraud at 
universities. In support of this view, respondents were in agreement that universities should 
have an independent audit and risk committee. A theme that emanates out the analysis of open-
ended questions is that universities should have an audit and risk committee. Audit and risk 
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committees are not responsible for preventing fraud at universities. According to King III 
(2009:34), audit committees should maintain oversight over internal controls and not design 
and implement these controls. This implies that management expects the audit and risk 
committee to prevent fraud, which is the responsibility of management. Universities should be 
aware of the roles and responsibilities of management and audit committees with regard to 
preventing fraud.   
 
Respondents expressed the view that there are adequate anti-fraud policies in place at 
universities to prevent fraud. According to CIMA (2008:44), organisations should address 
fraud by designing and implementing a fraud policy and response plan. Respondents held that 
universities should implement policies and procedures in order to prevent fraud. This implies 
that anti-fraud policies are an essential form of internal control.    
 
Respondents were of the view that incompatible duties are adequately segregated at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal as a fraud prevention internal control. The segregation of duties 
emerged from the analysis of the open-ended questions that were put to the respondents and 
knowledgeable individuals, as an internal control that should be implemented at universities in 
order to prevent fraud at universities. According to CIMA (2008:34), management should 
exercise additional verification and control when it is not possible to segregate incompatible 
duties.  
 
Respondents held that universities currently conform to universal governance principles. 
Respondents and knowledgeable agreed that governance at the university should be based on 
best practice. It is a requirement in terms of Section 41 of the Higher Education Act (Act 101 
of 1997), that the council of a university must provide a report on the overall governance of the 
relevant institution to the Minister. The Minister requires assurance that the university is 
operating on sound governance principles. King III IODSA (2009:16) provides sound 
corporate governance principles which universities in KwaZulu-Natal should adopt as part of 
their fraud prevention strategy.  
 
Respondents and knowledgeable individuals were in agreement that universities should 
conduct forensic data analysis in order to detect fraud amongst large volumes of data. An 
analysis of the fraud case files reveals that regular forensic analyses of data were implemented 
after fraud was detected at the university. According to KPMG (2006:22), control effectiveness 
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can be evaluated by conducting forensic analysis of data. The forensic analysis of data is also a 
fraud detection and prevention technique. 
 
8.4.6 Required Prevention Measures 
The views of the respondents and knowledgeable individuals are that universities should 
provide an anonymous whistle-blowing facility which would enable employees and students to 
report their suspicion of fraud at universities. They also expressed the view that universities 
should create awareness about existence of the whistle-blowing facility to employees and 
students. The results of a global survey conducted by the ACFE (2014:19) reveal that a 
significant percentage (42%) of employee fraud was detected by means of a tip off. This 
implies that a whistle-blowing facility is essential for the prevention and detection of fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
Respondents and knowledgeable individuals were in agreement that universities should 
conduct due diligence when employing people and when contracting with external parties, 
such as suppliers. According to KPMG (2006:12), conducting due diligence on potential 
employees, suppliers, clients and other stakeholders is essential to prevent fraud, which should 
be undertaken at the commencement of an employment or business association process. This 
implies that universities in KwaZulu-Natal should be vigilant about who it employees and with 
whom it conducts business. This will contribute to the prevention of fraud at universities.  
 
There is significant agreement between the respondents and knowledgeable individuals that 
universities should conduct surprise fraud audits. According to the ACFE (2014:31), surprise 
audits are an essential anti-fraud internal control. This implies that universities should conduct 
frequent surprise anti-fraud audits as part of the strategy to prevent fraud at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
8.5 SUMMARY  
This chapter presented and explained the interpretation of the results and findings of this 
research. The results and findings emanated from an analysis of data that was collated from 
respondents to the survey questionnaire, face-to-face interviews that were conducted with 
knowledgeable individuals, fraud case files and the literature search. Firstly, the results and 
findings showed conclusively what the causes of employee fraud were. Secondly, they showed 
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what the nature of employee fraud was. Thirdly, they revealed what measures have been 
implemented by universities in KwaZulu-Natal to prevent fraud. Lastly, they indicated what 
fraud prevention measures should be implemented by universities in order to prevent fraud. 
Universities in KwaZulu-Natal are not immune to employee fraud. They are victims of 
employee fraud which has resulted in financial loss to universities due to the fraud. There are 
employees who are dishonest and betray the trust of their superiors by committing fraud 
against universities. Certain internal controls are designed to prevent fraud but these are of no 
effect if they are deficient, or employees circumvent them or do not comply with them. The 
over-riding of internal controls by management pose a serious threat to good governance at 
universities, which should be taken into consideration when designing and implementing a 
fraud prevention strategy. This research has found various best practice governance methods 
that could be used by universities in KwaZulu-Natal in order to holistically prevent employee 
fraud. The following chapter expounds on the results and findings of this research. It elaborates 
on model theories and proposes a conceptual model as a key point of departure for a set of 
recommendations in the last chapter designed to address employee fraud and prevention 























MODEL THEORIES AND PROPOSAL OF CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
9.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an explanation of relevant model theories that have been or could have 
been used to facilitate comprehension of a theoretical illustration of the successful 
management of employee fraud at universities. Hanekom (1987:45) holds that public policy 
making is simplified by the use of models to explain problems. He further explains that a 
model should consist of five phases, “goal identification, authorisation, public statement of 
intent, implementation and evaluation”. According to Cloete and Wissink (2000:29), models 
are used to answer questions of “What happened? Why? What will happen next? How can 
future processes be influenced and which are viable interventions?”. These are questions that 
are founded on a particular context and assumption. This chapter relates to model theories in 
general and proposes a conceptual model particularly for preventing employee fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
A conceptual model is proposed because this study has found that a holistic approach is 
required for the prevention of fraud at universities. The proposed conceptual model could be 
utilised by universities in KwaZulu-Natal, in particular, and universities in general, as a 
framework to prevent employee fraud.   
 
9.2  GENERAL MODEL THEORY  
According to Hanekom (1987:75), models are used to obtain an understanding of the 
theoretical and practical aspects of policy analysis. He explains that there are two types of 
methods used to analyse policy, namely, the functional and social efficiency methods. The 
functional efficiency method is also referred to as the descriptive approach because it describes 
the method used for problem resolution. The social efficiency method is also referred to as the 
prescriptive approach because it prescribes the conduct of people. Hanekom (1987:76) 
postulates that a descriptive approach is useful to analyse the process that is followed for the 
creation of policy. A prescriptive approach is useful to analyse the outcomes of policy 
implementation. The particular descriptive and prescriptive approaches were chosen and are 
explained below because they provide an understanding of systems models in general and 
 
 209 
provide a context for the proposed conceptual model in this study. Figure 9.1 below depicts 
both the descriptive and prescriptive approaches: 
Figure 9.1: Descriptive and Prescriptive approaches 
 
Source: Hanekom (1987:77) 
 
In the following paragraphs of this chapter, a number of different models that are related to the 
prescriptive approach are explained, followed by the descriptive approach models.     
 
9.3 PRESCRIPTIVE MODELS  
Hanekom (1987:82) avers that the prescriptive approach is intended to analyse the efficiency 
of the policy either post-implementation or as a combination of pre-implementation and post-
implementation (output and impact). According to Hanekom (1987:82), this approach 
originated as a method to improve how decisions were made, but the approach could also be 
used to identify limitations in the policy. The prescriptive approach focuses on the impact of 
policies and the results thereof. Cloete and Wissink (2000:31) identify four types of 
prescriptive approaches: 
 rational-comprehensive model; 
 incremental model; 
 mixed-scanning model, and 
 garbage can approach.  
 




9.3.1 Rational-comprehensive Model 
The rational-comprehensive model, according to Dye (1987:31), is intended to provide utmost 
social gain. According to Cloete and Wissink (2000:32), this model considers the needs, and 
the importance thereof, to society. This model also explores potential alternative frameworks 
and their consequences. Hanekom (1987:82) holds that a rational-comprehensive model 
provides for the policy-maker to have a wide variety of alternatives from which to select. A 
rational model is depicted in Figure 9.2 below:       
Figure 9.2: Rational Model 
 
Source: Dye (1987:27) 
 
9.3.2 Incremental Model 
Cloete and Wissink (2000:32) hold that an incremental model is based on the assumption that 
government activities are an extension of public policy. According to Cloete and Wissink 
(2000:32) and Hanekom (1987:84), government activities, which are being executed in line 
with existing policy, may only require minor incremental changes in terms of this model. For 
Cloete and Wissink (2000:32), the advocates of this model find that change in the form of 
increments can be more rapidly implemented than change that is based on a comprehensive 
model. It is also suggested that the potential for resistance to change is reduced when an 







Figure 9.3: Incremental Model 
 
Source: Hanekom (1987:84) 
 
9.3.3 Mixed-scanning Model 
According to Cloete and Wissink (2000:32) and Hanekom (1987:85), the mixed-scanning 
model is regarded as an alternative to the rational-comprehensive and incremental models. The 
mixed-scanning model involves a selection of best aspects from the other two models 
mentioned and incorporates them into one. The mixed-scanning model is depicted in Figure 
9.4 below:  
Figure 9.4: Mixed-scanning Model 
 
Source: Hanekom (1987:86) 
 
9.3.4 Garbage Can Approach 
Cloete and Wissink (2000:33) refer to the garbage can model which is used when decisions are 
made, as a reaction to an event or crisis. This may also be referred to as a “knee-jerk” response. 
When such a model is used, it is due to inaction by individuals who are tasked to make 
decisions. Cloete and Wissink (2000:32) aver that these policy-makers have a laidback 
approach to societal issues and only react when under pressure to do so. The garbage can 
approach is reactive in nature and activated in response to unfavourable circumstances.  
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9.4 DESCRIPTIVE MODELS  
According to Hanekom (1987:77), descriptive models relate to the process of policy-making, 
where information relevant to policy is analysed first before policy is developed. Descriptive 
models are used to describe the methods that are used in problem solving. Such methods are 
thereafter used to analyse information that is relevant for policy-making. Hanekom (1987:78) 
finds that there are five types of descriptive model, the functional process, elite/mass, group, 
institutional and systems models. In addition, Cloete and Wissink (2000:37) also describe the 
social interaction model, policy network and communities model, as well as the chaos, 
complexity and quantum models for policy analysis. These models are explained in the 
sections that follow.    
 
9.4.1 Functional Process Model 
The functional process model, according to Hanekom (1987:78), relates mainly to the activities 
that are carried out during the policy-making process by focusing on the “how” and “who” 
attributes. He holds that such a model is suitable for conducting a comparative study, rather 
than a study of policy-making. According to Hanekom and Thornhill (1986:89), the functional 
process model facilitates the search for answers to the following aspects: 
 Formulation and communication of substitute recommendations; 
 Allocation of responsibility and guidance for the formulation and application of 
measures (how and who); 
 Allocating responsibility for deciding when action is illegal (who); 
 Enforcing the law (who); 
 Determining success or failure of a policy (how), and  
 Adapting or terminating legislation (how). 
 
Cloete and Wissink (2000:45) observe that the process model is generally used internationally 
for policy-making. Dunn (1994:15-18), as quoted by Cloete and Wissink (2000:45), holds that 
the process for the analysis of policy is a combination of intellectual and political activities 







Figure 9.5: Policy-making Model 
 
Source: Dunn (1994:17) 
 
Cloete and Wissink (2000:46) proffer that the stage model is an alternative approach in policy-
making whereby the process is segregated into descriptive stages linked to the activities that 
result in the outputs of policy implementation. According to Cloete and Wissink (2000:47), the 
stage model emphasises the need to consider the activities that are undertaken during the 
process of policy-making. The stage model, they postulate, specifically provides for the 
allocation of resources during the implementation phase of the policy. The stage model is 
depicted in Figure 9.6: 
Figure 9.6: Stage Model 
 




9.4.2 Elite/Mass Model          
The elite/mass model, according to Hanekom (1987:78), is a popular model for the analysis of 
policy. This model is premised on the assumption that the government is responsible for 
formulating policy for the masses (public) that are inadequately informed. It is suggested that 
the policy is implemented by public servants and relevant government entities on the masses. 
Hanekom (1987:79) holds that the assumption in this model is that the elite are in agreement 
with the policy and continue with implementing it despite what the masses want. De Coning 
and Cloete (2000:34) hold the view that the elite/mass model ensures that the elite are in power 
because they know what they are doing and that the policy is based on consensus among them. 
Figure 9.7 below shows the elite/mass model: 
Figure 9.7: Elite/mass Model 
 
Source: Henry (1992:289)  
 
9.4.3 Group Model 
The group model relates directly to the involvement and participation of interest groups, 
according to Hanekom (1987:79), in order to influence policy-making. The extent of success 
that a group achieves in this regard is linked to the influence it has on policy-makers. In certain 
instances, some interest groups may have more of an influence on policy-making than others. 
Hanekom (1987:80) postulates that the group model is suitable for the initiation and/or 
adaptation of policy. According to Cloete and Wissink (2000:35), interest groups are vehicles 
for changing policy due to the pressure they bear and the consultation they have with policy-
makers, which are based on subjective reasons such as the interest and preference of the 







Figure 9.8: Group Model 
 
 
Source: Henry (1992:289) 
 
9.4.4 Institutional Model 
According to Hanekom (1987:81), the institutional model is based on the premise that the 
creation and implementation of public policy is the responsibility of public institutions. He 
avers that the structure of public institutions is interlinked with policy and should therefore be 
considered simultaneously. De Coning and Cloete (2000:26) are of the view that the 
institutional model promotes a separation of power between institutions, for example, the 
judiciary, the legislature and the executive. The institutional model is depicted in Figure 9.9 
below: 
Figure 9.9: Institutional Model 
 
 
Source: Hanekom (1987:82) 
 
9.4.5 Systems Model 
Easton’s (1957:384) model for political systems comprises different types of inputs which are 
processed in a system and generated into various outputs. He holds that these outputs bear 
consequences for both the system as well as the environment in which the system operates. 
This simple input and output political system model is depicted in Figure 9.10 below, showing 
the relationship the system has within an environment:   
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Figure 9.10: Political system 
 
 
Source: Easton (1957:384) 
 
According to Easton (1965:109), there is a link between political systems and environmental 
systems. The effect of environment on input impacts the political system, which in turn makes 
an impact on output. The dynamic response model depicted in Figure 9.11 below reflects a 
framework for a political system which can be used for analysis:   
Figure 9.11: Dynamic Response Model of a political system 
 
 
Source: Easton (1965:110) 
 
According to Hanekom (1987:80), public policy is determined as a response to the political 
system to various expectations and requirements of people and particular groups. Support for 
specific policies is provided to the policy-maker from various sources and is regarded as inputs 
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to the political system. Hanekom (1987:80) avers that subsequent to debates, proposals and 
amendments, an agreement is reached about the outputs (policy), which are thereafter 
implemented. After implementation of the policy, the policy-maker receives feedback about 
the impact, results and consequences of the policy. The policy-maker makes a decision about 
further amendments or adaptation that may be necessary. Hanekom (1987:81) postulates that 
the systems model is also useful when analysing public policy as it provides information on: 
 Impact of variables on policy during the design phase; 
 Political policy influence on the environments; 
 Conversion of demands into policy; 
 Feedback process, and  
 Extent to which policy is adapted (or new policies are created), based on feedback.   
 
Figure 9:12 illustrates a simplified version of the systems model below: 




According to Easton’s (1979:29) input-output transformational systems model, a political 
system is made up of varying external and internal environments. Both these environments are 
considered and processed through a conversion mechanism. The outputs then lead to a 
feedback mechanism which provides information back to the external environment about the 
achievement or otherwise of the set goal. According to Easton (1979:29), where the goals are 
achieved and the environment is functional, the process can begin afresh whereby the input-
output transformational systems model can proceed in a continuous cycle. 
   
For Bayat and Ferreira (2008:79), organisations face internal and external environments which 
could be hostile and may negatively affect the survival of the organisation. Hence 
organisations should be prepared for such hostility and set goals appropriately. An adequate 
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response would be to identify weaknesses and opportunities to convert the hostile environment 
to the benefit of the organisation and the environment. Bayat and Ferreira (2008:79) hold that a 
SWOT analysis (analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) is conducted 
using a management process as a conversion mechanism to achieve the desired outcome. 
Figure 9.13 below illustrates an adapted version of Easton’s input/output transformational 
systems model:  
Figure 9.13: Systems Model for public management 
 
Source: Easton (1979:29), adapted by Ferreira (1996:81) 
 
According to Easton (1979:29), a dysfunctional external environment contains a need that has 
to be addressed. The process then flows thorough the internal environment which is dynamic, 
and which consists of varying value systems, ethical culture, other foundations and guidelines 
which act as a filtration process in order to establish and maintain standards of the current body 
politic, extant community values and legal compliance. The next phase of the process flow is 
the conversion mechanism, which is the administrative/management process of transforming 
the demands, problems and needs (inputs) into achieved goals (outputs). This phase comprises 
a variety of functions and options that are available to enable the organisation to satisfy the 




According to Wissink (in Fox et al., 1991:32), the systems model is valuable, inter alia, due to 
the framework that it provides, vis-à-vis, the links between the needs/demands/inputs, political 
system and the results/outcomes/outputs in order to render the system functional as well as 
recurrent. Cloete and Wissink (2000:39) equate the systems model to a “sausage machine” 
because of the structured application to the process of policy-making. Wissink (in Fox et al., 
1991:32) postulate that the model is silent about how the inputs are transformed into outputs 
and this aspect is regarded as the “black box” of the systems model process. The systems 
model fails to address the power relationships in the decision-making process, nor does it 
address the impact of political change on policy-making. According to Wissink (in Fox et al., 
1991:32), the systems model is premised on the presumption that the policy process is “logical 
and orderly”, whereas policy-making is impacted by varying aspects and activities.        
 
9.5 SHORTCOMINGS OF A SYSTEMS MODEL 
The views of Erasmus in Bayat and Meyer (1994:83-101) on the adoption of a systems 
approach as an absolute dogma deserve mentioning here. Erasmus in Bayat and Meyer 
(1994:84) holds that the systems approach only has real value when viewed in a less 
reductionist and ideologically predetermined manner.   
 
According to general systems theory, the typifying characteristic of the relationship between 
elements of systems is their propensity to maintain or restore a condition of equilibrium among 
all the elements. This characteristic, according to Erasmus in Bayat and Meyer (1994:88), may 
contribute to a distorted and possibly iniquitous view of the world.   
 
The causal linearity of a process comprising inputs, throughputs, outputs and feedback in 
dynamic interaction with a discernible environment fits in with the way the empirical world 
appears to function. In this manner, the systems theory brings complex processes within the 
cognitive reach of researcher and practitioners. It does so by reducing those processes to a 
single, predictable, causal unilinear process. Given the understanding that the system is 
assumed to exist, and because it is assumed to have an inherent inclination for equilibrium, 
systems theory enables the system to be readily understood. If one of the elements of the 
system changes, it is assumed that all the other elements will respond in such a manner that 
equilibrium within the system will be maintained. However, Erasmus, in Bayat and Meyer 
(1994:90), questions the validity of the view that any society consists of several inter-related 
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subsystems, and that such subsystems interact within an indeterminate cycle of mutual 
reciprocity that promotes and enables harmony and overall stability within the system. He 
substantiates this view by referring to Minzberg (1983:177), who states that each subsystem 
pursues its own dynamic ends, to the exclusion of other subsystems. As a result, subsystems 
often compete with overall system goals for primacy. 
 
Evidence of the above phenomenon within a system is furnished by Hult and Walcott (1990:2), 
with an explanation of the factors that led to the Challenger space shuttle accident on 28 
January 1986. One of the main reasons put forward for the occurrence of the disaster was 
extreme competition among the various sub-divisions of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) organisational structure charged with the shuttle program. These were 
the three field centres, the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, the Johnson 
Space Center near Houston, and the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Especially as the NASA 
budget grew leaner in the 1980s, these three organisational structures competed for resources 
and responsibilities and resisted sharing information or dividing and co-ordinating tasks. 
Ultimately, it was found that this lack of effective communication and lack of sharing of 
resources as well as a propensity of the various management structures within the three 
organisational sub-divisions to "... contain potentially serious problems and to attempt to 
resolve them internally rather than communicate them forward ... ", were the main causes of 
the accident.   
 
The above case study reiterates Minzberg's (1983:177) view that each subsystem within a 
system pursues its own dynamic ends, to the exclusion of other subsystems. Erasmus in Bayat 
and Meyer (1994:91-92) nevertheless accede that simply acknowledging the existence of 
assumptions and/or assertions that the systems theory is fallacious should not result in the 
whole systems approach being rejected. There can be little doubt that systems do exist, and that 
their elements are integrally related. Systems per se should, however, be viewed with a 
fundamental conceptualisation and empirically-driven consideration of the nature, limits and 
usefulness of systems theory and its contributing concepts. 
 
Bearing in mind the abovementioned inherent shortcomings of utilising a systems approach to 
explain phenomena, it is nevertheless proposed that the systems approach be used for the 
purpose of analysing phenomena relevant to this study. There could be numerous other 
approaches that could be used, but the researcher has selected this one for this study. This 
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proposal is made considering the particular circumstances of the South African situation, 
where the adoption of an easily-understood approach that may yield relatively rapid results in 
the short term, is regarded as suitable to facilitate understanding of complex social sciences. 
 
9.6 PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
In developing a conceptual model for preventing employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-
Natal, the input/output transformational systems model of Easton (1979:29) formed the basis 
for its creation. The proposed conceptual model is intended to provide a simplistic overview 
for the management of the complex subject of preventing employee fraud at universities in 
KwaZulu-Natal in a holistic manner. The proposed model should take into consideration the 
complexity of the influence that an environment has on a political system and should therefore 
be flexible and adaptable to the changing environment. Wissink (in Fox et al., 1991:32) avers 
that the policy process is not “logical and orderly” because it is influenced by other factors. 
The proposed model is intended to convert dysfunctionality with respect to fraud within 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal to enable employee fraud to be prevented. Due to the dynamic 
nature of the topic of this study, the proposed conceptual model is flexible and adaptable to the 
changing environments that affect each university. The proposed conceptual model for fraud 


















Figure 9.14: Adapted from input/output transformational systems model, by Easton (1979:29)   
 
Proposed conceptual model for fraud prevention at universities in KwaZulu-Natal 
 
9.6.1 Macro Environment 
According to Ferreira (1996:403), there are different types of environment which can affect an 
organisation. The macro (external) environment forms part of the “input” phase of the systems 
model. Easton (1965:113) holds that environmental input is an aspect which impacts a system 
from the outside of that system. The macro environment, that impact on organisations, should 
be considered as dysfunctional within the context of the systems model. In this proposed 
conceptual model, universities in KwaZulu-Natal should contemplate the following macro-
environmental factors: 
 Political 
The political landscape has an impact on the creation of policies as government 
responds to the demands and needs of the communities it serves. In this study, it 
was found that government has designed and implemented certain policies and 




 Legislative  
The legislative environment consists of common law and statutory law. This study 
has delved into the specific laws that have been promulgated to combat fraud and 
corruption within the country. Legislation, such as the Higher Education Act 101 
of 1997, specifically relates to universities and other institutions of higher 
education and stipulates how they should operate.  
 Socio/economic 
The societal demands and needs coupled with the economic environment directly 
impact the delivery of services to communities. These two factors influence the 
formulation of policy. The socio/economic impact should be considered by 
universities when designing and implementing policy to enable the achievement of 
goals that satisfy the needs and demands of the communities which are affected. 
 Technological 
Rapid technological advancement continues to influence and impact policy 
formulation. Due to the continual changes in the technological environment, 
government should regularly review policies and align these to the rapid evolution 
of technology. This study has found that fraudsters continuously adapt their modi 
operandi to evade detection by the authorities. Management should remain 
cognisant and vigilant about the impact of technology on policies.    
 Criminality  
Criminality has a direct impact on communities because it is linked to 
socio/economic factors such as unemployment and poverty. Fraud is an act of 
criminality as it is listed as an unlawful act in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977. Criminality affects both the public and private sectors. Government 
should consider the impact of criminality on service delivery during policy 
formulation. 
 Educational 
The Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 108 of 1996 dictates that every citizen of South Africa has a right to further 
education. Government is therefore expected to fulfil this obligation through 
policy formulation and resource allocation. Providing higher education to all 




9.6.2 Micro Environment 
The micro (internal) environment also has an impact on an organisation. The micro 
environment  forms part of the “input” phase of the systems model. The aspects that 
universities should consider in this micro environment phase are the following: 
 Constitutional dictates 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 is the supreme 
law of the country. All other subordinate laws should be aligned to the 
constitutional dictates. Policies that are not congruent with the constitutional 
dictates should not be designed and/or implemented. 
 Tenets of democracy 
The current democratic body politic in South Africa dictates that all citizens are 
expected to abide by the tenets of democracy. Policies should be formulated in 
consultation with people or interested parties who may be impacted. Government 
is accountable to the people who have elected them into power. The rule of law 
principle should be adhered to, and any changes that are required to be made to 
policies should follow a democratic path of consultation with the affected 
communities. 
 Governance principles  
Organisation should abide by the governance principles of fairness, accountability, 
responsibility and transparency. These four principles have an impact on the 
achievement of goals and should be considered during the policy formulation 
phase. Abiding by these governance principles is essential to combat fraud at 
universities. Sound governance is the cornerstone to service delivery. 
 Community requirements  
The requirements of the community are the foundation of policy formulation. It is 
essential to understand what the client (community) needs or demands. The 
community at the university comprises mainly parents, students and employees. 
Any political system should consider what the community requires to enable goal 
achievement that is sustainable. 
 Legal compliance 
Universities are affected by various legal prescripts. They must ensure compliance 
with administrative law requirements such as:  
o Intra vires, meaning within legal authority;  
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o Ultra vires, meaning beyond legal authority;  
o Bona fide, meaning done in good faith;  
o Mala fide, meaning done in bad faith, and  
o Audi alteram partem, meaning hear the other side. 
Compliance with legislation is not only a legal obligation but also a moral one. 
Universities should formulate policies and procedures that ensure and promote 
legal compliance. The risk of non-compliance with legislation should be 
considered when designing and implementing policy.  
 Competition 
The impact of competition among universities should be considered when 
formulating policy. Universities need to attract students to ensure that they remain 
relevant and sustainable. Universities do not have a captive market because 
students have a choice of which universities they want to attend. The quality of 
teaching, learning and research should be of a superior standard to enable the 
university to be competitive. This variable should also take into account the 
substantial number of applicants that are rejected at all universities each year. The 
reality is that universities are inundated with applications and are unable to 
accommodate all applicants. 
 Ethics 
Ethics is the cornerstone of sound governance. Universities should consider the 
risk of unethical conduct by staff and students within the systems model approach. 
A poor ethical culture sends a message to the community that the university has a 
poor governance environment. A sound ethical culture attracts donors and students 
to a university. 
 Fraud  
The results of this study have shown that universities are exposed to the risk of 
fraud. Fraud has an impact on the environment of a systems model. The 
debilitating effects of fraud on an organisation and its stakeholders should be 
considered when formulating policies. Fraud impedes the delivery of service to the 
community.   
 Suppliers 
Suppliers are essential in the service delivery chain. The impact that suppliers have 
on a systems model can be significant. Unscrupulous suppliers who commit fraud, 
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either in collusion with university employees or on their own, have a detrimental 
effect on the ability of the university to deliver a superior service to its 
stakeholders. The process of policy formulation should thus consider the role and 
impact of suppliers on service delivery. 
  
9.6.3 Transformation Mechanism 
The next phase in the systems model is the transformation (conversion) mechanism. According 
to Hanekom (1987:80), the conversion mechanism forms part of the output phase of the 
systems model. In this phase, the intervention entails addressing the demands, needs and 
problems identified in the environments by designing and implementing mechanisms to 
convert the situation from dysfunctionality to functionality. The dysfunctionalities are 
embedded in the external (macro) environments and, for effective and efficient goal 
achievement, are converted to functionality by the conversion mechanism (also known as the 
“black box”). The transformation mechanism in the proposed conceptual model involves the 
following: 
 SWOT analysis  
It is essential for Management to conduct an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats (SWOT) by which it is confronted. A SWOT analysis 
should form part of the initial step of the transformation mechanism and identify 
areas of focus. The results of this analysis should guide the designing of 
interventions by management and lead to the formulation of policies that are 
intended to satisfy the needs of the stakeholders.  
 Management oversight and policy formulation 
Management oversight is essential during the process of policy-making, planning, 
organising, leading and controlling. The findings of this study showed that there 
was a lack of management oversight, resulting in fraud being committed against 
the universities. In order to achieve the goals set out in the systems model, it is 
essential for management to maintain sound oversight over operations.   
 Methods and procedures 
It is essential, during the conversion process of the systems model, to design and 
implement effective policies. This study has found that certain policies contribute 
towards preventing fraud at universities. There are five policies that are 
recommended, namely, code of ethics, anti-fraud, whistle-blowing, conflict of 
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interest and gifts policy. It is not sufficient to design and implement policies 
without relevant and adequate procedures that need to be followed to ensure 
compliance with the policies. Management should concurrently design, implement 
and communicate a set of procedures for each policy to relevant stakeholders, to 
ensure compliance.    
 Resourcing 
Providing resources to enable management to give effect to the policy should be an 
essential consideration during the conversion phase of the systems model. 
Notwithstanding the costs of resourcing, management should ensure that 
prospective employees are adequately vetted prior to employment. A disciplinary 
code should govern the misconduct of employees. When policies and procedures 
are implemented they require oversight. In this regard, internal financial controls 
are essential to ensure that the objectives set by management are achieved. Internal 
controls can be costly, a factor which management should take this into 
consideration during the policy-making process. In the technological advanced 
environment in which universities operate, electronic systems are essential for 
service delivery. Such systems are also costly, another factor of which 
management should be cognisant. 
 Fraud risk management 
The management of fraud risk requires a holistic approach given the complexity of 
the crime. The management of fraud risks at universities should comprise five key 
components. This study has found that the assessment of fraud risks, designing and 
implementing a fraud prevention plan, forensic analysis of data, retaining a 
competent investigation capacity and providing fraud and ethics awareness 
training are essential to prevent employee fraud. A comprehensive fraud risk 
management strategy should include these five key components. 
 Governance 
This study has found that sound governance at universities should be supported by 
certain essential structures. Oversight bodies such as a Council and Audit and Risk 
committees are essential in ensuring that there is sound governance at the 
university. The Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 stipulates that universities 
should be governed by a Council, which should form any other committees that it 
deems necessary. The Council and its committees are assisted by functions such as 
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forensic services, internal audit and external audit. The roles of these entities are to 
provide assurance to Council and its committees about the governance of the 
university. The study has also found that governance should form part of a key 
performance area for management. The measurement of the performance of 
management should include assessing governance.  
 
9.6.4 Goal Achievement  
The goal achievement phase of the conceptual model is also regarded as the “output” phase. In 
this phase, the results of the interventions that were embarked on are reviewed to ensure that 
the goals that were envisaged have been achieved. According to Easton (1965:127), outputs are 
results that either address the need of the environment, or are adapted in order to satisfy the 
need. In order to achieve, maintain and enhance the prevention of employee fraud at 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal, the following goals should be achieved to satisfy this need: 
 Reports are received from the whistle-blowing facility; 
 Sound ethical culture; 
 Employees are trained and aware of fraud risks; 
 Enhanced internal control environment; 
 Fraud averse environment; 
 Reduced incidents of employee fraud; 
 Reduced value of losses due to employee fraud; 
 University is sustainable, and  
 Enhanced stakeholder confidence. 
 
9.6.5 Feedback   
The feedback phase forms a loop within the conceptual model. Easton (1965:128) avers that 
feedback is necessary for a system to respond appropriately about the existing conditions, the 
support being provided and the effect of the outputs. The feedback mechanism is a method to 
evaluate the results and inform the internal and external environments about the success or 
failure of the envisaged goal. Where the goals have been achieved, the continuous process will 
identify new demands, needs or problem which will require resolution. According to Cloete 
and Wissink (2000:39), the systems model approach is cyclical. It will commence afresh once 
new demands, needs or problems are identified. The feedback phase,  Easton (1965:129) states, 
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is intended to equip the relevant authorities when assessing the system to make adjustments, 
corrections or modifications to their existing decisions.  
 
9.6.6 Guitar Analogy to a Systems Model  
The guitar is analogous to an input/output transformational systems model. A guitar was 
chosen to depict a systems model in this study because it is a universal musical instrument. 
Guitars around the world are tuned in the exactly the same way, which enable a guitarist from 
anywhere in the world to play a guitar that is universally in tune. In the sections below, the 
analogy of a guitar to a systems model is explained. The input phase in the guitar involves 
tuning each specific string to a predetermined note. The transformation (conversion) phase 
takes place on the fret board of the guitar where the notes are played. The output phase is the 
sound that resonates from the belly of the guitar. The feedback phase would include the 
audience that receives the musical notes as sound.  
 
9.6.6.1 Input 
A guitar has to be well tuned to ensure that whatever musical notes a guitarist plays will satisfy 
the audience. Each string on a guitar is individually tuned to a predetermined note. Tuning 
each string in this manner enables the guitar to be in tune and ready for playing musical notes 
or chords. Such a process can be likened to a systems model which is impacted by various 
demands, needs and requirements from internal and external environments. 
 
9.6.6.2 Transformation  
In order to create musical sounds, the guitarist uses his/her fingers on the strings along the fret 
board to do so. The music could be either played note-by-note or in chords. Chords are a 
combination of strings that are pressed down by the guitarist using his fingers in a particular 
position on the fret board and then the strings are strummed together to create a musical note. 
This phase is comparable to the interventions that are implemented by policymakers (Council) 
and university employees in converting the inputs to outputs.   
 
9.6.6.3 Output  
The output phase embodies the release of sound from the belly of the guitar in the form of 
musical notes (output). The output is the result that is derived from tuning the strings (input) as 
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well as playing the musical notes or chords (transformation) on the guitar. The audience will 
either approve or disapprove of the music. The output phase is analogous to goal achievement 
where the environment may, for example, be satisfied that their needs have been met.   
 
9.6.6.4 Feedback 
As mentioned, the audience listens to the music from the guitar and either approves or 
disapproves of it. If the music is approved, then new melodies are played. Should the melodies, 
or the manner in which they were played, be disapproved of, it would warrant a rehearsal or 
changes to the process, such as re-tuning the guitar and/or playing different melodies that the 
audience prefers. The analogy of a guitar, when referring to a systems model, serves two 
purposes. Firstly, it depicts the input, transformation, output and feedback phases of a systems 
model. Secondly, it depicts an essential factor of “ethical tone” which is a vital foundation for 
a sound organisational culture. The Council of a university is regarded as a policy-maker for 
the university. Councils are tasked with setting a sound ethical tone at universities in KwaZulu-
Natal, like a well-tuned guitar. This conceptual model serves to emphasise the “tone at the top” 
advocated by King III (2009:11).  
 
9.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has explained the various models and theories that are available for use 
throughout the world. For purposes of this study, an adaptation of the input/output 
transformational systems model was designed and presented in this chapter. The conceptual 
model provides universities in KwaZulu-Natal with tools to prevent employee fraud. The 
results of this study have revealed that employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal should 
be addressed in a holistic manner. The implementation of a fraud risk management strategy has 
to be based on a multi-faceted approach rather than piecemeal. Universities should determine a 
practical approach when considering implementing this conceptual model.  
 
The next and final chapter provides a set of recommendations as a contribution to the existing 
body of knowledge, which would be valuable to universities in KwaZulu-Natal, in particular, 
and universities in general, to prevent employee fraud. Chapter Ten also provides a conclusion 







RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
10.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter highlights the significant findings emanating out of this study. These findings are 
related to the following research questions propelling this study: 
 What are the causes of employee fraud? 
 What is the current nature and extent of fraud committed by employees? 
 What fraud-prevention measures are currently in place to manage fraud at 
universities in general and those in KwaZulu-Natal in particular? 
 What additional fraud prevention measures could be recommended to universities 
for implementation at various levels? 
 
In line with the objectives of this study, recommendations are made in this chapter to narrow 
the gap between the current measures that are in place and additional measures required to 
prevent employee fraud at universities in general, and universities in KwaZulu-Natal in 
particular. Based on these findings, it is essential that a holistic approach is adopted to prevent 
employee fraud at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. The proposed conceptual model explained in 
Chapter Nine serves to simplify and complement the understanding of the recommendations 
intended to prevent employee fraud at universities.    
       
10.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
A summary of the significant findings of the study are highlighted in this section. These 
findings are explained under four headings in relation to the research questions.   
 
10.2.1 Findings on Causes of Employee Fraud 
This study has found that employee fraud continues to pose a risk to organisations globally 
and in all sectors of the economy with a concomitant increase in losses.  Universities are 
susceptible to employee fraud because the internal control environment is based on open-
ness, collegiality and academic freedom, which are fertile grounds for fraud because 
incompatible duties are not adequately segregated; explicit trust is placed on employees and 
there is a lack of management oversight and monitoring. This study also found that the 
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prevention of employee fraud requires more than a sound internal control environment. The 
ethical culture of an organisation also occupies an essential role in the fight against fraud. Just 
as business processes have evolved, it is essential for fraud prevention techniques and 
methodologies to keep pace with continuing change in the work environment.   
 
The perpetration of fraud by employees is enabled by a variety of factors that are necessary for 
it to be committed. These factors are financial pressure, opportunity, rationalisation and 
capability that a fraudster requires to commit fraud. The study has confirmed that employees 
commit fraud because of their greed for money. Fraudsters live beyond their means. Greed is 
regarded as the pressure or motivation to commit fraud. Fraudsters exploit deficient internal 
controls to commit fraud because this provides them the opportunity necessary to commit fraud 
without being easily detected. Employees rationalise their unlawful conduct vis-à-vis fraud, by 
convincing themselves that their wrongdoing is justified.  
 
10.2.2 Findings on the Nature of Employee Fraud 
Employees in the management and senior management cadre commit the most number of 
frauds within organisations. The use of computer technology has exposed organisations to 
increased risk of fraud. Fraud that involves collusion amongst employees or employees with 
suppliers is difficult to detect as they circumvent internal controls and conceal the fraudulent 
act. Trustworthy employees are not a control measure. Apart from the actual funds that are 
misappropriated, employee fraud affects organisations in various other ways such as legal 
costs, negative publicity, poor employee morale and costs to institute formal disciplinary 
procedures. There are two types of fraudsters: the predator fraudster and the accidental 
fraudster.  
 
Universities have suffered financial losses due to frauds. Fraudsters identified were found to 
work in a finance or procurement related role. They commit fraud by circumventing or over-
riding internal controls. The frauds relate to the procurement of goods/services, expense 
claims, falsification of documents/records, soliciting bribes and conflicts of interest. The value 






10.2.3 Findings on Current Fraud Prevention Measures 
Universities rely on current legislation, regulatory frameworks and anti-fraud organisational 
policies and procedures to prevent fraud. Whistle-blowing mechanisms are essential fraud 
prevention and detection initiatives. Although whistle-blowing is reactive in nature, that they 
could be reported also serves as a deterrent to potential fraudsters. Internal controls are 
essential to prevent fraud but are not the only anti-fraud intervention that is relied on by 
universities.  
 
This study has revealed that fraud is usually investigated by internal university employees. 
Management is responsible for designing and implementing internal controls. The study has 
also found that there is incongruence between the designing and implementing of internal 
controls due to the circumvention and over-ride of certain internal controls. The deficiency in 
this process is that management, which is responsible for designing and implementing internal 
controls, is also involved in violating them to commit fraud.  The non-compliance with the 
internal controls results in objectives not being achieved.  
 
Universities in KwaZulu-Natal have implemented adequate anti-fraud policies. Incompatible 
duties are adequately segregated. The responsibility for preventing fraud lies with 
management, internal auditors, external auditors and audit and risk committees. Employees 
who commit fraud are subjected to disciplinary action, criminal prosecution as well as civil 
litigation to recover losses. Continuous fraud awareness training is provided to university 
employees. 
 
10.2.4 Findings on Additional Fraud Prevention Measures 
It is essential for the focus of anti-fraud efforts to move from detection to prevention. There are 
various legislation, models and frameworks that are available which advocate a sound 
governance environment. Valuable information was collated, inter alia, from The Constitution 
of South Africa Act 108 of 1996; King III; the Batho Pele principles; National Development 
Plan 2030; the African Charter and other relevant literature related to preventing fraud at 
universities.  
 
The findings of this study have shown that policies and procedures are essential for 
preventing fraud. Sound governance requires organisations to have an independent audit 
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and risk committee. Internal audit departments are also a requirement but should report 
directly (functionally) to the Audit and Risk Committee in order to retain independence and 
objectivity. A sound ethical culture is the cornerstone of good governance, which is premised 
on a code of ethics for all employees. In order to inculcate a sound ethical culture at 
universities, executive management (leadership) is required to lead by example and regularly 
communicate a strong ethical culture to employees.  
 
Educating and training employees about fraud and the prevention thereof is also necessary. 
Red flags indicate the potential presence of fraud, of which employees should be made aware. 
Anonymous whistle-blowing hotlines are a valuable mechanism which enables employees 
and students to report suspicions of fraud. These reports should be investigated by competent 
forensic investigative personnel. Awareness about the existence of the whistle-blowing 
facility is essential for its success. 
  
A fraud risk management strategy that is developed and implemented should incorporate 
detection, investigation and prevention methodologies. Management has to play an active role 
in fraud prevention from an oversight and monitoring perspective. The assessment of fraud 
risks provides the university with insight into the root causes of fraud to enable it to 
implement mitigating controls. Internal controls are essential to prevent fraud and should be 
designed and monitored by management. It is necessary to conduct due diligence when 
employing people and contracting with third parties. The forensic analysis of data is also 
valuable especially when dealing with large volumes of data. Surprise fraud audits have been 
found to be an essential part of fraud prevention. It is essential for sound governance to 
provide recognition for good service, clean audits and well-run divisions, and should form 
part of the key performance areas of employees by which their performance is managed and 
measured. In order for fraud risk management to be sustainable, it is essential that this topic 
be incorporated into the curriculum of courses offered at universities.   
 
10.3 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY  
The recommendations outlined below are based on the findings of this study. These 
recommendations are intended to provide guidance to universities in KwaZulu-Natal on 
measures that should be implemented to prevent employee fraud. The recommendations 
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emanating from this study are in line with the objectives outlined in Chapter One and are 
explained in the sections below.   
 
10.3.1 Trust and Collegiality   
Although trust and collegiality are essential in maintaining a sound working environment at 
universities, these aspects require a degree of circumspection on the part of management. Trust 
is not an internal control because most employees who commit fraud exploit the trust and 
collegial relationship that they enjoy with their employer in order to commit fraud. 
Management should therefore exercise their professional scepticism during their oversight and 
review of operational activities, and not be blinded by trust and collegiality. The reluctance by 
management to review and monitor a subordinate’s work does not promote collegiality. This 
reluctance constitutes a breach in the internal control process of monitoring and reviewing 
compliance with policies and procedures. Raising awareness about this phenomenon should 
form part of ongoing fraud awareness education at universities. Internal auditors and forensic 
investigators should remain cognisant of this red flag when conducting an audit or 
investigation.   
 
10.3.2 Ethics 
An ethical culture should constitute the foundation of governance at universities. The Council 
of the university should approve a policy on ethical conduct. The implementation of the policy 
must be propelled from executive management who should also lead by example. This is 
regarded as setting the tone-at-the-top. In order to inculcate an ethical culture at the university, 
executive management should regularly communicate with employees about the policy on 
ethics and create awareness about ethical behaviour. The university should establish an Ethics 
Committee which should be chaired by a member of executive management. The committee 
should meet regularly to monitor the ethical landscape of the university. Each college or 
division should have an ethics champion who would ensure that the ethics policy is being 
regularly communicated and that management is leading by example. Non-compliance with 
the policy should be dealt with swiftly and decisively to serve as a deterrent to potential 






10.3.3 Fraud Committed by Management  
The Council of the university should take note of this concerning phenomenon, namely, fraud 
committed by management. Council should implement focused oversight over the conduct of 
management at the university. In this regard, Council should task its committees, such as the 
Audit and Risk Committee as well as the Finance Committee, to improve and enhance their 
oversight over the performance of management. Management should be dealt with 
appropriately should they be found to have over-ridden or circumvented internal controls to 
commit fraud against the university; such measures should include instituting disciplinary, 
criminal and civil action against them. Those tasked with preventing fraud at the university 
should focus on creating awareness among all staff about this phenomenon and implement 
initiatives for misconduct which is reported to executive management or to the vice-chancellor 
of the university should the fraud be committed by a member of executive management. 
Internal auditors and forensic investigators should be cognisant of this phenomenon when they 
scrutinise the internal control environment because unscrupulous members of management 
could intentionally design and implement weak internal controls with the objective of 
exploiting the deficiency to commit fraud. Council should inculcate an ethical culture at the 
university by obliging the university leadership to lead by example and taking stringent action 
against management who engage in dishonest and/or unethical behaviour.        
 
10.3.4 Red Flags  
Red flags serve as warning signs about the potential that employee fraud is or may be, 
occurring. Universities should make a list of these common red flags and alert employees 
about them during the fraud awareness education initiative. Although red flags may be found 
in a particular environment, they should not be regarded as conclusive evidence that fraud is 
taking place. The red flags depict typical behaviour displayed by fraudsters based on ongoing 
global research. Management should be circumspect when responding to such red flags, and if 
they are in doubt as to what they should do, they should refer their suspicions to those tasked 
with investigating suspected fraudulent behaviour. Internal auditors and forensic investigators 







10.3.5 Types of Fraud Schemes  
The common types of fraud schemes that universities should be vigilant about involve the 
procurement of goods and/or services, expense claim fraud, falsification of documents to 
commit fraud, theft of assets, soliciting bribes from suppliers/students and fraud involving a 
conflict of interest.  
 
Management should ensure that the procurement of goods and/or service is carried out in 
compliance with the procurement policy of the university. The university should have a 
procurement department which should be responsible for procuring goods and/or services on 
its behalf.  
 
Management should be vigilant when approving the expense claims of employees. A common 
fraudulent expense claim practice is to inflate mileage claims, per diem allowances or other 
expenses. In certain instances, employees submit falsified invoices or receipts to support their 
expense claims. It is recommended that management pre-authorise expenses so that they are 
not surprised when the expense claim is submitted to them for approval.  
 
It is recommended that management verify the authenticity of documents and ensure that they 
are aware of the activities that are taking place within their areas of operations. In instances 
where management is dissatisfied about the expenditure incurred, a telephone conversation or 
email communication with the supplier would be able to verify pertinent issues of concern that 
management may have.  
 
The risk of misappropriation (theft) of assets can be reduced by the implementation of an 
updated asset inventory listing, coupled with asset tagging and regular asset verification 
exercises. Management should also enhance the physical access system at the university to 
prevent the theft of assets. This access system could be implemented jointly with the security 
department at the university.    
 
Management should remain vigilant about employees who solicit bribes from suppliers or 
students. Excessive expenditure on a particular supplier should serve as a red flag which would 
require some degree of probing by management to determine the authenticity of transactions. 
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The university should ensure that a code of conduct is also applicable to suppliers and students 
and regularly communicated.   
 
Employees commit fraud because of a conflict of interest. The Council of the university should 
approve an appropriate policy relating to the declaration of interests for all stakeholders. 
Management should ensure that employees make regular declarations about any conflicts of 
interest that they have and which may impact the university. There should be a standard item 
on the agenda of all committee meetings where employees are required to declare any conflicts 
of interest. Universities must ensure compliance with Sections 27 and 34 of The Higher 
Education Act 101 of 1997, which requires members of Council and its committees as well as 
employees of universities respectively, to declare any conflicts of interest. Moreover, these 
stipulations must be discussed periodically to remind members of what having a conflict of 
interest means precisely, as often the negative response is made unthinkingly.  
 
10.3.6 Collusion  
Management should be alerted to the fact that collusion between employees and other 
employees or employees and suppliers/students to commit fraud is difficult to detect. It is 
recommended that internal controls are enhanced when collusion is suspected. Management 
should enhance its review and oversight over operations to deter employees who may be 
inclined to collude with others to commit fraud. Regular forensic analysis of large volumes of 
data will unearth potential fraudulent transactions. Regular fraud awareness education should 
be provided to employees in order to alert them to be vigilant about the risk of collusion and 
encourage them to report any suspicion about it to management, or to the whistle-blowing 
facility provided by the university. 
 
10.3.7 Policies 
To effectively address employee fraud, universities should design and implement policies and 




 Conflict of interest, and 
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 Gifts.  
In order for stakeholders to comply with these policies and procedures, it is essential for 
regular and continuous awareness training and education to be provided about these policies 
among stakeholders.  
 
10.3.8 Internal Controls 
Internal controls such as policies and procedures contribute towards preventing fraud. 
However, universities should remain cognisant of and vigilant about the potential for 
employees to collude with other employees or external parties to commit fraud by 
circumventing internal controls. In such instances, the strongest internal controls would not 
prevent a determined fraudster from perpetrating fraud. Internal controls are also rendered 
useless when management over-rides the internal controls to perpetrate fraud. Internal controls 
should be reviewed periodically to ensure that they remain adequate and effective for the 
purposes for which they were intended. The internal audit department is appropriately skilled 
to provide assurance to the university about the adequacy and effectiveness of internal 
controls. 
 
10.3.9 Audit and Risk Committee  
Universities should have an independent Audit and Risk Committee that reports directly to the 
Council of the university. Council should ensure that the members of this committee possess 
the requisite competence to serve on the committee. The Audit and Risk Committee should 
have unfettered access to the Internal Audit Department.  It should have a charter, which 
should set out its terms of reference and guide its approach. 
 
10.3.10 Internal Audit  
Internal Audit should be urged to consider the existence of fraud when conducting their audits 
within the university environment. The traditional role of “tick and bash” to verify compliance 
with policies and procedures by internal auditors is inadequate in detecting and preventing 
fraud.  Internal Audit departments at universities should also consider broadening their 
traditional role to include educating and advising management about the internal control 
environment. Internal Audit should provide an advisory service to management about 
designing the internal control environment. Management should be educated about designing 
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internal controls in a structured manner while considering the risk of fraud. This will assist 
management in pursuing a structured approach in designing, implementing and monitoring 
internal controls that detect and/or prevent fraud. Internal Audit should liaise with External 
Audit about the outcome of the internal audit projects insofar as they may impact on the 
external audit process. Internal Audit must produce work of a requisite quality that would 
provide assurance to External Audit, and not result in a duplication of effort.  
 
10.3.11 External Audit 
External Audit should consult with Internal Audit and Forensic Audit about the nature and 
extent of fraud, in line with the ISA 240 requirement, where it is expected that External Audit 
considers the risk of material mis-statement in the financial statements due to fraud and error, 
when planning and conducting the external audit process. External Audit should not unduly 
duplicate the effort of Internal Audit, which also has a role to play in providing assurance 
about the strength and effectiveness of the internal control environment.  
 
10.3.12 Whistle-Blowing  
Information about the whistle-blowing facility, coupled with advice about how to report fraud, 
should be provided to all stakeholders by the university. Stakeholders may be in possession of 
valuable information about fraudulent activities but are unaware of how to report them. A 
successful whistle-blowing system should cater for anonymity and confidentiality, and 
preferably be independently operated. Whistle-blowers need to be assured that the university 
will protect them from any harm due to the reports they make. The key to the success of a 
whistle-blowing facility lies in the manner in which awareness is created about its existence as 
well as the manner in which the university responds to the anonymous reports from whistle-
blowers. 
 
10.3.13 Criminal Prosecution  
Fraud is a criminal offence and should be reported to the SAPS so that the perpetrator can be 
prosecuted and punished for his/her deed. Management at the university is obliged to report 
incidents of fraud to the SAPS who will investigate the allegations and liaise with the relevant 
criminal court about the prosecution of the perpetrator. Failure by the Vice-Chancellor of the 
university to report fraud and related corrupt activities, in terms of Section 34 (1) (b) of the 
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Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004, is deemed unlawful and 
renders him/her liable to be prosecuted.  
 
10.3.14 Disciplinary Action 
The university should design and implement a disciplinary code, which stipulates that fraud is 
regarded as serious misconduct. The disciplinary code should also stipulate the sanction that 
could be imposed on the fraudster. Dishonesty is the sine qua non of fraud. Therefore, an 
irretrievable breakdown in the trust relationship between the employer and employee justifies 
the termination of employment. Disciplinary action should be instituted after completion of the 
internal investigation and after a forensic report has been issued. The Human Resources 
Department of the university should be consulted before the commencement of the disciplinary 
process because they are in a position to advise, inter alia, on the compilation of charges and 
the suspension from duty of the perpetrator.   
 
10.3.15 Loss Recovery 
The recovery of the financial loss should form part of the investigation process at the 
university. The fraudster should be requested to reimburse the university the misappropriated 
funds. If the fraudster is in agreement to repay the university, then an “acknowledgement of 
debt” document should be compiled and signed in consultation with the Legal Department of 
the university. Universities can rely on Section 37D (1) (b) (ii) of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 
1956 to recover the loss from the pension or retirement fund of the fraudster. A written 
acknowledgment is required from the fraudster or a judgement from a court of law. The 
university should ensure that its insurance policy covers infidelity by employees, because the 
financial loss sustained by the university due to employee fraud, could be recovered from the 
insurers. Alternatively, universities could litigate against the fraudster and recover the financial 
loss by judgement from a civil court. In such a litigation claim for damages, the university 
could include the costs incurred for investigating the fraud as well as legal costs. A further 
alternative available to the university is to request the criminal court that is prosecuting the 
fraudster to issue a “compensation order” in terms of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure 






10.3.16 Due Diligence  
Due diligence is essential before employing a person and before contracting with a supplier. 
The university should implement a policy that sets out the process that should be followed 
during the recruitment and selection of a potential employee. The objective is to employ a 
person who meets all the minimum requirements for the position that s/he has applied for. 
Management should be cognisant of the risk that potential candidates may submit falsified 
information and/or documents in support of their application for employment. The Human 
Resources Department at the university should ensure that thorough and careful vetting is 
conducted before an individual is offered a position at the university. The verification process 
should include, inter alia, independent reference checks (calling the previous employer 
directly), previous salary earned, authenticity of qualifications and the reasons for termination 
of previous employment. In an endeavour to address employee fraud, universities should also 
consider remunerating employees appropriately, as well as devising retention strategies.     
Before conducting due diligence on suppliers, the university should implement a procurement 
policy which stipulates how the Procurement Department should vet potential suppliers before 
authorising them to become registered suppliers to the university. The vetting process should 
be carried out carefully and thoroughly. Some of the credentials that should be requested from 
the potential supplier should include, inter alia, the company registration certificate, VAT 
clearance certificate and an original letter from the bank indicating the banking account details.   
 
10.3.17 Legislation  
In addressing employee fraud, the university should ensure that it complies with all relevant 
legislation. Compliance with the following relevant sections of legislation is essential: inter 
alia, Sections  29 and 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996; 
Section 27 of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997;  Schedule 1 of the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998; Section 1 of the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000; 
Section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004; Section 129 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and Section 37 of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956.  
 
10.3.18 Frameworks 
There are various frameworks that are available globally which universities should refer to 
when designing a holistic fraud risk management framework to prevent employee fraud. The 
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frameworks that are listed below provide a broad perspective on preventing fraud to ensure 
that the approach of the university is holistic in this regard. Universities should refer, inter alia, 
to the following: 
 KPMG Fraud Risk Management Model: 
o Fraud Prevention 
o Ongoing Process  
 COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework: 
o Control Environment 
o Risk Assessment 
o Control Activities  
 King III Code on Corporate Governance: 
o Ethical Leadership and Corporate Citizenship 
o Audit Committees 
o Governance of Risk 
o Internal Audit.   
 
10.3.19 Investigation Capacity 
The university must respond to allegations of fraud that are reported, by either having the 
matter investigated by dedicated university employees, engaging external investigators and/or 
referring the matter to the SAPS. The allegation of fraud should be investigated by individuals 
who are competent to do so due to the inherent risks present in addressing a complex crime 
such as fraud. All forensic investigations into fraud should be dealt with sensitively and 
confidentially and within the ambit of the law.   
 
10.3.20 Fraud Risk Management  
The management of fraud risks should be allocated to a particular department at the university 
that has the necessary expertise to address the inherent complexity of fraud. The fraud risk 
management strategy should be holistic and include interventions aimed at detecting, 
preventing and responding to fraud. In support of the strategy, it is essential that the university 
designs and implements a fraud prevention plan. Interventions such as forensic data analysis, 




10.3.21 Fraud Awareness Education 
Universities should embark on a comprehensive fraud awareness education campaign. The 
objective is to educate stakeholders on how to identify fraudulent schemes, how to report them 
and how they will be dealt with by the university. The information provided in the 
presentations should be compiled in such a manner that the information is not used by 
fraudsters to hone their modus operandi in order to evade detection. Universities should also 
consider publishing a regular anti-fraud newsletter for employees and students.  
 
10.3.22 Performance Assessment  
In pursuit of sound governance at universities, it is recommended that the assessment of the 
performance of managers also includes the measurement of incidents of fraud that occurred 
within their internal control environment. Universities should consider including governance as 
a key performance area for all managers, which should include ethical lapses, fraud, theft, 
corruption and other related irregularities that occurred within their areas of operations. These 
lapses should result in a financial penalty against the managers in relation to the performance 
management process vis-à-vis the payment of performance bonuses. 
 
10.3.23 Course Curriculum  
Universities should consider offering fraud risk management as a module within the 
curriculum for degrees related to auditing, accounting and law. According to Larson (2006:16), 
little is being done by tertiary institutions to incorporate forensic accounting concepts into their 
curricula in order to provide undergraduates with fraud prevention skills. The gap in the 
curricula of universities could possibly be addressed by creating a partnership between 
universities and the ACFE, which has embarked on an “Anti-Fraud Education Partnership” 
initiative with universities throughout the world. The ACFE provides certain resources for the 
fraud examination course to universities at no cost. 
 
10.4 CONCLUSION 
The recommendations in this chapter are based on data that were collated from various sources 
during this study. This chapter provides recommendations that could be implemented by 
universities without significant effort or resources. It is accepted without contestation that 
employee fraud is currently negatively impacting the financial viability of universities. In 
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conclusion, the findings of this study have provided a profound understanding of employee 
fraud and prevention strategies at universities in KwaZulu-Natal, and have broadened our 
insight into the modi operandi of both fraudsters and universities. 
 
The objectives of this study were to gain increased knowledge and understanding of fraud at 
universities and to establish the causes as well as the nature and extent of fraud committed by 
employees. The study also aimed to establish the additional measures that were implemented 
by universities to prevent fraud. Appropriate theoretical criteria were identified for fraud 
prevention and were included in the conceptual model and set of recommendations to 
universities for implementation. The empirical survey was conducted to determine the extent 
of employee fraud and related factors at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. The results of the 
statistical analysis and recommendations are intended to address the dysfunctional situation 
around fraud as set out in the problem statement. The conceptual model and these 
recommendations are proposed for fraud prevention at universities in general and in KwaZulu-
Natal in particular. 
 
Chapter One highlighted the need to combat fraud due to its ubiquitous nature and the negative 
impact it has on organisations throughout the world. Internal controls were not found to be the 
only solution to prevent fraud. Inculcating an ethical culture within the university would also 
contribute towards preventing fraud. Trust and collegiality are essential but require some 
circumspection when dealing with fraudulent conduct in the workplace. 
 
Chapter Two delved into the history and origins of fraud. In the early years, control 
mechanisms were designed and implemented to prevent fraud. It was found that fraud 
prevention interventions should keep up with the changing business landscape because fraud 
has become more sophisticated in recent times. Internal controls are not the only solution to 
combat fraud. Fraud is committed in a variety of ways but the hallmarks of fraud are the act, 
conversion and concealment.  
 
Chapter Three expounded the theoretical concepts of fraud, including discussion of some 
popular models. The nature and extent of employee fraud as well as the modi operandi and 
motives of fraudsters were elaborated upon. This chapter also dealt with the profiling of typical 
fraudsters and the red flags for which we need to be vigilant. This study found that lapses in 
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the ethical culture within organisations need to be addressed. A significant finding was that 
most of the frauds were committed by senior management.  
 
In Chapter Four, the need for preventing fraud was emphasised. It is essential that 
organisations inculcate a sound ethical culture. In this regard, a code of ethics was identified as 
critical for preventing fraud at universities; furthermore, this code should be well 
communicated to all employees, clients, suppliers and other stakeholders. The study also found 
that the leadership of an organisation should lead by example and set a high standard of ethical 
conduct. Legislation, regulatory frameworks and anti-fraud policies and procedures are 
essential for combating fraud. This chapter also highlighted the value of whistle-blowing as a 
fraud prevention initiative.  
 
Chapter Five explored the origins of internal controls as a fraud prevention measure. Certain 
frameworks relating to internal controls were examined, as well as the nature and objectives of 
internal controls, and their design and implementation. The COSO Internal Control Integrated 
Framework was explained with respect to constructs that were selected for this study.  
 
Chapter Six dealt with the theoretical and historical perspectives of corporate governance. 
Corporate governance is an integral part of fraud risk management. This chapter also 
expounded on various relevant legislation. Governance was discussed from the perspective of 
King III; Batho Pele principles; the National Development Plan 2030 and the African Charter, 
with respect to addressing fraud and corruption. 
 
Chapter Seven dealt with the methods that were used in the study to collect, analyse and 
interpret the data. The participation by senior members of universities in this study provides 
confidence about the findings. The involvement of knowledgeable individuals as well as the 
collection of data from fraud case files contributed towards validity and reliability.     
 
Chapter Eight contained the interpretation, presentation and articulation of the results of the 
statistical analysis of data collected from the survey questionnaire; face-to-face interviews that 
were conducted with knowledgeable individuals; review of fraud case files and the literature 
search. The findings showed conclusively the causes and nature of employee fraud. The 
findings also revealed what measures were implemented by universities to prevent fraud. They 
too showed the type of fraud prevention measures that should be implemented by universities. 
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Universities are undoubtedly victims of fraud and they incur a financial loss due to employee 
fraud. Management was found to be involved in committing fraud against the university. This 
chapter also highlights the best practice governance practices that universities should 
implement to prevent fraud.  
 
Chapter Nine expounded on the various fraud prevention models that are available. The 
adaptation of the input/output transformational systems model was used to design and present a 
conceptual model. The conceptual model, which uses the guitar as an analogy, provides a 
holistic approach to fraud prevention at universities in KwaZulu-Natal. This chapter highlights 
the need for a multi-faceted approach to fraud risk management.  
 
Based on the findings and recommendations of this study, the proposed way forward is that 
universities in KwaZulu-Natal revisit their current fraud risk management strategy and 
approach, and compare it to the recommendations of this study. Should any gaps be found in 
the current approach of these universities, management should consider implementing the 
recommendations.    
 
Researchers in the field of fraud risk management may wish to conduct further research in this 
area or use this research thesis as a point of reference. Due to the complexity of the phenomena 
expounded in this investigation, further study is recommended based on the outcomes of this 
research, which could serve as a stepping-stone towards finding solutions to the global 
incidence of these crimes. This study highlighted the need for a holistic approach to preventing 
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Biographical and employment information of participant: 
  
A1 Gender 
Male  Female  
  
A2 What is your highest qualification? 
Post Doctoral Degree  
Doctoral Degree  
Masters Degree  
Honours Degree  
Bachelors Degree  
National Diploma  
Other  
  
A3 What is your job category? 
Executive Management  
Senior Management  
 
A4 How long have you been in your current position? 
1 year  
2 years  
3 years  
4 years  
5 years  




Indicate your opinion as to what were the underlying causes of fraud committed by 
employees: 
 












I believe that the university has 
been a victim of fraud 
committed by employees since 
2013. 
     
B2 
I believe that dishonesty is a 
trait of fraudsters. 
     
B3 
I believe that fraudsters 
exploited their superior’s trust. 
     
B4 
I believe that greed was the 
motive of the fraudsters. 




I believe that inadequate 
internal controls led to 
employees committing fraud. 
     
B6 
I believe that poor ethical 
culture led to employees 
committing fraud. 
     
B7 
I believe that other factors led 
to employees  committing 
fraud. 




Indicate the frequency with which the following items regarding the nature of fraud have 
occurred: 
 
No. Statement / question Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
C1 
The university suffered 
financial loss due to frauds 
committed since 2013. 
     
C2 
The fraudsters worked in a 
finance or procurement related 
role. 
     
C3 
The fraudsters colluded with 
other staff and / or third parties 
to commit fraud. 
     
C4 
The fraudsters circumvented 
internal controls to commit the 
fraud. 
     
C5 
The internal controls were 
overridden by the fraudsters to 
commit the fraud. 
     
C6 
The frauds were disguised to 
appear normal 
     
C7 
The frauds related to 
procurement of goods/services. 
     
C8 
The frauds related to expense 
claims. 
     
C9 
The frauds related to the 
falsification of documents / 
records. 
     
C10 
The frauds related to a 
misuse/misappropriation of 
university resources. 
     
C11 
The frauds related to 
solicitation of bribes from 
suppliers / students. 
     
C12 
The frauds related to a conflict 
of interest. 
     
C13 The value of each fraud was      
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below R100 000. 
C14 
The fraudsters were members of 
management. 




Indicate your agreement with the following statements regarding measures that are in 
place to prevent fraud: 
 












Allegations of fraud are usually 
investigated by internal 
university staff. 
     
D2 
Management is generally 
responsible for designing and 
implementing internal controls. 
     
D3 
The university has adequate 
policies which address fraud 
risks. 
     
D4 
Adequate fraud prevention 
workshops are held within 
affected departments at the 
university after conclusion of 
fraud investigations. 
     
D5 
I believe that the internal 
controls at the university are 
robust enough to prevent fraud. 
     
D6 
Management adopts a 
structured approach when 
designing internal controls. 
     
D7 
Internal controls prevent fraud 
from occurring at the 
university. 
     
D8 
Incompatible duties are 
adequately segregated at the 
university to prevent fraud from 
occurring. 
     
D9 
I believe that the university 
conforms to the universal 
governance principles of 
fairness, accountability, 
responsibility and transparency 
in the way in which it operates. 
     
D10 
Management is responsible for 
preventing fraud at the 
university. 




Internal auditors are responsible 
for preventing fraud at the 
university. 
     
D12 
External Auditors are 
responsible for preventing fraud 
at the university. 
     
D13 
Audit & Risk Committees are 
responsible for preventing fraud 
at the university. 
     
D14 
The university manages fraud 
risks in a systematic manner. 
     
D15 
The fraud risk management 
process of the university is 
effective. 
     
D16 
The university takes adequate 
action to recover losses from 
fraudsters. 
     
No. Statement / question Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
D17 
The university takes 
disciplinary action against 
fraudsters.  
     
D18 
The university criminally 
prosecutes fraudsters. 
     
D19 
The university provides fraud 
awareness training to staff. 




Indicate your agreement with the following statements regarding the implementation of 
global best practices in order to prevent fraud: 
 












The university should have an 
internal audit department. 
     
E2 
The university should have an 
independent audit and risk 
committee. 
     
E3 
The university should have a 
code of ethics for all staff. 
     
E4 
The university should provide 
an anonymous whistle blowing 
hotline to enable staff and 
students to report suspicions of 
fraud. 
     
E5 
Executive Management should 
regularly communicate a strong 
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ethical culture to staff. 
E6 
Management should investigate 
matters reported to it via the 
whistle blowing facility. 
     
E7 
The university should conduct 
adequate ongoing identification 
and assessment of significant 
fraud risks (including root 
cause analysis and 
implementing mitigating 
controls). 
     
E8 
Management should design and 
implement internal controls and 
monitor these on an ongoing 
basis. 
     
E9 
Governance at the university 
should be based on current best 
practice. 
     
E10 
The university should conduct 
due diligence when employing 
staff. 
     
E11 
The university should conduct 




     
E12 
The university should create 
awareness about the existence 
of the whistle blowing facility 
to staff and students. 
     
E13 
The university should conduct 
forensic data analytics in order 
to detect fraud amongst large 
volumes of data. 
     
E14 
The university should conduct 
surprise fraud audits. 




Kindly answer these questions by providing your opinion:   
 





















F4 Which internal controls were found to be deficient; and provided the opportunity for 






F5 What enhanced internal controls are in place to prevent fraud from  recurring? 
 ______________________________________________________________________
 ______________________________________________________________________
 ______________________________________________________________________  
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
 




































SCHEDULE 1 OFFENCES 
 
Criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of 1977) 










Assault, when a dangerous wound is inflicted. 
Arson 
Breaking or entering any premises, whether under the common law or a statutory provision, 
with the intent to commit an offence. 
Theft, whether under the common law or a statutory provision. 
Receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen. 
Fraud 
Forgery or uttering a forged document knowing it to have been forged. 
Offences relating to the coinage. 
Any offence, except the offence of escaping from lawful custody in circumstances other than 
the circumstances referred to immediately hereunder, the punishment wherefor may be a 
period of imprisonment exceeding six months without the option of a fine. 
Escaping from lawful custody, where the person concerned is in such custody in respect of any 
offence referred to in the Schedule or is in such custody in respect of the offence of escaping 
from lawful custody. 
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